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SUMMARY STATEMENT 
This final report presents and discusses national survey findings from a collaborative and 
cross-national research project undertaken by Griffith University (Australia) and Cardiff 
University (UK) examining public risk perceptions, understandings and responses to the 
threat and unfolding impacts of climate change in Australia and Great Britain. The Australian 
national survey was undertaken between 6 June and 6 July, 2010 and involved a 
representative and geographically and demographically stratified national sample of 3096 
respondents.  The British survey was undertaken between 6 January and 26 March, 2010 and 
involved a representative quota sample of 1822 respondents residing in England, Scotland 
and Wales. These articulated surveys were distinctive in their cross-national comparative 
collaboration, in their psychological and social science nature, focus, and design, in their in-
depth nature, and in their focus on underlying public understandings and psychological 
responses to climate change. 
This report addresses common findings from these two linked surveys, and expands 
discussion of issues and findings from the Australian survey. A report detailing the UK 
survey findings is available separately (Spence, Venables, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Demski, 
2010).  As well as shared questions and objectives, each survey had additional and differing 
objectives, with the Australian survey also examining in more detail public risk perceptions, 
direct exposure and experience, and psychological responses and impacts to natural disasters.  
The British survey examined in more detail respondents’ perceptions of energy policies and 
futures for the United Kingdom. The Australian survey also differed in that it was specifically 
designed and planned to establish a data base and research platform for documenting and 
monitoring climate-related changes and impacts in the human landscape over time, including 
changes in risk perceptions and understandings, psychological responses, and changes in 
psychological adaptations and impacts. 
Public Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses to Climate 
Change and Natural Disasters in Australia and Great Britain 
At a sample size of 3,096 and assuming random selection, reported proportions are accurate 
to within maximum of  +1.76%. (Illustrative 95% confidence intervals are 1.06% at a 10% or 
90% finding, 1.61% at a 30%/70% finding, and 1.76% at a 50%/50% finding). 
NOTE: All results show percentages among all respondents, unless otherwise labeled. Totals 
may occasionally sum to more than 100 percent due to rounding. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
What follows is a distillation and summary of more noteworthy findings of the Australian 
national survey undertaken by Griffith University researchers between 6 June and 6 July, 
2010, as part of a joint cross-national survey exercise with Cardiff University’s 
Understanding Risk Research Centre in Britain.  The respective national survey sample sizes 
were 3096 for Australia and 1822 for Britain, with these samples being geographically and 
demographically representative.  The Australian sample was further stratified by regional 
exposure to projected climate change impacts, extreme weather vulnerability, and gender.  
This final report follows an interim report released on 1 June, 2011, and constitutes a more 
comprehensive and detailed research report and monograph, including many Australia-
specific findings, broader comparison data, methodological and statistical details and 
background information, and a particular focus and emphasis on descriptive, quantitative, and 
comparative research findings and their interpretation.  A selection and discussion of more 
qualitative research findings are also included.   
The researchers from Australia and Britain are all applied psychologists and social and 
behavioural scientists with convergent interests and expertise relating to the phenomenon and 
threat of global climate change, and in particular public risk perceptions, understandings, 
adaptation responses, and the documentation and monitoring of the psychological and social 
impacts of climate change.  The likely audience for this report is quite diverse, including 
fellow climate change researchers, our funding bodies, federal and state level government 
policy advisers, the Pacific region authors of the next IPCC Report, multiple organisational 
end users, interested individuals, and an international research community.  We have 
attempted to write a report and monograph which will be accessible and meaningful across 
this wide spectrum of interest, and have provided a selective glossary of terms in those cases 
where terms or phrases might not be familiar to some readers and where there exist problems 
of language use and meaning across disciplinary boundaries, and with respect to both 
historical and emergent cultures of use. 
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
Findings from this collaborative research were striking in a number of respects:  
1. Despite dramatic differences in geographic regions, climate, climate change exposure, 
and recent histories of extreme weather events, the findings from Australia and Great 
Britain across most risk perception, belief, and concern domains were remarkably 
similar. 
2. Belief and acceptance of climate change among respondents was very high, with this 
acceptance including acknowledgment of some level of human causality for the vast 
majority of respondents. 
3. Public concern levels with respect to the threat and perceived impacts of climate 
change were also very high. 
4. Australian respondents viewed climate change as a more immediate, proximal, and 
certain threat to their local region and nation than was the case for British 
Climate Change Risk Perceptions, Understandings and Responses 
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respondents, for whom the problem was perceived to be more distant, uncertain, and 
less familiar in terms of anticipated consequences. 
5. A distinctive minority of Australian respondents, approximately 6.5%, could be 
characterised as being disbelievers or strong sceptics with respect to the reality of 
current climate change and/or the causal role of human activities and environmental 
impacts. The comparable figure for British respondents who could be characterised as 
being disbelievers or strong sceptics was 4.0%. 
6. Research findings for Australian respondents suggest an important nexus between 
climate change and natural disasters/extreme weather events in public perceptions and 
understandings, as evidenced by respondents’ comments about, descriptions, and 
anticipations, which reflect understandings of climate change in terms of extreme 
weather events and natural disaster manifestations and consequences. 
7. Extent of prior direct experience with extreme weather events and natural disasters for 
Australian respondents showed consistent but modest positive relationships with 
climate change-related psychological variables such as belief, concern, psychological 
adaptation, psychological distress, and behavioural engagement. 
8. Direct experience with salient environmental changes or events which respondents 
attributed to climate change evidenced much stronger positive relationships across all 
psychological measures than was the case for prior disaster and extreme weather 
event experience. 
9. Survey findings suggest that Australians are clearly adapting to the threat and 
perceived environmental impacts of climate change by way of changes in thinking, 
feelings, risk perceptions and appraisals, motivations, and other psychological and 
behavioural responses to climate change.  
10. Survey findings also suggest that the Australian public has been experiencing a range 
of psychological impacts relating to the threat of climate change, with these impacts 
in turn associated with psychological adaptation processes and behavioural responses. 
ADDITIONAL CROSS-NATIONAL FINDINGS 
11. Seventy-four percent of Australian respondents and 78% of British respondents 
reported believing ‘that the world’s climate is changing’, with 8% in both countries 
reporting ‘not knowing’. 
12. Seventy-one percent of Australian respondents either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘tended to 
agree’ with the statement, “I am certain that climate change is really happening”. 
13. Ninety percent of Australian respondents and 89% of British respondents believed 
that human activities were playing a causal role in climate change. 
14. Fifty-four percent of Australian respondents and 41% of British respondents believed 
that they were already experiencing the effects of climate change.  In open-ended 
survey items Australian respondents provided many examples of direct encounters 
with what they viewed as evidence of climate change. 
15. Sixty-six per cent of Australian respondents and 71% of British respondents reported 
that they were ‘very concerned’ or ‘fairly concerned’ about climate change, with an 
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additional 22% and 19% respectively, i.e., totals of 88% and 90% respectively, 
indicating some level of concern. 
16. Australian and British respondents reported being only slightly less concerned with 
respect to the personal impacts of climate change, with 62% of Australian and 60% of 
British respondents reporting that they were either ‘very concerned’ or ‘fairly 
concerned’.  
17. Survey findings suggest that the majority of both Australian and British respondents 
feel that despite clear difficulties and challenges, their actions can make a difference, 
and that the issue of climate change is serious, urgent, and personally relevant.  
Taken as a whole, these Australia/Great Britain comparison findings indicate striking 
similarities, high levels of climate change concern, and strong belief in both national survey 
samples that human activities are in part responsible for current global climate change.  These 
findings also suggest that media coverage of public perceptions and responses to the threat of 
climate change is often very wide of the mark, and that reported declines over the past several 
years in public acceptance and concern about climate change and its relative importance as an 
environmental issue and threat have been overstated.   
AUSTRALIA-SPECIFIC RESEARCH FINDINGS: 
Belief and concern about climate change and other environmental risks 
18. Structural equation modeling identified numerous predictors of belief in climate 
change, with strong linkages from beliefs through distress and self-efficacy to 
psychological adaptation, and from there to behavioural engagement. 
19. Seventy-one percent of Australian respondents reported that their level of concern 
about climate change had increased over the preceding two years. 
20. Reasons given for reported increased concern were predominately: increased 
awareness about the nature, magnitude, and possible consequences of climate change; 
media coverage of climate change; lack of action by government on climate change; 
and the perceived increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters and extreme 
weather events. 
21. Seventy-eight percent of Australian respondents agreed that, “If nothing is done to 
reduce climate change in the future, it will be a ‘very serious’ or ‘somewhat serious’ 
problem for Australia”. 
22. When asked, “How serious a problem do you think climate change is right now?” 
45% of Australian respondents reported that it was a serious problem. 
23. Twenty-seven percent of respondents reported thinking about the issue of climate 
change either ‘a great deal’ or very often. 
24. Forty-eight percent of Australian respondents reported that the issue of climate 
change was ‘extremely’ or ‘very’ important to them personally.   
25. The relative concern ranking of climate change as compared with other environmental 
threats for Australian respondents nation-wide was eighth out of a provided list of 13 
environmental risks, with water scarcity, drought, and threatened environmental 
quality and sustainability coming first, second, and third in this rank ordering of mean 
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concern ratings.  All environmental risks, however, including climate change, 
received high mean concern ratings. 
26. Water scarcity and drought were the most salient and often-mentioned environmental 
threats in response to open-ended survey questions.  However, all natural disaster and 
environmental threats appeared to be of high salience and concern for the majority of 
respondents. 
27. Relative concern levels respecting differing environmental risks nonetheless reflected 
regional exposure and experience. In cyclone-prone northern coastal communities, for 
example, respondents’ highest concern levels were given to cyclones, severe storm 
activity, and species extinctions, with threatened environmental quality and 
sustainability coming fourth. 
Knowledge of climate change 
28. Respondent objective knowledge levels about matters relating to the underlying 
science of climate change and projected impacts were modest, with respondents 
getting, on average, four to five out of 10 true/false/don’t know statements about 
climate change correct.
29. Respondent understandings of climate change were both distinct from and more than 
objective knowledge of climate change science explanations for climate change.  
These understandings included important emotional responses; responsibility, human 
agency, and moral dimensions; personal experiential understandings of environmental 
change and extreme weather events; and cultural and symbolic associations.
Trust 
30. In response to the question, “How much do you trust what different sources say about 
the environment?” 50% of respondents answered ‘completely’ or very substantially in 
the case of ‘scientists’.  Comparison figures for the media and for government for 
complete or substantial trust were only 5% and 8% respectively.
Responsibility 
31. Many respondents made reference to a felt moral responsibility in answering an open-
ended question concerning reasons for engaging in pro-environmental behaviours, 
with responses such as ‘doing my bit’, ‘making a difference’, ‘making a contribution’, 
and ‘doing the right thing’ constituting the second highest category of self-reported 
motivations. 
Political affiliation comparisons 
32. Political affiliation, as measured by voting intention ‘if there was a Federal election 
tomorrow’, was an important consideration across many key variables for Australian 
respondents.  While 73.6% of Labor preference respondents were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ 
concerned about climate change, comparison figures for Liberal, National, and Green 
preference respondents were 53.9%, 48.6% and 87.9 % respectively.  Similarly, with 
respect to acceptance of some level of human causality with respect to climate 
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change, acceptance level for Labor preference voters was 92.5%, with the respective 
acceptance levels for Liberal, National, and Green preference respondents being 
86.6%, 85.5%, and 96.8%.
Psychological impacts associated with climate change 
33. An important and neglected domain in climate change surveys relates to possible 
psychological impacts of the threat and perceived consequences of climate change.  In 
addition to the 88% of respondents reporting some level of concern about climate 
change, 20% of Australian respondents reported feeling, at times, appreciable distress 
at the prospect and implications of climate change and its consequences. 
34.  Experienced psychological distress in response to the climate change threat was 
found to be the strongest predictor of psychological adaptation to climate change in 
the comprehensive structural equation modeling analyses undertaken, with 
psychological adaptation powerfully mediating the relationship between distress and 
behavioural engagement. 
 
Psychological adaptation to climate change 
35. Australian survey respondents appear to be actively adapting to the threat of climate 
change, both psychologically and behaviourally.
36. Survey respondents who evidenced high levels of psychological adaptation were 
much more likely to accept anthropogenic climate change, believe that Australians are 
already experiencing the effects of climate change, have greater objective knowledge 
about climate change, have had what they believe to be personal encounters with 
environmental events or changes associated with climate change, are more concerned 
and distressed by the implications of climate change, more engaged with the topic and 
issue, and see themselves as more exposed and vulnerable to the anticipated 
consequences of climate change.
37. Psychological adaptation to climate change (changes in thoughts, feelings, and 
understandings about climate change) was the most immediate and principal mediator 
of pro-environmental behavioural engagement.
Experience of natural disasters and perceived climate change events and changes 
38. Thirty-seven percent of Australian respondents reported having had direct personal 
experience with differing natural disaster events, with many respondents having 
experienced events such as cyclones, floods, bushfires, and drought, five times or 
more.  
39. Forty-eight percent of respondents reported that they live within 50 kilometres of 
areas “frequently affected by extreme weather events or natural disasters”. 
40. Overall, public risk perceptions and understandings of the threat of climate change in 
Australia appear to be strongly influenced and informed by direct and indirect 
exposure to and experience with both acute and chronic natural disasters within the 
Australian environment. 
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41. Seventy-one percent of Australian respondents reported believing that climate change 
was influencing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (e.g., floods, 
cyclones, drought, bushfires).
42. Fifty-nine percent of Australian respondents thought that the region where they lived 
was vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with two thirds of these respondents 
indicating that their location was ‘very’ or reasonably vulnerable. 
43. Forty-five percent of Australian respondents reported having directly experienced 
noteworthy changes or events which they thought might be due to climate change. 
44. Climate change appeared to be understood by most respondents as a very genuine risk 
domain, but one that is imbued with very mixed response associations with respect to 
its natural/technological disaster character, cost implications, media treatment and 
credibility, perceived scientific consensus, and faith/trust in science and societal 
resources to effectively manage the climate change threat. 
State and regional comparisons 
45. A number of State, Territory, and regional comparisons of survey responses are 
included in this report.  Mean climate change concern levels, for example, were 
highest in Victoria and Western Australia, and lowest in Queensland and New South 
Wales, though mean concern levels were high across all states.
46. Differences between urban and rural Australian respondents were not as marked as 
might be expected.  Rural respondents did report significantly greater residential and 
lifestyle exposure to and direct experience of natural disasters and extreme weather 
events.  Further significant - though very modest – differences found across key 
measures for urban versus rural residents were with respect to belief in climate 
change, climate change concern, and trust in government.  Rural respondents reported 
slightly lower acceptance of and expressed concern about climate change, and slightly 
less trust in government.  No appreciable or significant differences were found with 
respect to other key variables such as climate change distress, self-efficacy, 
psychological adaptation, or behavioural engagement. 
When a composite statement of individual survey item findings are brought together, the 
clarity and strength of public views and sentiments becomes clearer.  For example, 74% of 
respondents personally thought that climate change is occurring, with 71% ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ 
certain that this was happening, and 54% judged it is already happening in Australia.  In 
addition 45% reported it being ‘a serious problem right now’, 66% reported being very or 
fairly concerned about climate change, 48% reported that climate change was an extremely or 
quite important issue to them personally, and 27% reported that they think about climate 
change a lot.  Approximately 20% of respondents reported feeling, at times, appreciable 
distress at the prospects and implications of climate change and its consequences.  Australian 
respondents, on the whole appear to feel that they themselves can and should be addressing 
this environmental threat (59%), that the Australian government, state governments, and 
corporate Australia should be doing the same (77%, 63%, 75%), they are prepared to greatly 
reduce their energy use to help tackle climate change (64%) and many are psychologically 
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adapting to the threat of climate change and changing their behaviours and lifestyle with 
respect to reducing their own carbon footprint. 
These summary findings cannot do justice to the extensive and rich Australian data set 
provided by our survey respondents.  The report which follows can only attempt to more 
selectively capture and present what constitutes an initial and quite comprehensive set of 
research findings, covering a particular point in time.  A subsequent Griffith University 
research program national survey was undertaken in July and August of 2011 to provide both 
longitudinal and repeated cross-sectional data and comparisons over time (samples of n = 
1037 repeat respondents and n = 4347 new respondents), and to incorporate a number of 
additional psychological and situational parameters of particular interest and importance.  
The results of this 2011 survey are currently being finalised and will form the basis of a 2011 
survey report to be released later this year.  Further information regarding the 2010 and 2011 
survey procedures, measures, overall methodology and administration, and associated 
research program publications can be obtained through either Michelle Ellul or Joseph Reser 
in the School of Applied Psychology at Griffith University, Gold Coast Campus.  
Queries relating to this report and research program can be directed to Michelle Ellul 
m.ellul@griffith.edu.au or Joseph Reser j.reser@griffith.edu.au.
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BACKGROUND 
The research was initiated as a collaborative undertaking between the Understanding 
Risk Research Group at Cardiff University (UK) and the Psychology and Climate Change 
Research Group within Griffith University’s Climate Change Response Program.  This 2010 
research undertaking by Cardiff was a continuation of a number of convergent research 
initiatives addressing climate change and energy futures in Britain (e.g., Bickerstaff, 
Lorenzoni, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Simmons, 2008; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Spence, 
Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011a; Spence, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Venables, 2010; 
Spence, Venables et al., 2010).  Coincidentally, there was an opportunity to undertake a 
comprehensive national survey research project addressing public risk perceptions, 
understandings, and responses to climate change and natural disaster phenomena within a 
national Australian context.  This research was principally funded by the Australian 
Department of Climate Change under the Disaster Management Research Plan of the 
National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF).   
The multiple shared objectives of the UK and Australian surveys included 
documenting public perceptions and attitudes with respect to energy options and climate 
change considerations, as well as associated public understandings, concerns, and acceptance 
of policy alternatives.  The Australian research also included a specific mandate to examine 
the nexus between climate change and natural disasters with respect to public perceptions, 
understandings, and responses.  Survey methodologies and instrument items and design were 
finalised early in 2010, with an agreed set of common questions and items being given a high 
priority, notwithstanding differing agency and funding body commitments and priorities.  
The disciplinary base of all researchers was psychology, with a common interest in applying 
social, health, and environmental psychology to the challenges posed by climate change.  The 
research findings reported in this document encompassed shared components of these 
national surveys conducted in Great Britain (UK) between 6 January and 26 March and in 
Australia between 6 June and 6 July 2010, with these periods roughly corresponding to 
periods of the main winter months in each country.  
While many national surveys of public perceptions, beliefs, and responses to ‘climate 
change’ now exist and continue to be undertaken, collaborative international studies are rare.  
Yet national survey findings and data sets by themselves have limited interpretability and 
meaning without comparative touchstones and reference points.  International collaboration 
between the Understanding Risk Research Group at Cardiff University and the Climate 
Change Adaptation Response Program at Griffith University has allowed for useful and 
meaningful comparisons between two countries in very different parts of the world which 
nonetheless share many common characteristics with respect to population and societal and 
cultural contexts, as well as political and energy issues and discourses.  While similarities 
between Great Britain and Australia allow for sensitive and relevant comparisons, dramatic 
geographic and climate change exposure differences also allow for meaningful and 
informative contrasts.  The findings reported and discussed in this report evidence many 
striking similarities and some differences, with a number of these being both unexpected and 
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challenging with respect to prevailing assumptions and conventional wisdom.  Such research 
is valuable in providing strong external validity and a compelling global currency to national 
survey findings, and equally importantly, in identifying those areas, indicators, and specific 
findings that might require serious reflection and qualification with respect to their 
interpretation and generalisability. 
RESEARCH AND POLICY CONTEXTS 
The strong interest in and proliferation of survey research with respect to climate 
change and energy futures (e.g., Brechin, 2010; Krosnick, 2008a 2008b; Leiserowitz, Smith, 
& Marlon, 2010; Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2010b; Leiserowitz, Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 2011a; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Hmielowski, 
2011b; Leviston & Walker, 2011; Rabe & Borick, 2010; Spence & Pidgeon, 2009; Villar & 
Krosnick, 2010; Weber & Stern, 2011) reflects the increasingly urgent nature of these related 
matters within the research community.  It is also a strong indicator of political and policy 
needs for a more informed appreciation of public risk perceptions, understandings, and 
responses to media communications, and the relative success of  public education and policy 
initiatives relating to climate change adaptation and mitigation.  Using survey data to assess 
constituency preferences, public support, voting predispositions, and behaviour change has a 
long history across many domains (e.g., political polling, market research, health 
psychology), and is increasingly used in more reflective and strategic ways to explore public 
understandings of and psychological and behavioural responses to risk communications and 
social representations with respect to global climate change.   
More recently, a clear need for sensitive measures and appropriate methodologies for 
documenting and monitoring important impacts and changes in the human landscape over 
time has become increasingly evident and urgent, such as in the context of addressing adverse 
impacts, fostering and monitoring adaptive responding on the part of communities, and with 
respect to evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation 
policy initiatives (e.g., Brewer, 2008; Reser, Bradley, & Ellul, 2012a).  This has led many 
social scientists engaged in environmental issue-focused survey research to review the value 
and purpose of existing measures and methodologies, and to refocus their work towards a 
better understanding of ‘public understandings’ as well as on psychological and behavioural 
responses to myriad and often conflicting risk communications relating to ‘climate change’ 
(e.g., Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008; Trumbo & Shanahan, 2000; Weber & Stern, 2011).   
While considerable survey research has been undertaken in the UK and North 
America with respect to global climate change, relatively little programmatic or longitudinal 
survey research has taken place in Australia (see Appendices C-E).  Climate change survey 
questions, where they exist, have often constituted no more than several items in the context 
of broader survey exercises (e.g., Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2008; Department of 
Environment, Climate Change and Water NSW (DEECCW), 2009; Hanson, 2010) with some 
notable recent exceptions (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2009; Ashworth, Jeanneret, Gardner, & 
Shaw, 2011; Ipsos-Eureka Australia, 2010; Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker 
2011; Leviston & Walker, 2011).  This situation is changing with respect to the increasing 
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numbers and types of surveys relating to this issue, but not, it seems, with respect to 
programmatic research initiatives with the capacity to measure and monitor important 
changes in psychological, social and behavioural responses to climate change over time.  This 
‘state of the survey research’ does not reflect a lack of climate change interest or saliency in 
the case of Australia.  Indeed for the past decade, climate change has been centre-stage in 
terms of public debate, political controversy, and as a background issue and a source of 
increasing anxiety (e.g., Flannery, 2005; Gascoigne, 2008; Hamilton, 2010; Pittock, 2009; 
Spratt & Sutton, 2008).  The latter part of 2010 witnessed the ousting of a sitting Labor Prime 
Minister and the subsequent toppling of a government, largely or at least partly attributed to 
the non-recognition of climate change as a profoundly salient public issue and concern 
(Shanahan, 2010a, 2010b; Weller, 2010).   
While the UK and Australia are both defined by their island status, these countries 
differ greatly in their size, geography, and location.  The land mass of the UK, including 
Northern Ireland is 242,900 square kilometres, whereas that of Australia is 7,692,024 square 
kilometres, roughly 31 times the size of the UK.  Population differences, 22 million 
(Australia) versus over 59 million (UK), mean that average population density in Australia is 
2.6 people per square kilometre compared with 243 people per square kilometre in the UK.  
However, Australia is one of the most urbanised countries in the world, and despite its 
continental scale and breadth, approximately 77% of Australians live within 50 kilometres of 
the coast (ABS, 2006a).  It should be noted however that all of Australia’s largest cities are 
also coastal cities.  The UK comprises Northern Ireland, England, Scotland, and Wales, 
though survey sampling by Cardiff was limited to Great Britain (England, Scotland and 
Wales).  Australia, in contrast, is one country, encompassing an entire island continent. 
More critically from a climatic perspective, Australia and the UK occupy very 
different latitudes and global hemispheres.  Britain has a temperate climate and ample 
rainfall, whereas Australia is the driest inhabited continent, and its diverse climate includes a 
monsoon climate across much of the northern half of the continent, with both Mediterranean 
and temperate climates across the southwest and southeast parts of the land mass.  These 
differences make comparisons in environmental risk perceptions and responses particularly 
interesting and valuable, with obtained similarities being in many ways more interesting than 
found differences, which might be readily expected given these geographic and demographic 
differences, despite a common language and similar political structures, as well as 
intertwined cultural histories. 
Notwithstanding geographic and climatic differences, societal and cultural similarities 
and global socioeconomic comparisons are highly relevant to cross-national survey findings 
relating to a phenomenon and risk domain such as climate change, and to meaningful 
interpretations of found similarities and differences.  In these respects, Australia and Britain 
are indeed similar.  Australia was a colony of Britain, with a shared history extending over 
300 years.  Both Australia and the UK are developed economies, share a formal constitutional 
monarchy, have a common political and judicial history, and myriad international linkages 
spanning cultural exchange, education, immigration, residence, trade, and mutually reflective 
cultural identities.  The UK, for example, is the world’s 6th largest economy by nominal GDP 
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(and the world’s first industrialized country).  Australia is the 13th largest global economy, 
and has the 11th highest per capita GDP.  While many features of social and cultural life in 
Australia and the UK underscore similarities and inform important differences, a key point is 
that it is exactly these geographic, climatic, and people-environment relations and collective 
experience differences, yet strong cultural and socioeconomic similarities and inter-linkages, 
which make the present cross-national survey findings particularly interesting and meaningful 
in the context of global climate change. 
Also characterising the Australian geographic, climatic, and cultural contexts, is a 
wide spectrum of weather-related natural disasters, in a continent far more extensive and 
diverse than the United Kingdom (e.g., Pittock, 2009).  As well, Australia is deemed by many 
to be the inhabited continent most exposed to the potential ravages of global climate change, 
with a current public discourse and understanding that would appear to see and understand 
current natural disaster events and impacts as clear manifestations of unfolding climate 
change (e.g., Garnaut, 2008; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007; 
Lowe, 2005; Steffen, 2009).  Yet there are only now emerging adequate databases and 
research programs within Australia with which to more closely consider the nature of public 
risk perceptions, understandings, and concerns, and the nature and extent of current 
psychological and social impacts of the perceived threat and consequences of climate change.   
Notwithstanding the very substantial Australian research investment in the study of 
biophysical environmental change and impacts, and climate change adaptation and mitigation 
considerations respecting human settlements and infrastructure (e.g., Department of Climate 
Change (DCC), 2010; Steffen, 2009), scant attention has been paid to establishing a national 
database and monitoring program addressing important changes and impacts in the human 
environment (Brechin, 2010; Garnaut, 2008; Leviston & Walker, 2011).  Additionally, very 
little consideration has been given to more psychological and social considerations relating to 
public understandings and concerns, psychological responses and motivations, adaptation and 
coping responses, and impacts on psychological and social wellbeing.  This Australian survey 
was undertaken in 2010 in response to this crucial gap and clear need, and in the face of 
daunting climate change challenges (e.g., American Psychological Association (APA), 2009; 
Australian Psychological Society (APS), 2010). 
The challenges of a comparative international study include more than historical 
factors that might be specific to particular countries or cultures (e.g., Cohen, 2007).  These 
include the logistics of administering the survey at the same or equivalent time, similar mode 
of delivery where possible (online, telephone, face-to-face), translation equivalence if more 
than one language is involved, differing institutional ethics requirements and clearances, etc.  
Even timing can be problematic, in that comparable season of the year might be more 
important than parallel dates of administration, given the clear salience and priming character 
of prevailing weather circumstances for many respondents.   
More challenging is the direct equivalence of item wordings, framings, and response 
formats and scales.  Differing research teams may well have different constraints relating to 
the possible time series nature of what might be a current iteration or baseline study of a 
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national survey and prior item wordings or content, or funding requirements.  In the current 
collaboration, the principal Australian funding came with the proviso that the research needed 
to address public risk perceptions and understandings of natural disasters as well as climate 
change, thereby increasing survey breadth and length, adding time, instrument, and space 
restrictions.  Funding for an international comparative study is not a simple matter, as many 
funding agencies are loath to fund an expensive national survey in another country, 
notwithstanding the widespread call for just such collaborative work in the context of social 
science-based studies of climate change perceptions and responses (e.g., Agrawal, Orlove & 
Ribot, 2012).  A number of invited potential partner countries in the context of the current 
collaboration were simply not able to find the funding necessary to undertake the survey.  
There are then the direct item and scale comparison issues, when the exigencies of the 
research and other standardisation and envisioned longitudinal monitoring have entailed 
modest differences in item and instrument design.  Notwithstanding these clear challenges, 
which were all encountered in the present research with one exception (language), this 
collaboration across two dramatically different countries and climate change contexts was 
very successful and particularly valuable, yielding data which is arguably crucial in the 
context of this global issue requiring international policy responses. 
The two research undertakings differed in survey presentation.  The Cardiff survey 
was administered via computer assisted face-to-face interviews at respondent residences at 
geographically stratified sampling points in Britain, whereas the Australian survey was 
administered on-line to panel respondents residing in geographically stratified areas with 
particular population centres designated.  Both research studies used highly regarded service 
providers Ipsos MORI (UK) and Qualtrics (Australia) for survey administration, data 
collection, and initial processing.  Both surveys achieved broadly representative samples aged 
15 and older of their respective populations.  A substantial review of the literature has 
examined the relative strengths and merits of traditional survey administration methodologies 
compared with on-line surveys, with the strong consensus being that well designed and 
executed web-based surveys typically achieve very comparable if not superior results to 
conventional best practice (e.g., Birnbaum, 2004; Chang & Krosnick, 2009; Rao, Kaminska, 
& McCutcheon, 2010).  The extent, geographic diversity, and logistical challenges which 
characterise the Australian continent, in the context of a national study of global climate 
change risk perceptions and responses, meant that a web-based survey was the only practical 
option for an in-depth survey including multiple rating scales, considered responses, and a 
number of open-ended qualitative response items.  The striking similarities of many findings 
in this climate change comparison study involving two countries in very different parts of the 
world suggest that such administrative differences in the context of these carefully designed 
and executed collaborative surveys did not substantially affect the survey outcomes. 
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RESPECTIVE DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHIC PROFILES 
The survey sample sizes were 3096 for Australia and 1822 for Britain, with the 
respective populations of these countries being 22, 271, 900 (ABS, 2010 a) and 59, 853, 300 
(estimate from 2001 census plus current growth statistics).  Proportions of male and female 
respondents were very similar (Australia 47% male, 53% female; UK 48% male, 52% 
female).  The age profile of Australian respondents was (15 to 24, 7.8%; 25-54, 60%; 55 plus, 
31.6%), with  the corresponding profile for British respondents being (15 to 24, 15%; 25-54, 
49%; 55 plus, 36%) representing proportionally fewer younger respondents but 
proportionally more respondents aged 55 and over.  The 2006 Australia census data give a 
more differentiated population distribution across these age cohorts (17.5%; 54.2%; 28.3%), 
reflecting the total national population profile, and the fact that respondents associated with a 
survey panel such as that used by Qualtrics are somewhat more likely to be of working age 
than is the case in the general population.  The patterns of full- and part-time employment 
status were comparable across the Australian and UK samples, being 38%/20% and 
36%/13% respectively. (Appendix A contains more detailed demographic information). 
Of particular importance to both surveys was the nature of respondents’ residential 
locations, as greater geographic proximity and/or general exposure to potential threats and 
climate change outcomes might be expected to influence risk perceptions and concerns, as 
well as anticipated or actual climate change responses and adaptations (e.g., Brody, Zahran, 
Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008; Hess, Malilay, & Parkinson, 2008).  It is noteworthy that 71% of 
Australian respondents described their residential circumstances as either urban or suburban, 
a further 17% as ‘country town’, and 12% as rural or rural residential.  Given the largely 
urban population and coastal demographic distribution of settlements in Australia, these 
figures are not surprising and closely reflect national figures.  The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS, 2006b) reported that 68% of Australians live in major cities.  Figure 1 
provides a visual and spatial picture of the geographic and demographic distribution of 
survey respondents and survey sampling centres.  Figure 2 shows the categorisation of 
Australia into regions reflecting varying degrees of remoteness.  Together, figures 1 and 2 
clearly indicate the dramatically different circumstances across rural and remote Australia. 
The sampling procedure and ultimate survey sample reflected, in part, the nature of 
survey panels used by international research survey companies such as service provider used, 
Qualtrics.  Qualtrics was provided with population centre nodes and radiating suburban, peri-
urban and rural regions with designated postal codes, and ideal participant numbers.  These 
geographically stratified nodes and proximal regions were then used to establish survey 
invitations to panel members reflecting respondent quota numbers sought.  Appendix B 
provides population numbers and subsample sizes for nodes and associated regions selected 
for the survey.  Smaller centres were less likely to have resident panel members, whereas 
larger towns and cities had much larger numbers of available panel members.  This meant 
that respondent numbers for smaller centres in regional Australia had few respondents, for 
example, Longreach and Charleville in Queensland had seven and three respondents, 
respectively; Broome and Laverton, in Western Australia also had seven and three 
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respondents.  Urban centre and region subsamples were 319 for Sydney, 348 for Melbourne, 
311 for Adelaide, 315 for Perth, 98 for Hobart.  The State of Queensland was strategically 
oversampled as a number of prospective climate change-related research projects were in 
train, and the geographic heterogeneity of Queensland and the diversity of population centre 
sizes and locations made Queensland an ideal State-based survey catchment. 
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Figure 2. Remoteness areas of Australia based on the 2006 Census of Population and Housing (ABS, 
2006b). 
OVERVIEW OF THE CONTENT AND SCOPE OF THE SURVEY 
The Australian survey addressed a number of differing aspects and considerations 
relating to public risk perceptions, understandings, and responses to the threat and impacts of 
climate change.  The project, for example, incorporated both an emphasis on energy futures 
in the context of the collaboration with Cardiff University, and the inclusion of natural 
disaster and extreme weather perceptions and responses, as a project funded under the 
NCCARF Disaster Management Research Plan.  The project also included those more typical 
and policy relevant matters and considerations relating to public views and behavioural 
change.  In addition the survey encompassed an unprecedented selection and number of 
specific psychological variables which, together, allowed for a more comprehensive and in-
depth consideration of individual level psychological factors, interactions, and dynamic 
processes which might be influencing sense making, and psychological and behavioural 
responses and impacts in the context of a threat and phenomenon such as climate change.  
Where possible and practical these variables were measured using multi-item rating scales, 
allowing for more sensitive and valid measurement as well as more sophisticated and 
multivariate statistical analyses. 
Additional variables not commonly found in such surveys included objective 
knowledge and other parameters which might be considered as aspects of understandings, 
and a number of convergent items which could clarify causal attributions relating to climate 
change and how these might be related to motivational processes and individual and 
collective efficacy in addressing the threat of climate change.  In addition a number of 
conventional psychological measures were modified to be climate change-specific, such as 
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self-efficacy, concern, and distress.  As well, the selection of variables and the development 
of items and measures were to a large extent theoretically and conceptually driven, with an 
interest in whether specific variables might be playing important mediating or moderating 
roles in psychological adaptation to and the psychological impacts of the threat of climate 
change.  As no adequate measures of psychological adaptation or psychological distress in 
the context of climate change existed, provisional scales were designed and utilised to 
measure these important and very policy-relevant variables. 
ORGANISATIONAL GUIDE TO REMAINDER OF REPORT 
The document which follows is both a research report describing, summarising, and 
discussing our research findings, and a more detailed research monograph which provides 
selective information relating to methods, measures, specific issues and caveats, and 
comparison findings, where possible and useful, with respect to comparable research findings 
in Australia, Britain, and North America.  The progression of the report roughly follows the 
sequencing of material and items in the survey instrument, Appendix I, and an initial 
introduction to the circumstances, distinctive nature, and objectives of the research 
undertaking.  As well, the document reflects a progressive organisation and coverage in terms 
of specific topics and underlying constructs and variables of particular relevance to this 
consideration of public risk perceptions, understandings, and responses to climate change and 
natural disasters.  There exists, at points, some necessary redundancy and overlap with 
respect to reported findings, as repeated reference to some findings was required in the 
context of different comparisons and analyses. 
Given the broad scope of the survey, the very substantial number of survey 
participants involved, and the importance of comparative findings across specific groups, and 
with other survey research findings in Australia and internationally, an extensive Appendix of 
findings and ancillary information is provided to which frequent reference is made.  The table 
of contents and headings throughout the report have been designed in such a way as to 
facilitate the location of specific sections or findings of interest, and Appendix I contains all 
survey items and response formats in the form in which they appeared in the respective 
Australian and British surveys, and all pertinent descriptive statistics.  As the research and 
survey instrument was essentially multi-method in its inclusion of nominal response 
categories, psychometric rating scales and measures, and open-ended, qualitative items, 
differing reporting and statistical analysis approaches are found, reflecting the nature and 
level of measurement of the data involved.  Where necessary and/or useful, additional detail 
is provided in identified Appendix sections. 
A final and important matter is that the report covers both the reporting of and 
comparisons with Cardiff survey items for all common items, along with the reporting and 
discussion of the majority of survey items which were specific to the Australian survey.  In 
each instance where a composite measure of differing items has been used in statistical 
analyses, this is invariably an Australia only measure.  Similarly extreme weather and natural 
disaster items are Australia only items.  Indeed all survey items which come after item 21 in 
the survey are Australia specific items.  When addressing any particular topic, however, such 
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as belief or concern, both common item findings, and Australia-specific item findings, may 
be discussed within the same section and/or argument. 
COMPOSITE VARIABLES 
In the pages of the report which follow there is repeated reference to those variables 
and measures which reflected the considerations, questions, issues, and related ‘constructs’ 
that the survey addressed.  Core variables, for example, included climate change risk 
perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, concerns, and associate psychological and behavioural 
responses, adaptations, and impacts.  Each of these variables required conceptual 
specification and operational ‘measures’ by way of survey questions and response formats, 
with a number of these response formats including individual item rating scales and 
composite psychological scales addressing particular variables.  Where no existing and 
climate change specific scales existed, modified or new scales were designed and used. 
Appendix item J provides a listing of the more important variables or constructs that were 
addressed and brief explanation of how each of these was ‘operationalised’ or measured in 
the context of the survey, with reference to existing psychological scales where appropriate.    
Following initial data analyses of modified existing scales and new scales, a multi-item 
composite scale was specified for each named variable for the purpose of all subsequent data 
analyses and reported results.  These measurement issues are also addressed in text in each of 
the relevant sections.  
Composite (multi-item) scales were constructed to measure 19 key variables. These 
variables fall into four groups:  
1. Three of these variables (Biospheric values, Altruistic values, Egoistic Values) were 
measured using established and previously validated scales developed by Schultz 
(2001).  Responses to the four items comprising each of these three environmental 
values scales were summed to form composite scores of each. 
2. Two of the variables (Climate Change Media Consumption and Engagement in 
Carbon Emission-Reducing Behaviours) comprised checklists of items developed for 
the purposes of this study from knowledge of the extant literature.  In each case, the 
number of items checked by the participants, out of 14 (for Media) or 15 (for 
Behaviour), was summed to form a composite score. The behaviour items were based 
on the work of Jon Krosnick, at Stanford University and the Woods Institute for the 
Environment, and the ABC News polls. 
3. One of the variables (Objective Knowledge) was developed for this study based on 
the climate science literature and on similar items used in past studies (e.g., Ashworth 
et al., 2011, Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008; Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2007).  As the 
items comprising this scale had objectively correct answers, a total score was obtained 
by summing all correct answers and subtracting from this the number of incorrect 
responses.  
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4. The remaining 13 variables (that is, Residential Exposure, Lifestyle Exposure, Prior 
Adverse Weather Experience, Connection to Nature, Trust, ‘Green’ Self-Identity, 
Belief in Climate Change, Climate Change Concern, Risk Perception, Distress, Self-
Efficacy, Felt Personal Responsibility to Act, and Psychological Adaptation)  
comprised items selected, constructed  and/or adapted for the present study from (a) 
items used in the Cardiff study, (b) items used in past studies (e.g., Gosling, & 
Williams, 2010; Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2008, Krosnick, Holbrook, & Visser, 
2000; Mayer & Frantz, 2004) and/or (c) our own pilot work.   
For the thirteen variables in group 4 above, the scale development process was as 
follows.  First, in the absence of available items or developed scales with acceptable 
psychometric attributes, new scale items were formed in expert group discussions, based on 
conceptual and theoretical considerations.  Second, items that appeared to represent face valid 
indices of the focal constructs were grouped together to form rough initial scales.  Third, 
convergent validity was assessed by computing inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficients.  Poorly correlated items and/or those that detracted from scale 
reliability were considered for omission, and were in fact deleted if their loss did not to 
detract greatly from the content validity of the scale and/or from the variance of the total 
scale scores.  Fourth, exploratory factor analyses (using Kaiser’s criterion and principal axis 
factoring, followed by oblique rotation) was performed on the composites of items that 
purportedly measured multiple conceptually-related constructs (e.g., one analysis involved all 
the items intended to measure the constructs of Concern, Distress, and Risk Perception).  
While no items failed to load on their intended factor, in many of these analyses one or more 
items cross-loaded on multiple factors.  These items were deleted or not, subject to other 
considerations such as the number of items remaining, the response distribution of all items, 
and the potential impact of item removal on content validity and internal consistency.  With 
one exception, these processes provided support for the dimensionality and validity of the 
final set of thirteen scales.  The single exception was that the items intended to measure 
Belief and Concern loaded on a single common factor, suggesting that, although these 
variables are readily and importantly distinguishable on conceptual grounds, the items we 
used to measure them did not provide sufficiently independent measures of the underlying 
constructs.  In the fourth step in this set of analyses, further evidence as to the divergent and 
convergent validity of the scales was obtained by computing a series of confirmatory factor 
analyses.  Given the importance of the distinction between belief in human-forced climate 
change and concern over the adverse impacts of climate change, and given that the fit of a 
structural model that distinguished these constructs was marginally satisfactory, the decision 
was taken to compute separate multi-item measures of Belief and Concern. 
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
ENERGY FUTURES  
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES 
Initial survey items were shared items with Cardiff collaborators relating to a 
principal focus of the UK survey, alternative energy sources.  Item one in the survey explored 
attitudes towards alternative forms of electricity production.  Previous research has found that 
people are more likely to favour renewable forms of electricity production (e.g., sun/solar 
power, wind power) rather than those based on the burning of fossil fuels and nuclear power 
(Pidgeon, Lorenzoni, & Poortinga, 2008; Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Lorenzoni, 2006; Spence, 
Venables et al., 2010).  Respondents were asked how favourable or unfavourable their overall 
opinions or impressions were in relation to eight different sources of electricity generation 
(see Figure 3).  Solar power was viewed more positively by both Australian (95% ‘mainly’ or 
‘very favourable’) and UK respondents (88%), followed by wind power (91%, 82%), and 
hydroelectric power (80%, 76%), with Australians more strongly endorsing these renewable 
energies compared with UK respondents.  In contrast, biomass, another alternative renewable 
energy source, was more strongly supported by British respondents (57%) than by Australian 
respondents (37%).  Lower levels of support were found for fossil fuel generation.  Gas was 
the most favoured form for both Australian and British respondents (53%, 56% respectively), 
followed by coal (16%, 36%), and oil (11%, 33%).  Similar results were found in relation to 
nuclear power, with 31% of Australian and 34% of British respondents endorsing ‘mainly’ or 
‘very favourable’ options.  Overall, renewable energies were the most favoured form of 
electricity production for both Australian and British respondents, while oil, coal, and nuclear 
power were the least favoured.  Also, Australians’ attitudes were more highly differentiated 
than were those of British respondents. 
 
“Renewable energies were the most favoured form of electricity production 
for both Australian and British respondents”  Photo: SCA Svenska 
Cellulosa Aktiebolaget  
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Figure 3. Alternative energy sources. 
Respondents from the UK and Australia shared similar concerns in relation to energy 
futures.  Eighty-five percent of Australian respondents indicated that they were ‘very’ or 
‘fairly’ concerned about the affordability of electricity in the future, as compared with 78.1% 
of British respondents.  A large majority of respondents from both the UK and Australia were 
concerned about fossil fuel energy supplies (e.g., coal and gas) running out in the future, and 
that there would be power cuts.  Not surprisingly, British respondents were much more 
concerned (59%) than were Australian respondents (33%) about terrorist attacks causing 
interruptions to electricity supplies, and about their nation becoming too dependent on energy 
from other countries (80.5%, 53% respectively).  (See Appendix I). 
NUCLEAR POWER 
Perceptions of the risk of nuclear power can be influenced by many factors, such as 
previous incidents and dread risk, but these factors also include dimensions of proximity, 
such as physical proximity, place attachment and ‘experiential closeness’ (e.g., Gifford, 2007; 
Van der Plight, 1992).  The similarity of findings in the current study are striking, given that 
residents of Britain have considerable exposure to nuclear power and nuclear power plants 
whereas Australian residents by and large have had no exposure to, or direct experience with, 
such nuclear power generating facilities.  
Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to nuclear power, covering such 
considerations as risks and benefits, and trust, as well as general attitudes and concern levels 
(questionnaire items #2, #3, #4, #5).  When asked about the risks of nuclear power as 
contrasted with benefits, 42% of Australian respondents agreed that the risks of nuclear 
power either ‘slightly’ or ‘far outweighed’ the benefits, contrasted with 38% of British 
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How favourable or unfavourable are your overall opinions or impressions of 
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respondents.  Appreciable numbers of respondents from both countries answered ‘don’t 
know’ to this question (Australia 10.1%, UK 6.6%).  When the question was framed in terms 
of “There are risks to people in Australia from nuclear power”, 65% of Australian 
respondents either ‘strongly’ agreed or ‘tended’ to agree, while the corresponding figure for 
British respondents was 61%.  
 Australian respondents were also asked whether they favoured or opposed the 
construction of nuclear power stations in Australia, with the results indicating that nearly 
50% of respondents were opposed.  Again a substantial proportion of respondents simply 
reported ‘not knowing’ (15%).  More than half of the survey respondents in both countries 
were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned about nuclear power (Australia 57%, UK 55%) in their 
respective countries.  Fifty-seven percent of British respondents as opposed to 40% of 
Australian respondents either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘tended to agree’ with the statement, “I
don’t really like the idea of nuclear power, but I reluctantly accept that we will need it 
to help combat climate change and improve energy security”.  Respondents also were 
asked to indicate their level of trust in relation to nuclear power. Forty-six percent of 
Australian and 35% of British respondents indicated that they did not trust the nuclear 
industry to run nuclear power stations safely.   
VOTING PREFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO ENERGY OPTIONS 
When respondents were asked to indicate how they would vote in relation to a number 
of alternative energy sources, both national samples were in favour of voting for renewable 
energies rather than nuclear or fossil fuels.  Forty-one percent of both Australian and British 
respondents indicated that they would ‘probably vote in favour’ or ‘definitely vote in favour’ 
of building new nuclear power stations, while 92% of Australian and 82% of British 
respondents indicated that they would vote in favour of building new wind farms.  Just over 
two thirds of Australian and British respondents indicated that they would vote in favour of 
spending taxpayers’ money on projects designed to tackle climate change (67% and 68% 
respectively). 
A very clear finding was that these respective survey samples preferred renewable 
sources of energy production to nuclear-powered facilities.  Overall, respondents expressed a 
degree of concern about nuclear power, with nearly half of Australian respondents indicating 
that they did not trust the nuclear industry.  British respondents were more likely to show 
support for nuclear power and to trust the nuclear industry.  Public attitudes toward nuclear 
power, both internationally and in Australia appear to have been shifting over the past several 
years, as reliable and lower carbon emission alternatives to coal-fired power plants have been 
seriously addressed.  While these public discussions were certainly salient prior to the 2010 
surveys in Australia and Britain, the Fukushima Daiichi disaster as a result of the earthquake 
and tsunami in Japan on 11 March 2011may have profoundly influenced public views around 
the world.  This hybrid natural/technological disaster resulted in the worst nuclear disaster 
since Chernobyl in 1986, with an estimated 20,000 lives lost in the Fukushima region (e.g., 
Marks, 2011).  The Fukushima event is having profound consequences for Japan’s industries 
and economy, and the future of its 54 nuclear reactors is now very uncertain (e.g., Aldhous & 
Marks, 2012).  These current soundings on public attitudes to nuclear energy alternatives may 
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prove to be a very valuable benchmark, as post-Fukushima surveys around the world sample 
and monitor nuclear versus carbon emissions concerns.  It is noteworthy that sixty nuclear 
reactors are under construction globally, with a further 163 ordered or planned, while a 
number of European countries are now committed to scaling down or ending their nuclear 
energy programs (Wallace, 2012).  
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CLIMATE CHANGE BELIEFS AND UNDERSTANDINGS 
BELIEF THAT THE WORLD’S CLIMATE IS CHANGING 
Important initial survey items related to climate change beliefs, risk perceptions, and 
understandings.  The most determining of these is arguably respondent acceptance, or belief 
in the reality of contemporary climate change.  While survey items reflect the prevailing use 
of ‘belief’ in this climate change context, for communication and comparison reasons, 
acceptance of the reality of this current phenomenon and risk better reflects and captures the 
cognitive and emotional processes and responses involved, and the risk representation and 
communication nature of most social representations of climate change (e.g., Deaux & 
Philogene, 2001; Wagner & Hayes, 2005).  It is also arguable that the complex global 
phenomenon, convergent issues, and risk domain of climate change is not very comparable to 
or commensurate with conventional attitudinal or belief ‘objects’ (e.g., Eagley & Chaiken, 
1993; Crano & Prislin, 2008).  In the context of a survey such as this, and given the research 
focus on public response to the threat of climate change, it is worth noting that many 
questions about climate change are often premised on a presumption that respondents accept 
that the threat and/or phenomenon of climate change is ‘real’.  In the world of perceived or 
subjective risk and exposure this real or not real quandary is of course a very natural aspect of 
risk or threat perception and appraisal; one appraises the credibility or substance of a threat, 
as well as matters of seriousness and vulnerability if the danger is deemed to be ‘clear and 
present’ (e.g., Breakwell, 2007; Tulloch & Lupton, 2003).   
In the context of belief about climate change we enter a more complicated realm of 
politics, party affiliation, vested interests, often slanted media coverage, and differing 
notional and objective climate change impact exposures across Australia (e.g., Dunlap & 
McCright, 2008; McCright & Dunlap, 201a, 2011b).  Hence asking a question about belief in 
climate change can be interpreted, depending upon context, as a question about one’s 
political affiliation or in-group/out-group status, contingent upon circumstance.  
Notwithstanding the complexities of the phenomenon, the issue, and careful question framing 
and response options in the context of a survey addressing public risk perceptions, 
understandings, and psychological responses, it has been very important to document as 
accurately as possible where survey respondents stood on this matter of belief or acceptance 
of the threat and/or phenomenon of contemporary ‘climate change’. 
Differences between Australian and British responses to the question, “As far as you 
know, do you personally think the world’s climate is changing?” (item #8) were modest, 
with 73.9% of Australian respondents saying ‘Yes’, compared with 78.3% of British 
respondents.  Of Australian respondents 7.8% gave a ‘don’t know’ response compared with 
6.4% of British respondents.  Figure 4 shows relative percentage responses for the 2010 
Australian and UK surveys, as well as for UK data from a prior Cardiff survey in 2005 using 
an identical item.  This figure also shows corresponding U.S. survey findings for two points 
in time in 2010, and at one point in 2008 (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Smith, 
2010; Spence, Venables et al., 2010). 
Beliefs, risk perceptions, and understandings 
35 
        
Figure 4. Respondents’ reported belief in climate change from six surveys. 
These North American findings must be interpreted with an awareness that reference 
to ‘global warming’ rather than ‘climate change’ can influence responses, and that reported 
belief in climate change in the United States can have charged ideological and political party 
identification connotations, which are more muted in Australia and the UK (Dunlap & 
McCright, 2008, 2010; Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 2010; Lewandowsky, 2011; Whitmarsh, 
2009).  The U.S. findings, however, do provide some bases for comparison.  These national 
findings indicate that roughly three quarters of Australian and British respondents believe that 
the world’s climate is changing, with ‘no’ responses accounting for 18.2% and 15.3% of 
responses respectively.  A subsequent survey question asked for extent of agreement with the 
statement, “I am certain that climate change is really happening” (#12a).  With the item 
framed in this way, respondents had to indicate agreement with a very strong statement of 
certainty.  Seventy-two percent of Australian respondents chose either ‘strongly agree’ (31%) 
or ‘tend to agree’ (41%), reflecting their belief and/or assessment that climate change is really 
happening. [As the equivalent British item was worded in terms of being uncertain, a direct 
comparison was not made]. 
Note that in both of these belief questions, respondents were asked for their personal 
view and appraisal, with this prefaced by “as far as you know”.  This encouraged 
respondents to give their own honest view, but perhaps also put participants on the spot, with 
their response resting upon their personal knowledge base, rather than asking their view of 
what others thought, or their assessment of scientific opinion.  Clearly the framing of survey 
questions and response options can substantially influence responses with respect to the 
phenomenon and risk domain in question (e.g., De Vaus, 2002; Keren, 2011; Krosnick & 
Presser, 2010; Yeager, Larson, Krosnick, & Tompson, 2011).  This present framing arguably 
elicited relatively conservative statements of acceptance or belief, premised as the question 
was on one’s personal knowledge.  One might also argue that in the case of item #8, more 
general reference to normal, naturally-occurring changes in climate was understood by some 
respondents.  But the fact that 18.2% of individuals replied ‘No’, along with the larger 
climate change context of the survey, would suggest that this possibility was not at all likely.   
It is, of course, important to compare and contrast our survey findings with those of 
other survey researchers, both in Australia and in North America, where many of the current 
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standardised items have been used.  Such comparisons help both to validate and to 
benchmark these present survey findings.  Not only are these Australian survey results very 
similar to British findings of the same year for the identical items in an identical survey 
section, but they are very similar to other Australian and North American findings using 
similar items, notwithstanding media reports to the contrary (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2011; 
Krosnick & Villar, 2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, 2010b; Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-
Renouf, Smith, & Hmielowski, 2011b; Leviston & Walker, 2010, 2011; Reser, 2011a, 
2011b).   
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF BELIEF 
A four-item composite measure of belief was developed to assist in parametric and 
non-parametric analyses of research data.  The measure included items (#8, #9, #12a, #14) 
which related to the world’s changing climate, causation (e.g., human activity, natural 
causes), and the certainty and immediacy of climate change impacts.  Where responses were 
not on a 5-point scale, they were converted to such a scale and then scores were summed 
(possible range 4-24), with higher scores indicating a greater belief in anthropogenic climate 
change (M = 15.90, SD = 4.16).  This scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .85. 
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Demographic analyses revealed that female respondents reported significantly higher 
levels of belief in climate change (M = 16.5, p < .001) than did male respondents (M = 15.2).  
Respondents under 35 years also reported significantly greater levels of belief (M = 16.5, p < 
.001) than did respondents aged 35-54 years (M = 16.1), and respondents aged over 55 years 
(M = 15.1).  Respondents with a tertiary education reported significantly greater levels of 
belief (M = 17.0, p < .001) than did respondents with a trade/certificate qualification (M = 
15.9) or those with a high school education (M = 15.8).  Interestingly, respondents without 
children or grandchildren reported significantly higher levels of belief (M = 16.4, p < .001)
than did parents/grandparents (M = 15.7).  Urban respondents had significantly greater levels 
of belief (M = 16.1, p < .001)  than rural respondents (M = 15.5), and respondents reporting 
intention to vote either Green or Labor in the next federal election also reported significantly 
higher levels of belief (M = 17.1, p < .001) than did respondents reporting an intention to 
vote for another party (M = 14.9).  No significant differences were found for belief between 
sub-groups of the sample formed on the basis of employment status, country of birth, or 
income. 
CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Belief in climate change correlated positively and strongly with climate change 
concern (r = .82), distress (r = .62), responsibility (r = .62), self-efficacy (r = .60), risk 
appraisal (r = .60), psychological adaptation (r = .59), objective knowledge (r = .52), trust (r
= .48), green self-identity (r = .47), and more moderately with residential 
exposure/vulnerability (r = .38), behaviour (r = .34), and subjective knowledge (r = .16).  All 
correlations were significant at p < .001. 
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SUMMARY 
The matter of public acceptance of the reality of a profoundly consequential change in 
the world’s climatic patterns is of course of particular importance in the context of this 
contested environmental, political, and social issue; hence the importance of very carefully 
measuring and monitoring public understandings and responses to this dramatic global threat. 
‘Belief’ in climate change is arguably a rather odd notion, given the multiple 
meanings and referents of ‘climate change’ (threat, change in greenhouse gas concentrations 
in atmosphere, human consequences, human causality, political party affiliation, etc) and the 
meaning of ‘belief’, but this has been the language used in both public discourse and by 
survey researchers to frame such questions.  In the present context we have followed suit both 
for comparison purposes, and because it was necessary in the context of other questions to 
ascertain whether respondents accepted this contested phenomenon and threat as ‘real’.  That 
74% of our Australian respondents (and 79% of British respondents) said yes, “that they 
thought the world’s climate is changing”, and a further 7% of Australian respondents did not 
know, is a strong statement of acceptance if not belief in.  By asking about one’s belief in 
various ways it is also possible to obtain a clearer and nuanced view of strength of belief or 
conviction, which is a more accurate gloss for subjective certainty in psychology, as distinct 
from the question of uncertainty in the context of public risk perceptions and assessments of 
a phenomenon such as climate change, and the underlying science. 
These comparable Australian 2010 survey findings respecting belief, when averaged 
across the surveys referred to above, indicate that 77% of respondents accept or believe that 
climate change is occurring.  While the matter of the meaning of ‘climate change’ for survey 
respondents in the context of such belief questions has routinely been raised, the reality is that 
in the context of these surveys, as in public discourse, media coverage, and climate change 
science, there was little question but that ‘climate change’ implied contemporary changing 
climate patterns reflecting some level of human causation or ‘forcing’.  Given that substantial 
numbers of respondents also indicated that they did not know or were uncertain when these 
response options were available, this level of acceptance or belief is very high.  These 
Australian results are also very similar to the North American and British figures, which 
average out to 71.8% of respondents, with, for example, quite high (19%) ‘don’t know’ 
responses in the case of the frequently cited Yale Center for Climate Change 
Communications findings (e.g., Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, 2010b) (see Appendix N for 
comparisons of belief/acceptance of climate change). 
This latter figure is essentially identical to that reported by a CSIRO survey 
undertaken in late 2010 by Ashworth and her colleagues (Ashworth et al., 2011).  They 
reported that 78% of their respondents from a random sample of 1602 participants indicated 
their belief that climate change was real.  This figure is also virtually identical with more 
recent CSIRO national survey findings for reported belief that climate change is happening 
(77%) (Leviston & Walker, 2011) and Griffith 2011 national survey findings (74%) (Reser et 
al., 2012c).
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DISBELIEF, SCEPTICISM, AND UNCERTAINTY 
As indicated in the previous discussion of belief, framing the matter of acceptance or 
nonacceptance of climate change as an actual threat or altered condition of Earth’s current 
climate systems as a matter of belief rather than risk perception and appraisal has a number of 
logical and theoretical problems.  That climate change is also a contested and polarising 
political issue further exacerbates conceptual fuzziness and respondent as well as 
measurement confusion.  Asserting one’s belief or nonbelief in the ‘reality’ of this threat and 
phenomenon can be and clearly is seen as seen as a salient matter of political party 
identification and affirmation, and values and world view expression (e.g., Leiserowitz et al., 
2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a, 2011b; Milfont, Harre, Sibley, & 
Duckitt, 2012; Schwartz, 1992).  A further complexity is that the matter of belief in climate 
change is often implicitly framed and understood, not simply as a matter of acceptance of the 
phenomenon or risk, but as a matter of perceived scientific acceptance and consensus, and/or 
a questioned credibility of scientists (e.g., Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008; Lewandowsky, 
2011; Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2012; Oreskes & Conway, 2010; Stocking & 
Holstein, 2009).  Finally, the Australian public has not been receiving straightforward risk 
communications about climate change, or only reasonably objective environmental 
documentaries and media coverage of a natural or technological phenomenon, changing 
environmental condition, or threat.  Rather the average individual has been exposed to a 
barrage of media coverage, often politically contextualised and biased, and in a context where 
there has been a well-documented and unprecedented effort by political conservatives and 
vested interest lobby groups to sway public opinion against acceptance of what has been in 
reality an unparalleled climate change science consensus on the genuineness and grave 
implications of this anthropogenically altered condition of the planet’s atmospheric 
conditions and consequent changes in climate patterns (Boykoff, 2011). 
Given the importance attributed to public acceptance of the reality of anthropogenic 
climate change, the complex nature of these climate processes and impacts, the questioned 
credibility of climate change science and scientists, and relative near term and longer term 
risk, the Australian and British surveys addressed respondent perceptions and beliefs with a 
number of differing but convergent questions.  This was done in as simple and standardised a 
way as possible, while still allowing for a more in-depth analysis of underlying public 
understandings and views.  This procedure allowed for a consideration of question framing 
effects, and for the reasonably unambiguous identification of respondents who could be 
characterised as de facto climate change disbelievers or strong sceptics.  Table 1 summarises 
relative findings from differing questions relating to acceptance or belief in ‘climate change’. 
The survey findings across items suggest what initially appears to be appreciable 
inconsistency, varying from a 7.6% strong sceptic or disbeliever (combined) count in 
response to endorsement of either #9a or #9f (for item 9) to an 18.2% strong sceptic or 
disbeliever response to question #8, for the Australian sample.  This demonstrates the 
powerful framing effects of differing question wordings and response formats (e.g., Schwarz, 
1999; Singer, Couper, Raghunathan, Antonucci, Burmeister, & Hoewyk, 2010; Tourangeau, 
Rips, & Rasinski, 2000).  Notwithstanding that 71.4% of Australian respondents either 
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‘strongly agreed’ or ‘tended to agree’ with the statement, “I am certain that climate change 
is really happening” (#12a), while only 4.7% strongly disagreed’, the actual percentage 
figure for those identified as not accepting the reality of climate change is marginally greater.  
When “strong scepticism or disbelief” is operationalised in terms of responses to questions 
#8, #9, #12a, #14, and requiring a consistent disbelief or sceptical response for each of these 
four items, the total proportion of such respondents falls to 3.04%, or 94 individuals.   When 
a less stringent criterion is adopted, requiring a ‘no’ response to question #8, and a nonbelief 
or sceptic response to at least two of the three questions #9, #12a, and #14, the proportion of 
survey respondents who could be characterised as disbelievers or strong sceptics becomes 
6.5%, or 202 individuals.  The comparable figures for British survey respondents were 1.4% 
(26 individuals, stringent criterion, i.e., answering sceptically to all four questions) and 4.0% 
(72 individuals, more inclusive criterion, that is, answering sceptically to three or four 
questions) respectively.  It is noteworthy that just under two thirds (65%) of the 202 
Australian respondents identified as sceptics were males, a finding consistent with the 
emerging picture of conservative white males sharing a distinctive and system-justifying 
world view contributing disproportionately to levels of climate change denial in countries 
such as the United States (e.g., Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011a).  What appears to be the case for disbelievers and strong sceptics, on the basis of our 
own and other research findings, is that these views are strongly held and closely associated 
with self-perceptions, world views, and value stances (e.g., Dunlap & McCright, 2010; 
Krosnick, 2010; Krosnick & Villar, 2010).  The influence of such discrepant and polarised 
beliefs on survey means and overall statistics can be appreciable. 
Our Cardiff research collaborators have very intensively examined their own survey 
data with respect to what light their findings, along with several associated studies, could 
shed on differing types of public scepticism with respect to anthropogenic climate change 
(Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011; Spence & Pidgeon, 2009; 
Whitmarsh, 2011).  It would appear that scepticism is somewhat less prevalent in Britain than 
in Australia, and, as other studies have shown, is particularly common among individuals 
who hold politically conservative worldviews and traditional values.  These British findings 
also suggest that their sceptic respondents were not likely to hold these climate change views 
with strong conviction, as was the case with those survey respondents holding strong self-
transcendence and environmental values.  While our common findings with Cardiff relating 
to the identification of climate sceptics are very congruent, ongoing collaborative research in 
Australia is only now examining interpretive communities, including sceptics and 
‘naysayers’, following the lead of similar research in North America undertaken by 
Leiserowitz and colleagues (e.g., Leiserowitz et al., 2011b).  The Griffith research program 
has been more specifically focused on establishing a research platform and database 
encompassing a spectrum of intra-individual change variables of particular relevance to 
documenting and monitoring climate change psychological adaptation and impacts. 
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Table 1. Relative findings from differing items relating to beliefs concerning 'climate change'1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The British survey framed this item as ‘uncertain’ rather than ‘certain’, hence the scale percentages have been reversed to align with 
Australian results. 
 
                                                          
1 Stringent classification as disbeliever or strong sceptic was determined by highlighted responses to the four questions, with 
this operationalisation including all respondents who answered ‘no’ to question 8, and selected either ‘a’ or ‘f’ to question 9, 
either ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘tend to disagree’ to question 12a, and selected ‘never’ in response to question 14.  The more 
inclusive 6.5% figure was calculated on the basis of a no response to question 8,  and ‘disbeliever’ or ‘strong sceptic’ 
responses to two of the three remaining belief questions (9, 12 ,14). 
 
Q8. As far as you know, do you personally think the world’s climate is changing? 
 Australia 
% 
Great Britain 
% 
Yes 73.9 78.3 
No 18.2 15.3
Don’t know 7.8 6.4 
Q12a. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about climate change? 
   
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Tend to 
agree 
% 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
% 
 
Tend to 
disagree 
% 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
% 
 
No 
opinion 
% 
 
Don’t 
know 
% 
*I am certain that 
climate change is 
really happening 
Australia 30.8 40.6 12.2 10.1 4.7 0.3 1.2 
UK 24.0 35.0 12.0 22.0 6.0 0.8 0.4 
Q9. Thinking about the causes of climate 
change, which, if any, of the following best 
describes your opinion? 
 
Australia 
% 
UK 
% 
a)Climate change is entirely 
caused by natural processes 4.9 
 
5.6 
b)Climate change is mainly 
caused by natural processes 
 
12.6 
 
12.2 
c)Climate change is partly 
caused by natural processes 
and partly by human activity 
 
 
45.8 
 
 
46.3 
d)Climate change is mainly 
caused by human activity 
 
27.6 
 
24.3 
e)Climate change is entirely 
caused by human activity 
 
4.2 
 
6.5 
f)I think there is no such 
thing as climate change 
 
2.7 
 
2.2 
g)Don’t know 1.9 2.5 
h)No opinion 0.4 0.4 
Q14. When, if at all, do you think 
Australia/Britain will start feeling the effects of 
climate change? 
 
 
Australia 
% 
UK 
% 
We are already feeling the 
effects 
 
54.0 
 
41.4 
In the next 10 years 9.2 13.5 
In the next  25 years 7.5 13.9 
In the next 50 years 4.5 10.9 
In the next 100 years 2.3 4.9 
Beyond the next 100 years 2.6 4.3 
Never 5.5 3.6 
Don’t know 12.9 7.1 
No opinion 1.5 0.3 
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Question #12, a Cardiff item, examines a spectrum of considerations regarding belief, 
risks/benefits, intensity of emotional response, seriousness of threat, uncertainty, scientific 
consensus, and optimism about collective societal response.  Question #12(i) asks for the 
extent of respondent agreement with the statement, “Most scientists agree that humans are 
causing climate change”.  The statement contains an unqualified and unspecified assertion 
respecting the extent and relative importance of a human causal contribution, which some 
respondents might understandably not entirely agree with.  Nonetheless over one half of 
survey respondents either ‘strongly’ or ‘tended to agree’ with this statement, while only 19% 
‘strongly’ or ‘tended to disagree’, with 23.6% neither agreeing nor disagreeing.  These 
findings, along with those of other researchers, suggest that both trust in science and the 
perceived scientific consensus about the phenomenon of climate change is reasonably high.  
Two further questions in the present survey explored this issue.  When asked, “How much 
do you trust what different sources say about the environment” (#27), scientists were 
viewed as far more trustworthy than were media or government sources, with 79.3% of 
respondents indicating that they did trust scientists.  When directly asked, “How much 
agreement do you think there is among scientists that climate change is happening” 
(#28), over half (57.8%) again indicated strong to moderate agreement.  This and the finding 
for item #12i are interesting in that they suggest that the public perceives more disagreement 
among scientists than actually exists, though there is general acknowledgement that scientists 
accept that contemporary climate change is happening and is the product of anthropogenic 
forcing.  Respondents themselves, however, when asked about their own position on climate 
change, are in fact much stronger in their belief and acceptance of climate change and its 
anthropogenic character than they perceive scientists to be.  These findings do not appear to 
directly implicate findings relating to respondents’ trust of scientists when speaking about the 
environment (r = .58, p < .001 between #28 and #27a), but rather underscore the reality that 
climate change is a complex phenomenon associated with some level of understandable 
uncertainty, and that some measure of disagreement among scientists does not undermine 
their credibility (Barnett, Cooper & Senior, 2007; Brown, Harris, & Russell, 2010; Earle, 
2010).  
Additional items relating to climate change beliefs, risk perceptions, and 
understandings are shown in Appendix I (#10, #11, #12).  These overall results suggest that 
climate change is seen as a very genuine risk domain, but one that is imbued with very mixed 
response associations with respect to costs and benefits, media treatment and credibility, 
perceived scientific consensus, and faith/trust in science and societal resources to effectively 
manage the climate change threat.  What is perhaps most striking about these findings is their 
overall similarity across Australia and UK, and the wide spectrum of views represented.  
Among these items the largest difference was found in reported extent of agreement with the 
statement, “I trust the Australian/British government to take appropriate action against 
climate change” (p < .001) (#12g).  Trust in government was clearly lower for Australian 
respondents.  These findings with respect to trust must also be considered in the context of 
perceived uncertainties with respect to climate change as a phenomenon, likely impacts and 
severity for particular regions, and scientific consensus (e.g., CSIRO-BOM, 2007, 2009).  It 
is noteworthy that Australian respondents expressed less uncertainty as to what the effects of 
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climate change will be, 55.8%, as compared with 69.5% of British respondents (#12j).  
Australians’ experience with a visibly changing climate and continent, and the natural 
disasters of the past decade, have been seen and interpreted by many as clear evidence of the 
reality of climate change and its unfolding impacts.  This issue will be further discussed in a 
later section of this report. 
“We are dealing with human perceptions and judgments of the nature, magnitude 
and possible implications and consequences of this profound threat” Photo: Timothy 
Swinson
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RISK PERCEPTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
While many surveys addressing climate change use the language and constructs of 
public opinion, attitudes, beliefs, and concerns, the matter at issue is also clearly one of risk 
perceptions, as what is being addressed is a seemingly profound risk and threat, and 
potentially planet-changing climate regime.  This framing in ‘risk’ and ‘perception’ terms 
emphasises the clear importance and relevance of the interdisciplinary risk literature (e.g., 
O’Riordan, 1995; Sjöberg, 1987; Slovic, 2000, 2010) and that we are dealing with human 
perceptions and judgments of the nature, magnitude and possible implications and 
consequences of this profound threat.  Unfortunately the survey research literature addressing 
climate change in risk perception terms is modest, and alternate framings and constructs are 
many, including attitudes, opinions, beliefs, perceptions, threat appraisal, subjective 
exposure, experienced vulnerability, and concern.  An implicit distinction between risk 
perception and concern is that risk perception relates more specifically to information 
processing and sense making relating to an external threat, phenomenon, or situation whereas 
concern relates more directly to one’s psychological responses to the risk or threat appraisal 
of the perceiver.  Importantly, more recent conceptualisations of risk as analysis and risk as 
feeling do underscore the few degrees of separation between perceptual judgment and 
experiential response (e.g., Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2004).  While a decision was made to more strongly focus on public 
concerns about climate change in terms of a more detailed consideration of psychological 
responses and impacts, the survey nonetheless included an existing 6-item measure of 
‘climate change risk perception’ (Kellstedt et al., 2008), and also addressed several more 
applied and theoretical avenues relating to threat appraisal in the context of coping and 
adaptation, and with respect to the socially and culturally constructed nature and content of 
the ‘risk domain’ of climate change.  
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF RISK PERCEPTION 
Those survey items which directly relate to climate change risk perceptions include 
#10, #11, #14, #15a-d, and #59a-f.  While multiple ‘concern’ items could be seen as relating 
to risk perception and vice-versa, we have treated these constructs and operationalised 
variables as distinct for the purpose of this survey research and in the context of comparison 
findings.  Risk perceptions were measured using a 5-item scale adapted from Kellstedt et al’s. 
(2008) Climate Change Risk Perception Scale (#59a-e).  The original scale contained six 
items but one of the original items was excluded as it detracted from scale reliability.  Items 
assessed respondents’ perceived risks to their health, economic and financial situation, and 
environment from a personal and state perspective.  Items included, for example: “Climate 
change will have a noticeably negative impact on the environment in which my family 
and I live”, and “In your opinion, what is the risk of climate change exerting a 
significant impact on economic development in your state”.  Mean responses to all items 
were above the scale midpoint, indicating that respondents tended to agree that climate 
change posed a significant risk.  Scores were summed (possible range 5-30), with higher 
scores indicating greater levels of perceived risk (M = 18.94, SD = 5.90). This scale achieved 
a Cronbach’s alpha of .90.  
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RISK PERCEPTION DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Female respondents perceived significantly greater risk of negative impacts from 
climate change (M = 19.8, p < .001) than did male respondents (M = 18.0).  Those aged under 
35 years perceived significantly greater risk (M = 19.8, p < .001) compared to those aged 35 
to 54 (M = 19.24), and those aged 55 years and older (M = 17.8).  Respondents with a 
university degree perceived significantly greater risk (M = 19.38, p < .05) than those with 
high school education (M = 18.64).  Interestingly, those without children or grandchildren 
perceived significantly greater risk (M = 19.31, p < .05) than those with children or 
grandchildren (M = 18.76).  Respondents intending to vote Green or Labor at the next Federal 
election perceived significantly greater risk (M = 20.22, p < .001) compared to those 
intending to vote for another party (M = 17.94). Non-home-owners perceived significantly 
greater risk (M = 19.32, p < .05) compared to home-owners (M = 18.75).  Finally, 
respondents earning less than $60,000 perceived significantly greater risk (M = 19.18, p < 
.05) compared to those earning greater than $100,000 (M = 18.52).  No significant differences 
were found for perceived risk to climate change across residential location, employment, or 
country of birth.  
RISK PERCEPTION CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Perceived risk with respect to climate change correlated strongly with climate change 
concern (r = .73), distress (r = .71), adaptation (r = .64), belief in climate change (r = .60), 
self efficacy (r = .59), and responsibility (r = .57).  Significant but moderate correlations were 
found between risk and objective knowledge (r = .44), trust (r = .43), connection with nature 
(r = .40) and behaviour (r = .37).  All correlations were significant at p < .001. 
SUMMARY
These risk perception findings would suggest that in addition to the Australian 
public’s acceptance of climate change, they are also viewing this global phenomenon and its 
associated changes and impacts as a very real threat.  This framing and consideration in terms 
of risk also underscores the reality that media coverage of climate change, and public 
awareness and education initiatives and policies, are all aspects of informal and formal risk 
communication.  Individual and community responses and underlying psychological 
processes relating to this threat and risk domain include making sense of and appraising just 
how serious the threat is in terms of magnitude, extent, and immediacy, and what the 
implications and possible consequences might be, globally, locally, and personally.  While 
framed in risk perception terms, we are of course also speaking of subjective exposure and 
experienced vulnerability.  Again, the information environment in terms of media coverage, 
public discourse, and popular science and documentaries figures powerfully here, not only in 
the social construction and representation of the environmental problem and threat, but in 
assessing one’s own feelings and thoughts, and coping strategies and response options (e.g., 
Boykoff, 2011; Carvalho, 2005; Reser et al., 2012a).  The risk perception findings strongly 
confirm that respondents by and large accept that this is a very salient and meaningful threat, 
quite possibly requiring individual and household responses as well as collective and 
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governmental action and resolve.  The correlational findings also begin to say something 
about associated psychological responses and impacts to this global threat and changing 
nature and condition of the natural environment, such as concern and distress.  The strong 
correlations between risk perceptions and climate change concern, distress, self-efficacy, and 
responsibility further suggest that risk perceptions are directly related to respondent 
motivational responses. The next section addressing climate change concern begins to 
address this psychological response side of beliefs and risk perceptions (Ryghaug, Sørensen, 
& Naess, 2010). 
 
 
“Risk perception findings would suggest that in addition to the Australian public’s 
acceptance of climate change, they are also viewing this global phenomenon and its 
associated changes and impacts as a very real threat”
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CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERN 
An important focus of the research was to measure, examine, and document public 
concern levels with respect to climate change, and their putative role in mediating adaptation 
and mitigation responses and the possible psychological and social impacts of the climate 
change threat.  There is understandable but often confusing conceptual and measurement 
overlap between the constructs of risk perception, appraisal, response, and concern(s) in the 
context of an environmental threat and phenomenon such as climate change (Reser, 2010). 
Nonetheless an attempt was made in this research to utilise a convergent set of previously 
tested survey items relating to climate change concern which might form the basis for a more 
satisfactory approach to the measurement and monitoring of public climate change concern 
levels. 
Environmental concern relates directly to environmental risk perceptions and sense 
making with respect to perceived environmental changes and threats, and media coverage of 
environmental risks, degradation, and hazards, but such concern is arguably better viewed as 
relating more to one’s psychological response and state rather than to risk perceptions or 
appraisals per se though these are of course interacting processes (Cvetkovich & Earle, 1992; 
Pidgeon, Kasperson, & Slovic, 2003; Reser, 2010; Slovic, 2000; Wandersman & Hallman, 
1993).  An extensive literature on environmental concern exists, with many authors tending 
to treat environmental concern and environmental values almost synonymously (e.g., 
Schmuck & Schultz, 2002; Schultz, 2001; Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico & Khazian, 2004; Stern 
& Dietz, 1994).  Environmental concern is a sensitive and meaningful psychological indicator 
in the context of psychosocial impact assessment (e.g., Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2001, 
2005) and reflects an important dimension of broader public issue perceptions and 
understandings.   
Concern about the threat and/or perceived physical environmental impacts of climate 
change is a more specific type of environmental concern, relating to the perceived nature, 
course, and implications of this threat and phenomenon.  It has been unclear as to whether 
one’s perception, appraisal, and psychological response to media representations or perceived 
instances of climate change differ from risk perceptions and psychological responses to other 
natural or technological environmental threats (e.g., Baum, Fleming, & Davidson, 1983; 
Reser & Swim, 2011).  Many social scientists have used ‘public concern’ about climate 
change as a principal construct and measure in their research on public perceptions and 
responses to climate change, and this has been the case in this present research.  This also 
reflects a history of social science research moving from ‘global environmental change’ to 
‘global climate change’ (Chen, Boulding & Schneider, 1983; Gardner & Stern, 2002; 
National Research Council (NRC), 1992, 1999, 2010a, 2010b; Stern, 1992). 
The initial and very direct survey question relating to public concern about climate 
change was, “How concerned, if at all, are you about climate change, sometimes referred 
to as ‘global warming’?” (#7) (See Figure 5).  This item has particular face validity, is 
transparent and meaningful to respondents, and comes close to the beginning of the survey, 
limiting the influence of further items and issues.  The wording also does not presume 
concern, and response options allow for the selection of ‘don’t know’ or ‘no opinion’ 
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response.  As with many initial items in the survey, this item was identical to the Cardiff 
item.  The mean responses to the question on a four-point scale were very similar for the 
Australian (M = 2.83, SD = 0.93) and British (M = 2.90, SD = 0.92) samples, and indicated 
that respondents were, on the whole, appreciably concerned about climate change, with 
66.3% or two thirds of Australian respondents, for example, giving a ‘very concerned’ or a 
‘fairly concerned’ rating response as compared with 71% of British respondents.  Hence, 
notwithstanding these modest differences with respect to levels of climate change concern, 
both Australian and British respondents reported that they were, on the whole, quite 
concerned about climate change. 
        
Figure 5. Climate change concern. 
Additional items directly relating to climate change concern included two statements, 
one worded in terms of personal relevance and one in terms of societal relevance: 
“Considering any potential effects of climate change that might affect you personally 
[that there might be on society in general], how concerned, if at all, are you about 
climate change?” (#16, #17). (See Figures 6 & 7). 
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Figure 6. Climate change concern - personal relevance. 
            
    
Figure 7. Climate change concern - societal relevance. 
The mean concern ratings for Australian and British respondents to expressed concern 
about the personal impacts of climate change were (M = 2.72, SD = 0.90) and (M = 2.63, SD 
= 0.89) respectively.  The mean ratings with respect to adverse impacts on society in general 
were (M = 2.87, SD = 0.90) and (M = 2.77, SD = 0.84).  (Note: These means are based on the 
4-point rating scale).  In absolute terms concern levels were quite high, with 61.8% of 
Australian respondents and 59.8% of British respondents indicating that they felt either ‘very 
concerned’ or ‘fairly concerned’ about personal consequences, and 68.6% of Australians and 
66.4% of British respondents indicating that they were either ‘very concerned’ or ‘fairly 
concerned’ about the impacts of climate change on society in general.  An additional 25.7% 
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and 27.6% of Australian and British respondents, respectively, indicated a modest level of 
concern about the personal impacts of climate change, and 20.9% and 23.3% about societal 
impacts.  It is important to note that these items were questions about the personal and 
societal psychosocial impacts of climate change, not the more abstract phenomenon of 
‘climate change’.  These findings may also reflect the pervasive risk appraisal finding that 
individuals tend to exhibit a measure of optimism bias with respect to personal adverse 
consequences in the context of risks generally (e.g., Pohl, 2004; Weinstein, 1980), as well as 
a more nuanced psychological distancing in terms of local and personal threats or events 
which are more immediate geographically and temporally as contrasted with global and 
societal threats and events (e.g., Liberman, Trope & Stephan, 2007; Spence, Poortinga, & 
Pidgeon, 2011b; Uzzell, 2000, 2004).   
A further way to assess concern levels among respondents was to ask about the 
seriousness of climate change, “If nothing is done to reduce climate change in the future, 
how serious a problem do you think it will be for Australia/the world”?  Respondents 
were initially asked about the seriousness of climate change for Australia (#10), then for the 
world (#11).  (Corresponding questions were not included in the British survey).  See Figure 
8.  A large proportion of respondents indicated that climate change will be a ‘very’ or 
‘somewhat serious’ problem for the world if nothing is done (81.8%), with a similar 
percentage (77.9%) endorsing the seriousness of the problem for Australia.  Many studies 
addressing climate change risk perceptions and concerns in the context of such questions 
canvas both local and known environments and countries as well as geographically distant 
regions of the world (e.g., Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b; Spence, Poortinga, 
& Pidgeon, 2011b; Uzzell, 2000, 2004).
 
Figure 8. Seriousness of climate change for Australia and the world. 
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based on a response to item #7, of either ‘very’ or ‘fairly concerned’), 72.5%, 72.3% 
respectively, with these state findings being somewhat different from Queensland and New 
South Wales, where respondents reported the lowest (but still strong) levels of concern 
(62.1% reported in both states).  Refer to Figure 9.  If we compare these results to findings 
released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008), the Australian Capital Territory 
reported the highest level of climate change concern (in 2007-2008), as contrasted with the 
lowest levels of concern reported in the Northern Territory.  See Figure 10.  These single item 
findings are replicated by regional comparisons using the composite measure of concern, 
discussed in the next section of the report. 
          
Figure 9. Percentage of respondents reporting climate change concern, based on item #7 'very' or 
'fairly' concerned 
 
Whether concerned about climate change 
      
Figure 10. Percentage of respondents reporting climate change concern in 2007-2008 as indicated by 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
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COMPOSITE MEASURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERN 
The results relating to item #7 are very consistent with other survey items related to 
concern, such as the perceived seriousness of the problem (# 10, #11), the immediacy of 
impacts (# 14, #32), and the personal and societal consequences of climate change (#16, #17, 
#22).  The results are also similar to other recent social science-based surveys addressing 
climate change in Australia (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2011; ABS, 2008; Ipsos-Eureka, 2010; 
Lamberts, Grant, & Martin, 2010; The Climate Institute, 2008, 2010).  These findings give 
further credence to preceding belief and risk perception results, and are notably different from 
many media reports suggesting that the Australian public is relatively unconcerned about and 
dismissive of the threat and implications of climate change (e.g., Reser, 2011a, 2011b). 
  In view of the nature of the parametric and structural equation modeling analyses 
planned for this research, a composite measure of climate change concern was developed.  
The seven-item measure included items relating to general levels of concern, as well as more 
specific concerns as to the consequences of climate change (#7, #10, #11, #16, #17, #23m, 
#32).  The measure included items relating to the perceived seriousness of the problem at 
local, global, personal and societal levels.  The scale contained items such as, “Considering 
any potential effects of climate change that might affect you personally, how concerned, 
it at all, are you about climate change?”  Scores were summed (possible range 7-32), with 
higher scores indicating greater levels of concern (M = 23.34, SD = 6.61).  This scale 
achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .95.  
CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERN DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Female respondents indicated significantly greater levels of concern (M = 24.5, p < 
.001) than did male respondents (M = 22.0), consistent with previous Australian research 
findings (ABS, 2008; Ashworth et al., 2011; Searle and Gow, 2010; Sweeney Research, 
2010; The Climate Institute, 2008).  Young adults (less than 35 years) evidenced significantly 
higher levels of concern (M = 24.3, p < .001) than did respondents aged over 55 years (M = 
22.0), which is also consistent with other survey research undertaken in Australia (e.g., ABS, 
2008; Sweeney Research, 2010).  Respondents with a university degree had significantly 
higher levels of concern (M = 24.2, p < .001) than did those with a certificate/trade (M = 
23.1) or high school education (M = 22.0).  Respondents without children or grandchildren 
had greater levels of concern (M = 24.1, p < .001) than did those who were parents and/or 
grandparents (M = 23.0).  Urban respondents evidenced slightly higher levels of concern (M
= 23.5, p < .001) than did rural respondents (M = 22.9), with non-home-owners also 
indicating greater levels of concern (M = 23.8, p < .001) than did home-owners (M = 23.1).   
Respondents intending to vote Green or Labor at the next Federal election evidenced 
significantly greater levels of concern (M = 25.5, p < .001) than did those intending to vote 
for another party (M = 21.7).  No significant differences were found for climate change 
concern across groups of respondents differentiated by income, employment status, or 
country of birth.  In general the between-group differences in concern were similar to those 
previously reported in relation to acceptance or belief in climate change.  (See Appendix L).  
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CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERN CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
The more general picture of how climate change concern relates to other salient 
survey variables is found in Appendix K.   Not surprisingly climate change concern correlates 
strongly with belief or acceptance of climate change (r = .82), risk perception (r = .73), 
responsibility and willingness to act (r = .76), climate change distress (r = .78), psychological 
adaptation to climate change (r = .73), climate change-specific self-efficacy (r = .73), and 
behaviour (r = .44).  A significant, but quite modest association was found between concern 
and previous exposure and experience with natural disasters (r = .12).  All correlations were 
significant at p < .001.  The findings indicated a very strong correlation between risk 
perception and climate change concern, operationalised as two independent composite scales, 
notwithstanding the fact that risk perception and appraisal processes are conceptually distinct 
from resultant climate change concern (e.g., Reser, 2010).  Again, risk perception and risk 
appraisal are arguably based on an evaluation of an external threat, whereas climate change 
or environmental concerns are psychological responses to this risk perception/appraisal which 
in turn reflect the psychological impact of the risk as mediated by risk appraisal (Doherty, & 
Clayton, 2011; Reser, Morrissey & Ellul, 2011).  
There is substantial consistency and coherence in these correlational findings.  It 
‘makes sense’ that the Australian public, by and large, accept and appreciate the implications 
of climate change across a spectrum of psychological responses.  It is worth noting that the 
correlations between concern and other core variables are particularly strong, accounting for 
between half and two thirds of the variance in most instances.  Australian respondents are 
concerned about and motivated to address this issue.  They are experiencing some distress at 
what is at stake and the seeming national and global lack of action in the face of this arguably 
profound threat, as will be discussed, and they are changing how they are thinking and 
feeling about climate change, as well as some aspects of their daily lives that have carbon 
footprint implications.   
COMPARATIVE FINDINGS OF CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERN  
How do the results found in the current study relating to public levels of climate 
change concern compare to other Australian and overseas findings?   Figure 11 provides an 
example of two additional national representative surveys, one conducted in Australia by the 
CSIRO and the other in America, undertaken by the Yale Project on Climate Change 
(Leiserowitz, Smith, et al., 2010; Leviston & Walker, 2010).  Whilst the wording of the 
question and response format is slightly different from the current survey, (i.e., replacing 
‘concerned’ with ‘worried’), overall, the results suggest a large proportion of respondents 
were on the whole, ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ worried about climate change, with somewhat lower 
levels of concern found in the U.S. as compared with Australia and Britain (65% CSIRO, 
55% Yale University).  Overall, public levels of climate change concern remain quite high.  
These results are consistent with Neilsen’s 2011 Global Online Environment & Sustainability 
Survey, which included more than 25,000 respondents from 51 countries (Nielsen, 2011).  
Whilst the findings from the Nielsen survey suggest climate change concern has decreased in 
recent years, a large majority of respondents indicated they were ‘very’ or ‘quite concerned’ 
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about climate change (69%).  This was down from (72%) in 2007.  The Nielsen report (2011) 
suggests one of the reasons for the drop in concern is a focus on other environmental issues 
(i.e., air and water pollution, pesticides, packaging waste, and water shortages).  Daily 
worries such as job security, crime, and economic well-being, and a decrease in the climate 
change media coverage, may all be contributing to this slight decrease in public concern 
levels.  Interestingly, a recent CSIRO survey (2010) asked respondents what they thought 
were the three most important environmental issues facing Australia today. Climate change 
issues accounted for almost 25% of responses and were clearly the most important 
environmental issue in this recent and in-depth survey (Ashworth et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 11. Public concern levels.   
Note: The percentage figures for the CSIRO have been estimated from graphs included in their 2011 
report (Leviston & Walker, 2011). 
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A number of items were included in the current survey to address general 
environmental concern.  A single question asked respondents to indicate their extent of 
agreement with the statement, “I think of myself as someone who is very concerned with 
environmental issues,” (#21) (see Appendix I).  Clearly the focus of concern changes here, 
in part because this becomes, in effect, a self-perception judgment, and in part because the 
focal reference is ‘environmental issues’ rather than ‘climate change’.  The respective mean 
ratings for this self-ascription scale were essentially identical for Australian (M = 3.50, SD = 
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from Britain on the other hand more strongly identified with the aims of environmental 
groups such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (M = 3.37, SD = 1.14) than did 
Australian respondents (M = 3.17, SD = 1.15), p <.001.   
SUMMARY 
These findings relating to climate change concern, taken together, both validate and 
inform our general finding from Australia and Britain that survey respondent climate change 
concern levels are, contrary to widespread media reports of public concern, very high.  It 
would appear to be the case that such measures of climate change concern provide a very 
useful and sensitive index of public risk perceptions and understandings, as well as 
psychological responses and impacts of the threat of climate change.  The research literature 
would suggest that these concern levels and psychological impacts may be more immediately 
and directly the product of multi-media coverage and treatment of the threat and unfolding 
global impacts of climate change (e.g., Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007: Carvalho & Burgess, 
2005; Eckersley, 2008; Graumann & Kruse, 1990; Smith & Joffe, 2009), although current 
findings suggest that direct personal encounters with what are perceived to be climate change 
events and environmental impacts are clearly ubiquitous and of particular salience.   
“Australian and British respondents reported that they were, on the whole, quite 
concerned about climate change” 
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PERCEIVED CAUSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Public perceptions of the causes of climate change relate to perceptions and 
understandings of the anthropogenic forcing of climate change.  Figure 12 indicates the 
comparison percentages to each of the response options, “Thinking about the causes of 
climate change, which of the following best describes your opinion?” (#9).  A remarkable 
similarity in causal perceptions is evident, with 45.8% and 46.3% of Australian and British 
respondents choosing the option, “Climate change is partly caused by natural processes and 
partly caused by human activity”, and a further 27.6% and 24.3% selecting the response 
option, “Climate change is mainly caused by human activity”. In contrast to this predominant 
view, approximately 18% of both Australian respondents and British respondents selected 
one of the following response options: “Climate change is entirely caused by natural 
processes” or, “Climate change is mainly caused by natural processes” with this latter 
response option nonetheless acknowledging some human causal contribution.  These findings 
again indicate strong similarities across the two national samples, and a shared perception by 
an overwhelming majority of respondents (90% and 89%) that human activities are a causal 
factor in contemporary climate change.  It is interesting that the response option, “I think 
there is no such thing as climate change” attracted only 2.7 and 2.2 percent of responses, and 
the response option “climate change is entirely caused by natural process’’ attracted only 4.9 
and 5.6 percent of responses respectively, suggesting that strong scepticism and actual 
disbelief in climate change characterise very small proportions of Australian and British 
respondents (in the context of this item, 7.6% and 7.8%), much less than media coverage 
might lead one to believe.  
 
Figure 12. Causes of climate change 
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responses were, “Assuming global warming is happening, do you think it is: caused mostly 
by human activities (47%); caused mostly by natural changes in the environment (36%); none 
of the above because global warming isn’t happening (9%); or caused by both human 
activities and natural causes (volunteered) (6%)”.  While the question and response format 
are not directly comparable, it seems clear that the majority of US respondents in survey 
reports using similarly worded items and response formats also believed that human activities 
constituted a contributing cause to current climate change.  It is particularly noteworthy that 
the response format in this widely cited recent study did not offer a response option which 
covered both ‘human activities and natural changes’ and these had to be volunteered by 
respondents.  This suggests that there might well exist a pervasive under-reporting of public 
acceptance of the contributing causal role of human activities in the context of climate 
change.  (Reference to Appendix O comparing national and international survey findings 
relating to causal attributions of climate change is particularly helpful to what follows.) 
 
Public acceptance of anthropogenic forcing of climate change is ostensibly a 
contested matter in Australia, hence it is informative to examine this matter across a larger 
national and international canvas.  Question framing and response options are clearly 
important in such comparisons. When examining similar questions, but somewhat different 
response options, comparisons across surveys provide strong support for widespread 
acceptance of some level of human causality.  The one discrepant finding across these studies 
is readily explained in terms of limited response options (See Figure 13, and Appendix O).  
 
      
Figure 13. Framing effects 
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in Earth’s temperatures”, and “I think that climate change is happening, and I think 
that humans are largely causing it”.  Hence respondents who accepted that climate change 
was happening had a very difficult choice, with no real option allowing for substantive 
natural and human causal contributions.  In contrast the other surveys in Appendix O, with 
the exception of the Leiserowitz survey, mention causation in the question or item statement, 
and each of the other surveys provide at least three response alternatives relating to differing 
natural/human causation possibilities or accounts.  In the case of the Griffith and Cardiff 
surveys, there were five response options which related to differing causal possibilities, and 
all were well utilised by respondents.   
An independent and subsequent, but as yet unpublished, research study undertaken at 
Griffith University in late 2011 (n = 200 +) clearly indicates that independent groups of 
survey respondents randomly assigned to receive either the Griffith or CSIRO framings and 
response options, systematically varied, replicated both the Griffith and CSIRO findings in 
otherwise similar online survey instruments, providing strong evidence that the independent 
effect of differing response options accounted for these seeming discrepant findings (Reser, 
Bradley, Lewis-Driver, Glendon, & O’Gorman, 2012b). 
Most of the survey findings in Appendix O have since been replicated in 2011 with 
very little change in terms of causal attributions and beliefs.  Both the Griffith research group 
and the CSIRO research group have replicated their 2010 findings with large national 
samples of new respondents (Leviston & Walker, 2011, Reser, Bradley, Glendon, Ellul, & 
Callaghan, 2012c).  The response options for the respective survey items remained identical.  
These 2011 findings strongly suggest that the differing response alternatives available to 
respondents very substantially determined what have been reported as very different findings 
relating to public acceptance of a human causal contribution to climate change.  These 
national and international findings overall with respect to acceptance of anthropogenic 
climate change have important implications not only for public understandings and successful 
public engagement, but with respect to disaster perception and response more generally, as 
will be discussed, along with multiple motivation, adaptation, and behavioural engagement 
implications. 
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RESPONSIBILITY 
The acceptance of some level of human causality with respect to contemporary 
climate change of course implicates individual and collective responsibility, as well as 
possible associated emotional and self perception responses, such as guilt, pessimism, and 
lessened self-esteem.  The more important the issue of climate change is to an individual 
(#25), the more salient these responsibility implications are likely to be.  As well, of course, 
attribution of human causality also carries the possibility of a collective human redressing of 
the problem, with corresponding self and collective efficacy implications, and possibly 
optimism as well as felt responsibility and guilt (e.g., Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010).  Item 
#25 asked respondents, “How important is the issue of climate change to you personally?” 
on a 6-point rating scale (1 = Not at all important to 6 = Extremely important).  Results from 
this item found the large majority of respondents found the issue of climate change to be 
quite important (M = 4.47, SD = 1.47).  The Australian survey included several items relating 
to felt responsibility in the context of climate change, #13, #18, #35, and #36, with #37 
constituting an often cited ‘self-efficacy’ scale (Kellstedt et al., 2008) containing two items of 
arguable direct relevance to felt responsibility e.g., “Human beings are responsible for 
global warming and climate change”, on a 6-point rating scale (1 = Strongly agree to 6 = 
Strongly disagree).  Items #35 and #36 were also noteworthy as these questions addressed 
respondents’ reasons for being engaged or not in particular pro-environmental behaviours 
relating to environmental sustainability and a reduced carbon footprint.   
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Following item analyses for all survey scales, a composite responsibility scale was 
operationalised as a 4-item measure which included a willingness to act, as well as felt 
personal responsibility (#13e, f, #20a, b).  The scale included items such as, “It is my 
responsibility to help to do something about climate change”.  Scores were summed 
(possible range 4-24), with higher scores indicating a stronger endorsement of personal 
responsibility (M = 12.69, SD = 3.54). This scale achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .82.   
RESPONSIBILITY DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Female respondents indicated significantly greater levels of felt responsibility and 
willingness to act (M = 13.3, p < .001) than did male respondents (M = 12.1).  Young adults 
(<35) evidenced higher scores on responsibility (M = 13.1, p < .001) than respondents aged 
35-54 (M = 12.8), or those aged over 55 (M = 12.2).  Participants with a university degree 
had higher felt responsibility scores (M = 13.2, p < .001) than those with a certificate/trade 
(M = 12.6), or high school education (M = 12.0).  Surprisingly, respondents without 
children/grandchildren indicated higher levels of responsibility (M = 13.0, p < .001) than 
those with children/grandchildren (M = 12.0).   Finally, respondents intending to vote Green 
or Labor at the next Federal election indicated higher levels of felt responsibility (M = 13.8, p
< .001) than those intending to vote for another party (M = 11.9).  No significant differences 
were found for responsibility scores between comparison groups formed on the basis of 
income, home ownership, country of birth, residential or employment status.  
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RESPONSIBILITY CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Correlational analyses indicated that felt responsibility was strongly and positively 
associated with behavioural engagement (r = .48), psychological adaptation (r = .69), trust (r
= .48), connection to nature (r = .45), and objective knowledge (r = .43), and more 
moderately related to other variables such as residential exposure (r = .36), direct experience 
of climate change (r = .35), media exposure (r = .23), and subjective knowledge (r = .22).  
All of these correlations were significant at p < .001.  These findings suggest that the issues 
of climate change belief or acceptance are complex and nuanced, and that acceptance of 
anthropogenic climate change implies not only a level of human causality but also human 
responsibility, with individuals differing on the extent to which such notional responsibility is 
individually and personally felt.  
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAKING ACTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
Multiple theoretical and research literatures address causal and responsibility 
attributions in the context of environmental threat, and more recently climate change, and 
how these attributions relate to public understandings with respect to anthropogenic forcing, 
self-efficacy and perceived control, local versus global considerations, and motivational 
processes, including protection motivation and psychological distancing (e.g., Lavergne, 
Sharp, Pelletier, & Holtby, 2010; Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009).  Additional items and 
sections of the Australian survey address these matters further.  Respondents were asked, for 
example, to indicate who they perceived as having principal responsibility for taking action to 
combat climate change, “Which of the following do you think should be mainly 
responsible for taking action against climate change?” (#18).  These findings are not 
directly comparable to those for Britain because of differing instructions (Australian 
respondents were advised that they could tick multiple responses whereas British respondents 
was asked to indicate a single option) (See Figures 14 and 15).   
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Figure 14. Perceived responsibility for action to combat climate change: Australian sample 
        
 
Figure 15. Perceived responsibility for action to combat climate change: UK sample
The overall distribution of responses is quite similar, notwithstanding that Australians 
could select more than one item.  Certainly the initial three response options are highly 
similar.  It is clear that respondents believe that national governments, the international 
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to combat climate change.  But the Australian multiple response data would suggest that 
individuals and families are viewed as having almost equal responsibility to take action in the 
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almost equally important responsibility attribution relating to individuals and families, and 
possibly local authorities and environmental groups.  Similarly, in the case of local 
authorities, it is likely that multiple option instructions might have provided more similar 
findings, notwithstanding the decentralised levels of responsibility that characterise the 
Australian State and local government systems. 
It is noteworthy that in response to item #13e British respondents were more likely 
than Australian respondents to ‘strongly agree’ or to ‘tend to agree’ with the statement, “I
feel a sense of urgency to change my behaviours to help to reduce climate change” (UK 
41.9%, AU 35.6%).  This finding must be understood in a context in which many Australians 
have already been changing their behaviours in the face of a more palpable and immediate 
climate change threat.  Extent of agreement with item #13f, “It is my responsibility to help 
to do something about climate change” is of particular interest as over 50% of both 
Australian (60.1%) and UK (70.5%) respondents indicated that they either ‘strongly agreed’ 
or ‘tended to agree’ with the statement. 
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SELF-EFFICACY 
An important dimension of public response to the threat of climate change in the 
survey was perceived self-efficacy with respect to this, for many, daunting and global 
problem, i.e., the extent to which people feel they can engage in actions that could make a 
difference either in their local or global environment (Bandura, 1997, 2006; Tabernero & 
Hernández, 2010).  Respondents were asked to indicate their extent of agreement with a 
number of statements (#13, #37) (see Appendix I).  Results indicate that respondents by and 
large felt that it was possible for them to take effective action in their personal lives to 
counter climate change.  These findings suggest that the common stereotype that the public 
feels overwhelmed and helpless in the face of climate change is far from the case, at least in 
these two countries.  While the similarities between Australian and British responses are, 
again, much more noteworthy than the differences, the findings suggest that compared with 
their British counterparts, Australian respondents reported feeling somewhat more able to 
make changes that could make a difference with respect to climate change, and somewhat 
less likely to agree that, “It is hard to take action against climate change”. 
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF SELF-EFFICACY 
A composite measure of self-efficacy was developed to assist with parametric and 
structural equation modeling analyses.  This five-item composite measure included two items 
(#13a, d) from Kellstedt et al.’s personal efficacy for global warming scale  (Kellstedt et al., 
2008) and three items developed by Cardiff and Griffith University,( #37a, b, c).  The scale 
included items such as, “My actions to reduce the effects of climate change in my 
community will encourage others to reduce the effects of global warming through their 
own actions”.  Scores were summed (possible range 5-30), with higher scores indicating 
greater levels of personal self-efficacy (M = 18.38, SD = 5.13).  This scale achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .89. 
SELF-EFFICACY CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Correlational analyses indicated self-efficacy was strongly and positively associated 
with responsibility (r = .79), climate change concern (r = .73), psychological adaptation (r = 
.69), distress (r = .66), green self-identity (r = .61), belief in climate change (r = .60), risk 
appraisal (r = .59), behaviour (r = .50), trust (r = .49), and objective knowledge (r = .40).  
Self-efficacy was found to be more moderately correlated with residential exposure (r = .38), 
subjective knowledge (r = .24), media exposure (r = .20), and prior disaster exposure (r = 
.14).  The correlations were all significant at p < .001 (See Appendix K). 
SELF-EFFICACY DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Female respondents reported higher levels of self-efficacy (M = 19.2, p < .001) than 
did male respondents (M = 17.4).  Younger participants (<35) evidenced higher levels of self-
efficacy (M = 18.8, p < .001) than respondents aged over 55 (M = 17.7).  Higher levels of 
self-efficacy were found for those respondents with tertiary education (M = 18.9, p < .001) as 
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compared to those with a high school education (M = 17.9).  Respondents intending to vote 
Green or Labor at the next Federal Election evidenced higher levels of self-efficacy (M = 
19.7, p < .001)  than those intending to vote for another party (M = 17.4).  Modest yet 
significant differences were also found for parental, and employment status.  Respondents 
without children/grandchildren and those working had slightly higher levels of self-efficacy 
than parents and unemployed respondents.  
SUMMARY 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of perceived self efficacy, control, and 
human agency and responsibility, in the context of an environmental issue such as climate 
change and adaptation and mitigation responses.  Nonetheless, a considerable challenge in the 
context of climate change is to overcome a common risk perception and secondary threat 
appraisal that there is very little than an individual can do about this complex and global 
problem.  Indeed some researchers addressing the issue of coping with climate change have 
concluded that collective efficacy is perhaps a more potent and efficacious coping option than 
self-efficacy (e.g., Grothman & Patt, 2005; Homberg & Stolberg, 2006; Van Zomeren, Spears 
& Leach, 2011).  The arguments advanced are understandable, but problematic in some 
respects, as efficacy appraisals and judgments involve not only the undertaking of an action 
but judgments of likely effectiveness and the perceived motivations, actions and efficacy of 
others (e.g., Bandura 1997, 2006).   In any case there is little question but that perceived self 
efficacy, collective efficacy, and an understanding and appreciation of the role of human 
agency in contemporary climate change are important and strategic factors in human 
responses to the threat of climate change, including motivations, coping and adaptation 
strategies, behavioural engagement, and psychological impacts (e.g., Reser, et al., 2012a).  
Current survey findings clearly indicate that perceived self-efficacy for Australian 
respondents is important, and strongly associated with other core variables. 
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UNFOLDING IMPACTS AND IMMEDIACY OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
TEMPORAL, SPATIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE 
An important item in the survey related to the immediacy of the climate change threat 
and unfolding impacts.  Respondents were asked: “When, if at all, do you think Australia 
[Britain] will start feeling the effects of climate change?” (#14)  Figure 16 provides 
relative percentages across response options. 
 
Figure 16. Temporal immediacy of climate threat and impacts 
The response distribution indicates that Australian respondents were more likely to 
report that they were already experiencing the effects of climate change, with relative 
frequencies for the next three response options higher for British respondents.  Thus 54% 
(AU) and 41% (UK) of respondents believed that they were already feeling the effects of 
climate change, while a further 17% and 27% of respondents thought that they would be 
feeling these effects within the next 10 to 25 years.  Gallup polls in the United States saw a 
dramatic increase in response to an item introduced in 1997 asking ‘When will the effects of 
global warming begin to happen’, with 60% of respondents answering that the effects had 
already begun by the time of the 2007 survey (Nisbet & Myers, 2007).  It is noteworthy that 
5.5% of Australian respondents opted for the ‘Never’ response option compared with 3.6% of 
British respondents.  This might suggest that a small but proportionately larger core group of 
climate change disbelievers and/or sceptics exists in Australia.  The contrast between 
Australian and British respondents in endorsing the ‘Don’t know’ option to this question is 
also worth mention, with the respective 12.9% versus 7.1% figures indicating that a greater 
proportion of Australian respondents reported not knowing when the effects of climate 
change were likely to commence.  This could reflect the confusing picture presented by the 
extreme natural disaster events in Australia over the past few years, including a crippling 
drought which lasted more than a decade across extensive areas of Australia, and only ending 
in late 2009 and early 2010, when much of Northeastern Australia was extensively flooded.   
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SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DISTANCING: THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 
Several survey questions examined aspects of the local/global continuum in terms of 
risk perceptions, appraisal, perceived exposure and psychological distance (e.g., Spence et al., 
2011b; Uzzell, 2000, 2004).  These and similar items have been used to explore and 
document the extent to which people tend to view climate change as a global phenomenon, 
distant in space as well as time from their own life circumstances (Lima & Castro, 2005; 
Uzzell, 2000).  In the context of this comparative research it was thought that Australian 
respondents would be less prone to ‘distance’ the threat and impacts of climate change.  This 
is one of the few areas of the joint surveys where clear and consistent differences between 
Australian and British respondents were evident.  In each relevant instance the direction of 
the differences indicated that climate change was seen as a more immediate, proximal threat 
in Australia than it was in Britain (p < .01).  
A number of items in the survey addressed the now well-documented finding that the 
perceived threat and seriousness of environmental problems, including climate change, tend 
to be minimised for one’s local and national region, but with one’s ‘vision’ becoming 
increasingly clearer and less distorted as the spatial and temporal focus become more distant 
and global (e.g., Lima & Castro, 2005; Uzzell, 2000, 2004).  The phenomenon has been 
called environmental hyperopia, or farsightedness in the context of such environmental 
threat, with risk perception and appraisal becoming more accurate and less blinkered with 
greater geographic and temporal distance.  Such distorting perceptions are self-serving in the 
context of climate change exposure and risk, as such perceptions tend to ‘distance’ the 
problems and risk, and minimize one’s own perceived vulnerability.  Australia presents an 
interesting case in that it could be argued that the relatively high current and predicted 
exposure of Australia to the impacts of climate change, along with the noteworthy incidence 
of extreme weather events in Australia over the 18 month period preceding the survey, would 
reduce protective ‘farsightedness’ or ‘hyperopia’ with respect to the local Australian context.  
Australian survey findings do show a modest but clear hyperopia effect with respect to the 
threat and seriousness of climate change, and again, evidence some interesting similarities 
and differences between Australian and British respondents.  The initial two survey items 
relating to this matter, which only Australian respondents completed, were questions #10 and 
#11.  The perceived seriousness of the climate change problem increases modestly but 
significantly as the question framing moves from a national reference to a global 
consideration.  Seventy-eight percent of respondents gave a problem rating of ‘very serious’ 
or ‘somewhat serious’ for Australia, whereas 81.8% of respondents gave those ratings for 
‘the world’.  Hence Australian respondents appear to be viewing their own exposure to the 
threat of climate change as very serious, but somewhat less serious than countries elsewhere 
in the world, even though Australia is deemed to be, in fact, considerably more exposed than 
other inhabited continents (e.g., CSIRO-BoM 2007, 2009; DCC, 2010; Steffen, 2009). 
All four items in question #15 can be seen to relate to the psychological distancing 
and risk perception distortion reflected in the phenomenon of environmental hyperopia.  In 
each instance where items stated that climate change impacts would be felt more seriously by 
distant countries, the differences between Australian and British respondents were dramatic, 
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with only 8.5% of Australian respondents, as compared with 32.1% of British respondents, 
either ‘strongly agreeing’ or ‘tending to agree’ that “Climate change will mostly affect 
areas that are far way from here”.  Similarly only 22.7% of Australian respondents as 
compared with 45.8% of British respondents either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘tended to agree’ that 
“Climate change will most affect developing countries”.  (See Figures 17 and 18).  That is, 
Australian respondents were much less likely to underestimate the risk of the climate change 
threat to their own country.  Differences were somewhat less marked for the remaining two 
items (#15c, d) relating to threatened local consequences of climate change.  Sixty-one 
percent of Australian respondents as compared with 52.6% of British respondents either 
‘strongly agreed’ or ‘tended to agree’ that “My local area is likely to be affected by climate 
change”.  In the case of the statement “Climate change is likely to have a big impact on 
people like me”, 45.6 % of Australian respondents and 44.6% of British respondents either 
‘strongly agreed’ or ‘tended to agree’, an almost identical finding. 
 
Figure 17. Spatial distancing of climate change effects: far away areas 
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Figure 18. Spatial distancing of climate change effects: developing countries
These findings suggest that levels of personal concern about climate change are quite 
high in both countries, notwithstanding the somewhat easier to maintain relative distancing 
effect for British respondents who are more prone to view climate change as a very serious 
but distant threat, relative to the UK and adjacent countries, than are Australian respondents.  
On the other hand, Australian respondents are only slightly more likely to agree that their 
local area and people similar to themselves are likely to be affected appreciably by climate 
change.  It could be concluded that neither Australian nor British respondents were entirely 
clear sighted when focusing on the local situation, but Australian respondents,though dint of 
circumstance and recent experience, are viewing their climate change exposure and 
vulnerability as more serious than British respondents. 
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TRUST 
A further comparison relates to relative extent of respondent agreement with the 
statement “I trust the Australian/British government to take appropriate action against 
climate change” (#12g).  Only 15.7% of Australian respondents as compared with 30.7% of 
British respondents ‘agreed strongly’ or ‘tended to agree’ with this statement.  There is little 
doubt that the acrimonious political issue status of climate change policies in Australia has 
eroded public confidence and trust that appropriate actions will be taken.  These findings, 
along with the strong results supporting a widespread belief that human activities are 
substantially contributing to climate change, shed light on and raise questions with respect to 
when and how perceived anthropogenic causation is associated with personal responsibility 
attributions in the case of global climate change. 
The Australian-specific item #27 addressed the matter of trust in the context of what 
different sources have to say about the environment, in this case ‘scientists’, ‘media’, and 
‘government’.  The matter of public trust has been viewed as an important consideration in its 
own right and also indirectly addresses the issue of source credibility (e.g., Earle, 2010; 
Siegrist, Earle & Gutscher, 2007).  The survey results indicate that public trust in what 
scientists say about the environment is relatively high, with a mean rating of 4.25 (based on a 
6-point scale, 1 = Not at all to 6 = Completely), but that levels of trust in what the media and 
government say about the environment is notably low, with mean ratings of 2.64 and 2.90 
respectively.  These findings are broadly consistent with CSIRO’s 2010 national survey 
findings in response to their group and organization specific question, “How much do you 
trust the following organisations or people to tell you the truth about climate change?” 
University scientists and environmental scientists and organisations received the highest trust 
ratings (Leviston & Walker, 2010).  
While these findings would appear to be robust, it is the case that most people do not 
obtain their information about climate change or the environment directly from scientists or 
the government, but through media reporting of and interpretation of what scientists and 
government officials are saying (Boykoff & Smith, 2010; Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 
2012; Malka et al., 2009).  Nonetheless it is arguable that, in Australia, scientists still retain 
quite strong credibility when speaking about the environment and what they say presumably 
influences both public understandings and confidence levels in science generally. 
COMPOSITE VARIABLE OF TRUST 
A composite scale of trust was developed from existing survey items (##12g, #27a, b, 
c).   The four-item measure included a modified question from Krosnick, which was used in 
the ABC news/planet green/Stanford University poll (ABC News, 2007).   The scale included 
items such as, “How much do you trust what different sources say about the 
environment”.  Scores were summed (possible range 4-23), with higher scores indicating 
greater trust (M = 12.03, SD = 3.45).  Cronbach’s alpha was .73 indicating a reliable measure.  
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TRUST CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Strong, positive, and significant relationships (p < .001) were observed between trust 
and climate change concern (r = .55), distress (r = .49), self-efficacy (r = .49), responsibility 
(r = .48), belief in climate change (r = .48), responsibility (r = .48), and risk appraisal (r = 
.43).  Further, moderate, positive correlations were found between trust and green self-
identity (r = .34), objective knowledge (r = .31), connection to nature (r = .25), behaviour (r
= .24), direct exposure to climate change impacts (r = .24), and residential exposure (r = .23). 
TRUST DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Female respondents indicated higher levels of trust (M = 12.4, p < .001) than did male 
respondents (M = 11.6).  Respondents aged less than 35 reported significantly higher levels 
of trust (M = 12.8, p < .001) than did respondents aged 35-54 years (M = 12.0), and those 
over 55 years of age (M = 11.5).  Respondents without children or grandchildren reported 
significantly greater levels of trust (M = 12.5, p < .001) than those with children or 
grandchildren (M = 11.8).  Urban respondents were significantly more trusting (M = 12.2, p < 
.001) than rural respondents (M = 11.7).  Respondents intending to vote Green or Labor at the 
next Federal election demonstrated greater levels of trust (M = 13.0, p < .001) than those 
intending to vote for another party (M = 11.2).  There were no significant differences found 
between groups formed on the basis of educational attainment levels, employment status, or 
income levels. 
SUMMARY 
These findings relating to trust are interesting on a number of counts.  They clearly 
show that these Australian respondents do, by and large, credit what scientists say about the 
environment and believe that scientists as a collective group will take appropriate actions 
against climate change to the extent possible.  But at the same time it is evident that trust in 
government to take appropriate measures, or in the media to accurately present the climate 
change case is quite low.  These findings are comparable with findings reported by Ashworth 
and colleagues, where Australian respondents rated scientific sources as the most trusted and 
government correspondence (e.g., mail outs), and media (e.g., radio, newspapers, magazines) 
as less trustworthy (Ashworth et al., 2011)  This is perhaps not surprising given the polarised 
and acrimonious political context and climate over the 12 month period to July-August 2011, 
and ultimately Labor’s back flip on pursuing effective carbon emission control legislation, 
despite arguably strong public support.  As well, trust in science in the context of climate 
change is a two-edged sword, as scientific forecasts for the remainder of the millennium are 
in fact quite bleak and confronting, and there is a comforting and self-serving protection 
motivation benefit in minimising the risk which is being communicated by the scientific 
community by disparaging or dismissing these messengers and their source credibility and 
trustworthiness.  The situation in Australia as contrasted with Britain over this period prior to 
the respective national surveys, along with more enduring socio-political differences with 
respect to faith in governing institutions, provide a cogent explanation for the differences 
found in levels of trust.  The overall endorsement of trust in science and scientists is 
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consistent with documented high levels of concern, along with faith and optimism that 
measures can be taken to address the problem.  As with other findings, female respondents 
and younger respondents indicated higher levels of trust, as did those respondents indicating 
Green and Labor voting intentions, but no significant differences in levels of trust were found 
across educational level, income, or employment status. 
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AUSTRALIAN SPECIFIC SURVEY FINDINGS 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 
A starting premise in the current research was that public ‘understandings’ of climate 
change were unlikely to overlap substantially with objective knowledge about the 
phenomenon or threat of climate change from a climate change science perspective.  An 
important reason for this is that public understandings would invariably reflect cultural 
meanings and symbolic components of this effective risk domain, as well as reflect multiple 
aspects of the social construction and representation of this phenomenon, ‘issue’, and 
‘environmental problem’ (e.g., Hulme, 2009; Kitsuse & Spector, 2000; Pidgeon et al., 2003; 
Wolf & Moser, 2011; Yusoff & Gabrys, 2011).  Individual, societal, and scientific 
understandings also necessarily encompass more than knowledge per se, with these matters 
briefly discussed in the discussion section of the report (e.g., Irwin, 1995; Irwin & Wynne, 
1996; Wynne, 1991).  Nonetheless many surveys addressing public responses to climate 
change do not address public understandings as such, and simply include a self-report level of 
knowledge item, or less often an objective knowledge scale (e.g., Kellstedt et al., 2008; 
Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & Morgan, 2010; Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008; Sundblad, Biel, 
& Gärling, 2009).  Such self report measures have been justly criticised as both confounding 
different kinds of knowledge and being subject to all of the vagaries and self-presentation 
biases of self report (e.g., Nisbet & Wilson, 1977; Schwarz, 1999).  For comparison purposes 
and for other conceptual, measurement and indicator reasons, the Griffith survey included 
both a single-item self-reported climate change knowledge item (#26) and a 10 item, 
true/false/don’t know, objective measure of knowledge about climate change science (#41).  
Very few Australian surveys of public responses to climate change have used a similar 
objective measure of climate change knowledge, with several exceptions (e.g., Ashworth et 
al., 2011; Fielding, 2009).   
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge is seen to be an integral component of public understandings of climate 
change, and a necessary but not sufficient factor in increasing public concern about risks and 
motivating preventive behaviours.  But knowledge can encompass many things, and in the 
case of global climate change this could be knowledge about climate change science, the 
causes and consequences of climate change, about politics, policies, and what actions one can 
take (e.g., Sundblad et al., 2009).  The pragmatic constraints of a national survey required a 
straightforward measure relating to aspects of climate change science frequently found in the 
media and popular science coverage, and similar or equivalent to content in existing objective 
measures used by other researchers.  The survey employed ten statements about the science 
and consequences of climate change which respondents were asked to designate as true or 
false, with a ‘don’t know’ option in each case.  These statements were based on the work of 
Sundblad et al. (2009).  Knowledge scores were obtained by assigning a value of +1 to 
correct answers, -1 to incorrect answers (to penalize indiscriminant guessing), and zero to 
non-committal ("don't know") answers, and summing these to produce a final score with a 
potential range of -10 to 10 (M = 2.69, SD = 2.91).  (See Table 2).   
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Table 2. Objective knowledge questions and distribution of responses 
Note: The correct answer for each item is highlighted in the table. 
 
What do these findings tell us and not tell us?  The overall knowledge ‘score’ is not 
directly interpretable as the differing items and scoring methods of these few studies using 
objective measures make comparisons difficult.  Nonetheless the scale provides a relatively 
sensitive and quantitative index of specific knowledge for examining associations with other 
variables as well as change over time.  It would appear, though, that objective knowledge of a 
climate change science-based account of climate change on the part of respondents is fairly 
modest.  While 59.4% of respondents correctly confirmed that Australia’s average 
temperature had increased by approximately 1°C from 1910 to 2002, for example, and 57% 
correctly noted that climate change is not caused by the hole in the ozone layer, the 
percentage of correct responses for the other 8 items was less than 50%.  Just over one third 
of respondents correctly confirmed that the projected average sea level rise provided by the 
IPCC (2007) for the remainder of this century is between 18 to 59 centimetres.   
Results from the 10 objective knowledge statements demonstrate that Australian 
respondents have a high degree of uncertainty when it comes to climate change science.  This 
is reflected in part by the high percentage (between 21% and 54%) of respondents who 
reported ‘don’t know’ when answering the ten knowledge statements.  Ashworth et al. (2011) 
also found, on average, 30% of respondents indicating ‘don’t know’, when asked a series of 
true/false questions to test knowledge of climate change related topics.  This suggests that the 
public has a particularly narrow understanding of the physical processes and causal drivers 
that contribute to climate change (Reynolds et al., 2010).  For example many people still do 
not understand and confuse the issue of climate change and the depletion of the ozone layer 
(Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000: Nisbet & Myers, 2007).  This was certainly the case in 
recent studies conducted in Australia.  When the findings from this report are compared with 
a widely-used knowledge question, “Climate change is mainly caused by the hole in the 
 True
%
False
%
Don’t 
know 
%
The projected average sea level rise provided by the IPCC for the remainder 
of this century (2010-2099) is between 18-59 cm’s 
35.5 10.2 54.3 
Australia is one of the most exposed nations with respect to projected impacts 
of climate change 
44.3 24.1 31.6 
Climate change will increase the risk in Australia for diseases transmitted by 
water and mosquitoes over the next 100 years 
39.8 23.3 37.0 
Globally, the current burning of fossil fuels accounts for 80-85% (Co2) 
emissions added to the atmosphere 
47.1 15.0 37.9 
Methane is emitted mainly from fossil fuels 16.9 49.8 33.3 
Climate change is mainly caused by the hole in the ozone layer 20.6 57.8 21.6 
Australia produces about 5.5% of the planet’s carbon emissions 23.4 17.8 58.7 
Australia’s average temperature has increased by approximately 1°C from 
1910 to 2002 
59.4 12.9 27.6 
The change in global temperature for the last 100 years is greater than for the 
last 1000 years 
46.8 14.9 38.3 
The number of weather-related disasters around the world has doubled since 
the mid 1990s 
47.4 15.6 37.0 
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ozone layer”, the majority of respondents answered this item correctly (58%), 20% answered 
incorrectly, and 22% selected the ‘do not know’ option, indicating that a large percentage of 
respondents are uncertain or indeed answering incorrectly.  Fielding (2009) used the same 
question and response format in a research study on youth and the environment, finding that 
42% of 12-17 year olds, and 47% of respondents aged 18-24 answered this question 
correctly.  In contrast, a similar question posed by Ashworth et al. (2011). “The hole in the 
ozone layer contributes to climate change”, found the majority of respondents answered 
this question incorrectly (59%), with 16% selecting the correct response, and 25% percent 
reporting that they didn’t know.  Uncertainty was also apparent in a qualitative research study 
undertaken by Bulkeley (2000) in Newcastle, Australia, where focus groups also reported 
being somewhat confused about this particular issue. 
 “I get a little bit confused between them, the global warming, the hole in the ozone 
layer, and the greenhouse effect, I am not exactly sure what all of these are, but I 
know that it’s bad...for the environment” (Bulkeley, 2000, p. 4). 
Such qualitative research has proven to be particularly valuable in providing a more informed 
window on public understandings (e.g., Wolf & Moser, 2011). 
The current findings are noteworthy given the above certainty of correctness findings, 
and given that many quite knowledgeable individuals are likely to judge their own knowledge 
level as relatively modest.  In the case of the current survey and following the ten objective 
knowledge questions, participants were asked to rate their level of certainty with respect to 
the correctness of the answers they had given (#42).  A number of researchers have examined 
such confidence levels in the context of climate change (Sundblad et al., 2009; Malka et al., 
2009).  Thirty-five percent of respondents gave a certainty rating of 5 or 6 on a six point scale 
(1 = uncertain to 6 = certain), with the mean certainty rating (M = 3.82, SD = 1.39), being 
very close to that found by Sundblad et al. (2009) on a very similar six point scale,  (M = 
3.73, SD = 0.88).  Unfortunately there are not many comparison findings that can be used to 
benchmark this current level of objective knowledge (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2010).  What is 
clear is that such measures cannot easily capture the nature and complexity of those risk as 
analysis and risk as feeling appraisal considerations that go into one’s personal 
understandings of, and psychological responses to, the phenomenon and threat of climate 
change (e.g., Slovic, 2010).  Yet engagement with the public about climate change and public 
education initiatives need to be informed by just such understandings of public 
understandings. 
KNOWLEDGE CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Objective knowledge was strongly and positively associated with climate change 
concern (r = .53), belief (r = .52), distress (r = .47), adaptation (r = .46), risk appraisal (r = 
.44), responsibility (r = .43), and self-efficacy (r = .40), and more moderately correlated with 
green self-identity (r = .36),  direct experience with climate change (r = .31),  residential 
exposure (r = .31), trust (r = .31), behavioural engagement (r = .30), and media exposure (r = 
.19).  Correlations were all significant at p < .001.  The correlation between objective 
knowledge and certainty of the correctness of the answers given, often used as a corrective to 
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self reported knowledge, was (r = .04, p < .05).  Self-reported knowledge, which was a single 
item measure, and objective knowledge evidenced a very modest correlation of (r = .19, p < 
.001).  This would suggest that it is reasonably hazardous to rely solely on self-reported 
knowledge levels when examining knowledge of climate change science or consequences and 
how this might relate to public understandings or behaviour change.  Previous research also 
suggests individuals are overly confident (Budescu, Wallsten, & Au, 1997).  If confidence 
levels are high, but knowledge levels are low, individuals may not be willing to seek out new 
information (Sundblad et al., 2009).  
Kellstedt et al. (2008) argue that the more informed respondents are, the less 
personally responsible they will feel towards global warming, and the less concerned they 
will be.  This rather surprising and anomalous finding does not appear to be the case with the 
findings from the present study.  Kellstedt’s measure of knowledge was based on a single-
item measure, “How informed do you consider yourself to be about global warming and 
climate change?” The response format was an 11-point scale, with higher numbers indicating 
a greater level of subjective knowledge (M = 6.32, SD = 2.33) (Kellstedt et al.).  When 
correlations between subjective knowledge and felt responsibility were examined in the 
present study, a moderate, positive relationship is found (r = .22), contrasted with the case of 
objective knowledge which evidences a much stronger association with responsibility, (r = 
.43).  Self-efficacy follows a similar pattern with a stronger relationship for objective 
knowledge (r = .40) and a weaker correlation with self-reported knowledge (r = .24).  
Climate change concern has a strong, positive relationship with objective knowledge (r = .53) 
and a much weaker relationship with subjective knowledge (r = .21).   
Overall the results of the present study are at substantial odds with the research of 
Kellstedt and colleagues when considering and comparing subjective knowledge, 
responsibility, self-efficacy and concern.  Kellstedt and colleagues note that one of the 
limitations of their study is that they based their knowledge measure on self-report, and that 
objective and self-report measures may not even be correlated; indeed they go on to say that 
they may work in opposite directions.  This latter suggestion was not supported in the current 
study, but their concern about their self-report measure of knowledge was certainly validated.  
Overall, current findings suggest the more people actually know, and to a lesser extent, the 
more they think they know, the more likely that they will be concerned about climate change 
and feel some responsibility to act in response to it.  This conclusion holds even when 
analyses of our current data were restricted to just the 6.5% of respondents identified as 
climate change sceptics.  Contrary to Kellsted et al., even among this sub-sample, objective 
knowledge was positively correlated with concern (r = .26), felt responsibility to act (r = .11), 
and actual behavioural engagement (r = .17).  In this group, however, self-reported 
knowledge was negatively correlated with these other variables (r = -.23, -.16, and -.08) 
respectively. 
A recent published study of public understandings of climate change is that of 
Leiserowitz, Smith et al. (2010), based on a survey of 2030 American adults undertaken 
between 24 June and 22 July, 2010.  The survey focused on public understandings of how the 
climate system works, and on the causes, impacts, and potential solutions to climate change.  
The study included measures of both objective and self-reported knowledge.  The findings 
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suggest a moderate level of general understanding of climate change science, important gaps 
in knowledge, and common misconceptions.  Overall, 63% of this North American survey 
sample reported believing that climate change is happening, but with many not clearly 
understanding why.  This U.S. study appears to have included no other parameters; it is 
therefore difficult to assess correlates of climate change systems knowledge.  There was also 
no provision in the study for exploring climate change understandings, or risk perceptions 
premised on cultural constructions and understandings of the climate change risk domain, or 
symbolic meanings and associations (e.g., Bohm, 2003; Oltedal, Moen, Klempe, & Rundmo, 
2004), though these avenues have been explored previously by this Yale research group (e.g., 
Leiserowitz, 2006).  
The consistent and strong positive correlations found across these disparate variables 
suggest that knowledge of climate change science is strongly associated with concern levels, 
psychosocial impacts, and adjustments in psychological and behavioural responses.  This 
argument is strengthened by the fact that many climate change sceptics actually appear to be 
very knowledgeable in some ways about climate change science, as this is necessary to 
discuss and argue one’s case in conversation and/or when challenged.  A cogent theoretical 
model in social psychology is that of motivated reasoning, which provides a persuasive 
explanation for why climate change sceptics expend considerable time and energy in 
bolstering their own stance in terms of selective information search (e.g., Kunda, 1990; 
Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010).  While these current knowledge findings overall make 
considerable sense, they are, again, at odds with the widely covered but actually very weak 
findings of a negative correlation found between self-reported climate change knowledge on 
the one hand and environmental concern and behavioural engagement on the other (e.g., 
Kellstedt et al., 2008). 
KNOWLEDGE DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Objective knowledge was significantly higher among female respondents (M = 2.8, p
< .05) than it was for males (M = 2.6).  Interestingly, subjective knowledge was significantly 
higher for males (M = 4.2, p < .001) than it was for females (M = 4.0).  This is consistent with 
previous research findings (e.g., McCright, 2010; Wolf & Moser, 2011).  Younger 
respondents (<35) evidenced significantly higher scores on objective knowledge (M = 3.1, p
< .001) than did respondents aged 35-54 years (M = 2.7), and those aged over 55 (M = 2.4).  
Again, it is worth mentioning that older respondents (55+) had significantly higher levels of 
self-reported knowledge (M = 4.2, p < .001) than did younger participants (<35) (M = 4.0).  
Respondents with a university degree had significantly higher levels of both objective (M = 
3.1, p < .001) and subjective knowledge (M = 4.2, p < .001) than did respondents with 
certificate/trade qualification (M = 2.6, M = 2.4 respectively), or those with a high school 
education only (M = 2.4, M = 3.9).  Respondents without children or grandchildren had 
significantly higher levels of objective knowledge (M = 3.0, p = .001) than respondents with 
children (M = 2.6).   Respondents intending to vote Green or Labor at the next Federal 
Election evidenced significantly higher levels of both objective (M = 3.3, p < .001) and 
subjective knowledge (M = 4.2, p < .001) than did respondents who indicated that they would 
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vote for other parties (M = 2.2, M = 4.0 respectively).  No significant differences were found 
between urban and rural respondents with respect to objective knowledge.  
SUMMARY 
It is important to emphasise that public understandings about climate change can be in 
many ways distinct from and encompass much more than factual knowledge about climate 
change science; the political, environmental, and social issues concerning climate change; 
and/or the projected consequences of climate change.  The psychological and social realities 
are that public understandings of climate change reflect and acknowledge the nature and 
composition of risk as feeling as well as risk as analysis with respect to individual risk 
appraisal and sense making (e.g., Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic, 2010), and the importance of 
such a profound global threat in the context of cultural meaning systems, and as a culturally 
elaborated and represented risk domain (e.g., Bauer & Gaskell, 2002; Pidgeon et al., 2003; 
Shore, 1996).  The Griffith survey nonetheless did examine public understandings in multiple 
albeit less direct ways.  Public risk perceptions, beliefs, causal attributions, anticipations, and 
concerns about climate change are all important aspects of public understandings, as are 
experienced distress, sense making, myriad motivational processes, and psychological 
adaptation itself.  Together these convergent factors and processes provide a more adequate 
and multi-faceted picture of public understandings, hopes, and fears. 
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VOTING INTENTION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION 
The survey item relating to voting intention, and, indirectly, to political party 
affiliation and identification, item #75 was, “How would you vote if there was a Federal 
election tomorrow?”  It must be remembered that this question was asked at a particular 
point in time in Australia, in the context of a highly contested and polarised environmental, 
social, and political issue, as well as in the immediate context of this survey with a strong 
climate change focus.  While voting intention is arguably an indirect measure of party 
affiliation or group identity, it nonetheless allows for a grouping of respondents along 
political lines.  An examination of selected key variables by party and notional policy 
preference in the context of climate change is presented in the following tables. 
Table 3 presents the results for item #7, “How concerned, if at all, are you about 
climate change, sometimes referred to as global warming?”  Table 4 is based on item #8, 
“As far as you know, do you personally think that the world’s climate is changing?” 
Table 3. Extent of concern by voting intention 
Table 4. Belief in climate change by voting intention 
Figure 19 demonstrates political orientation and climate change causation as per item 
#9 “Thinking about the causes of climate change, which of the following best describes 
your opinion?” 
Voting 
intention 
Not at all 
concerned 
Not very 
concerned 
Fairly 
concerned 
Very 
concerned 
Don’t 
know 
No 
opinion 
Total 
Labor 49 
(5.4%) 
180 
(19.7%) 
394 
43.0%) 
277 
(30.3%) 
9 
(1.0%) 
4 
(.4%) 
913 
Liberal 170 
(16.4%) 
294 
(28.4%) 
406 
(39.2%) 
152 
(14.7%) 
6 
(.6%) 
8 
(.8%) 
1036 
National 25 
(24.3%) 
26 
(25.2%) 
28 
(27.2%) 
22 
(21.4%) 
1 
(1.0%) 
1 
(1.0%) 
103 
 
Greens 12 
(2.7%) 
39 
(8.7%) 
161 
(36.0%) 
232 
(51.9%) 
2 
(.4%) 
1 
(.2%) 
447 
Independent 28 
(11.5%) 
62 
(25.5%) 
105 
(43.2%) 
46 
(18.9%) 
1 
(.4%) 
1 
(.4%) 
243 
Other 36 
(10.6%) 
69 
(20.3%) 
141 
(41.5%) 
78 
(22.9%) 
14 
(4.1%) 
2 
(.6%) 
340 
Voting intention Yes No Don’t know Total 
Labor 744 
(81.5%) 
109 
(11.9%) 
60 
(6.6%) 
913 
Liberal 663 
(64%) 
277 
(26.7%) 
96 
(9.3%) 
1036 
National 61 
(59.2%) 
34 
(33.0%) 
8 
(7.8%) 
103 
 
Greens 402 
(89.9%) 
27 
(6.0%) 
18 
(4.0%) 
447 
Independent 163 
(67.1%) 
57 
(23.5%) 
23 
(9.5%) 
243 
Other 241 
(70.9%) 
61 
(17.9%) 
38 
(11.2%) 
340 
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Figure 19. Causes of climate change by voting intention and political orientation 
Relative levels of belief, concern, and acceptance of some level of human causality 
were actually very high across all voting intention groups. With respect to the most direct 
concern item, (#7),  53.9% of ‘Liberal’ respondents reporting being ‘very’ or ‘fairly 
concerned’, trailed by 48.6% of ‘National’ respondents . Comparison figures for Labor and 
Green respondents are high as might be expected, 73.3% and 87.9%; and ‘Independent’ and 
‘Other’ respondents fall in between at 62.1% and 64.4% respectively.   
 
Findings appear to play out similarly for belief and acceptance of some level of 
causality, with the Liberal and National respondents being the modest outliers. It is 
noteworthy that the lowest figure for acceptance of some level of human causality is 62.2% 
(National respondents) and the highest is 93.1% (Greens) followed by Labor respondents at 
83.3%. 
A recent Australian study conducted by the University of Queensland found 
respondents affiliated with either the Green or Labor party were much more likely to ‘agree’ 
or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement, “The planet is warming because of human activity 
producing greenhouse gases”, as compared with 38% of Liberal/National affiliates (Fielding, 
Head, Laffan, Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012; Hoegh-Guldberg, Fielding, Head, Laffan, 
& Western, 2010).  Overall, Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2010) found Green respondents reported 
higher levels of belief, followed by the Labor party respondents and non-aligned respondents, 
with Liberal/National respondents reporting the lowest levels.  These findings are consistent 
with the results found in this present study. 
 
These figures suggest that while party affiliation and more accurately voting intention 
during June/July 2010 were clearly related to belief, concern, and causal attributions, this 
does not counter the more general finding that the great majority of these survey respondents 
accept the reality of anthropogenically-forced climate change and are very concerned about 
this phenomenon, threat, and issue.  
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PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS 
A number of items and scales were incorporated in the survey to specifically address 
the possible psychological impacts of the threat and perceived physical environmental 
consequences of climate change.  While the principal emphasis was on ‘climate change’, the 
associated threat and impacts of extreme weather events and disasters constituted a shared 
focus of the survey.  Survey findings overall indicated that the threat of climate change and 
the threat of natural disasters were strongly interrelated for respondents.  This is an important 
consideration, as Australia was buffeted by a series of dramatic natural disasters and extreme 
weather events over the 2009 to 2011 period, and over the preceding decade in terms of an 
unrelenting drought arguably heightening the saliency of climate change.   
The matter of the psychological and social impacts of climate change has been a 
central consideration and focus of the ‘human dimensions’ of global change, and more 
specifically climate change, for the past several decades.  However the importance of these 
human consequences considerations have been so obvious and taken for granted that they are 
often not formally stated or operationalised, and/or are assumed under the rubrics of ‘societal 
consequences’ or ‘health impacts’.  Yet the psychological impacts of climate change are far 
more encompassing, including more individual and personal psychological responses, 
adjustments, and adaptations to this global phenomenon and threat at individual and social 
process levels. These in turn mediate adaptation responses at behavioural, community and 
system levels, and longer term health and societal impacts (e.g., Luginaah, Taylor, Elliot, & 
Eyles, 2002).  As well, and very importantly, the psychological impacts of climate change in 
most regions of the world currently relate to the impacts of the threat of climate change and 
perceived future consequences and implications, typically communicated and socially 
represented through our contemporary, multimedia, and virtual information environment 
(e.g., Gifford, Steg, & Reser, 2011).  
 Hence there is considerable wisdom in more clearly conceptualising the 
psychological impacts of climate change as individual level responses to, and the associated 
consequences of, what are effective risk communications about this global threat, mediated 
through myriad media channels as well as informal and formal social interactions and 
communications.  Community and societal impacts of the threat of climate change constitute 
further levels of analysis and dynamic social processes, but these ultimately reflect 
aggregated individual level responses to personal exposures, perceptions, and experiences of 
the threat of climate change.  Finally, there is both wisdom and clarity in framing and 
thinking about human responses to and the impacts of the threat of climate change in 
psychosocial environmental impact assessment (PSIA) terms.  Such framing underscores the 
importance of measuring, monitoring, and addressing changes and adaptations taking place in 
the human landscape in conjunction with unfolding climate change (e.g., Reser & 
Bentrupperbäumer, 2001; 2008).  As well, an extensive literature exists which considers just 
such psychological impacts in the context of regional disasters and dramatic natural 
environmental change and impacts (e.g., Grattan, Roberts, Mahan, McLaughlin, Otwell, & 
Morris, 2011; Matthies, Höger, & Guski, 2000; Palinkas, Downs, Petterson, & Russell, 1993; 
Picou, Gill, & Cohen, 1997). 
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While the scope of what might constitute ‘psychological impacts’ is daunting, the 
reality is that this is a much more delimited domain of emergent variables and indicators in 
the social and health sciences, and in risk, emergency, and disaster research and practice 
arenas.  Figure 20 presents a selective sample of psychological impact considerations, i.e., 
areas of psychological functioning and response, which might be adversely affected by the 
ongoing threat and or physical environmental impacts of climate change.  The decision was 
made to measure and monitor a limited number of theoretically and practically important 
psychological impact variables which would be not only sensitive to the impacts of the threat 
of climate change and extreme weather events, and meaningful and ‘available’ (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) to survey respondents, but of theoretical and strategic interest and 
importance to climate change adaptation, and human health and well being, as well as 
associated disaster preparedness and response, and policy considerations.  The more 
important of these variables, repeatedly referenced or alluded to in contemporary 
considerations of climate change adaptation are climate change concern, climate change 
distress, and psychological adaptation to climate change.  Unfortunately there did not exist 
available and formal climate change-specific measures for these variables, and hence these 
needed to be developed for the purpose of this research, albeit informed by extensive related 
research and existing measures and indicators.  See Appendix J for specific details on survey 
constructs and operational measures. 
 
Figure 20. Selective compilation of differing psychological impact domains. 
 
 
      sense making                 comprehension          understandings, beliefs, values,                 
exposure and experience of adverse environmental changes and events 
attitudes, opinions                                                     concern, worry, anxiety   
  optimism/pessimism,  hope/hopelessness                  Fear, distress felt loss of control, helplessness, 
resignation    vigilance, preoccupation, anger, apathy      rumination   chronic and acute 
 responsibility, guilt acceptance and environmental stress                commitment  
                                                                                      behavioural adaptations and adjustments 
loss, grief, sadness, melancholy                  psychological adaptations and adjustment    
 risk perception and appraisal          self-efficacy           collective efficacy 
psychological defenses and protection motivation, denial,      
disruption,      selective attention 
rationalising, motivated reasoning 
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The constructs of climate change concern and the broader construct of general 
environmental concern were addressed earlier.  Certainly many psychologists and social 
scientists would argue that such concern measures constitute sensitive indicators of current 
psychological impacts, notwithstanding the largely anticipatory nature of the climate change 
threat (Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2001).  Such concern measures are also integrally related 
to values, and indeed identical measures are often equally treated and referred to as measures 
of ‘environmental concern’ or ‘environmental values’ (Schmuck & Schultz, 2002; Schultz, 
2000).  A logically related measure in terms of increasing anxiety and psychological health 
impact is that of climate change distress, that is, experienced distress in the context of 
thinking about, worrying about, and the experiencing of other adverse emotional responses to 
multi-media coverage of climate change and its implications or perceived direct experience of 
climate change (e.g., Reser et al., 2011).  As there were no available and suitable measures of 
climate change distress, a provisional 7-item scale was developed to assess such self-reported 
distress. 
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EXPERIENCED DISTRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
The survey items for the psychological impacts/experienced distress section address a 
much neglected area in the context of climate change research, and indeed with respect to the 
stress of environmental change (e.g., Aldwin & Stokols, 1988; Stokols, Misra, Runnerstrom, 
& Hipp, 2009).  There are few extant measures which can be readily transferred from 
research domains such as those addressing the chronic stress of living near degraded or 
contaminated environments, or recurrent natural or technological disaster threat (e.g., Lima, 
2004; Rogan, O’Connor, & Horwitz, 2005; Santiago-Rivera, Morse, Haase, McCaffrey, & 
Tarbell, 2007).  A substantial review of the measurement of key behavioural science 
constructs in climate change research reveals few that address this domain (Roser-Renouf & 
Nisbet, 2008).  Although considerable discussion and speculation has taken place with 
respect to the impacts of climate change in the context of rural and remote mental health, 
very little systematic research has been undertaken (e.g., Morrissey & Reser, 2007).  A 
frequently cited ‘environmental distress’ scale does exist, developed in the Australian context 
with respect to a spectrum of adverse psychosocial impacts of mining in the Upper Hunter 
Valley region of New South Wales (Higginbotham, Connor, Albrecht, Freeman, & Agho, 
2007).  Though careful consideration was given to the use of this scale in the present context, 
and while a ‘solastalgia’ subscale has been used in previous related research (Ellul, 2009), the 
scale items were not specific enough or in other respects deemed sufficiently sensitive or 
appropriate to the climate change and natural disaster focus of the present survey exercise.  
Another Australian study undertaken by Searle and Gow (2010) employed a 12-item measure 
of climate change distress, asking participants to rate how they feel when ‘thinking about 
climate change’.  Respondents rated response options such as depressed, worried, or sad on a 
three point scale.  This psychology-based scale which has also been used in the Australian 
context (Searle & Gow, 2010) was not available at the time of designing our research survey, 
nor were the items, which were themselves based on other scales (e.g., trait anxiety, Y2K 
anxiety, stress, depression), sufficiently congruent with our own conception of distress in the 
face of climate change and its implications for the average person.  
Hence seven items were developed and pilot-tested which address the increasingly 
discussed mental health and quality of life impacts of both the threat of climate change, and 
directly experienced and salient environmental alteration and change attributed to climate 
change.  These distress scale items attempt to capture a number of the dimensions of the 
experienced distress and other psychological responses and reactions to the threat of and/or 
directly experienced environmental impacts of climate change, such as worry, felt 
powerlessness, experienced guilt, loss, and diminution of quality of life and environment.   
In the following two sections covering psychological distress and psychological 
adaptation in the context of climate change, an extended consideration of findings is 
provided, given the importance of these constructs and their respective measures, and more 
general considerations of climate change adaptation
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS 
Experienced psychological distress due to the threat, implications, and perceived 
current consequences of climate change, as with climate change concern, is an important and 
putative psychological impact of climate change, which may well have been impacting 
communities around the world for several decades (e.g., APA Taskforce on Climate Change, 
2009; Berry et al., 2008; Costello et al., 2009; Coyle & Van Susteren, 2012; Doherty & 
Clayton, 2011; Fritze, Blashki, Burke, & Wiseman, 2008; Page, & Howard, 2010; Reser et 
al., 2011; Searle & Gow, 2010; The Climate Institute, 2011).  Climate change distress is 
defined for the purpose of this research as experienced apprehension, anxiety, sorrow, or loss 
due to the threat and projected consequences of climate change, for oneself, humanity, and/or 
the natural world.  Such distress might well take the form of preoccupation, heightened worry 
and fear, and/or pessimism with respect to being able to adequately address this profound 
environmental and social problem and issue.  In the present research context, and in the 
absence of an established psychosocial impact assessment literature specific to climate 
change, this construct and measure has not been given a strong or diagnostic clinical gloss.  
Rather what has been conceptually specified and measured is the extent to which respondents 
report experiencing, at times, noticeable distress at the prospect and implications of climate 
change, either through multimedia coverage or possible direct encounters with the perceived 
environmental consequences of climate change.  Affective responses to climate change may 
lie on a continuum from concern, to moderate distress, to a state of severe distress which 
interferes with one’s daily functioning and well-being.  We would view the distress which is 
captured in our provisional scale as relating to the mid range of such a continuum. 
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
For the purpose of the Australian survey psychological distress in the context of 
climate change was operationalised with the seven-item measure mentioned previously (#43). 
Participants were asked to rate their extent of agreement with statements on a 6-point Likert 
scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  The scale contained items such as, 
“At times I find myself thinking about and worrying about what the world will really be 
like for future generations because of climate change” (See Appendix J).  The items were 
designed to be particularly sensitive to subclinical levels of distress at the prospect and 
implications of global climate change.  Scores reflected summed ratings (possible range 7-
42), with higher scores indicating greater experienced distress (M = 21.90, SD = 8.31).  This 
scale achieved a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 indicating high reliability.   
Averaged results across all respondents indicate moderate levels of reported distress 
when thinking about and otherwise responding to the threat and implications of climate 
change.  More specifically, and when examining each of the items individually, it is clear that 
a substantial proportion of respondents at times experienced genuine distress relating to 
particular aspects of the climate change threat.  A large number of respondents (38%), for 
example, were worried about what the world will really be like for future generations because 
of climate change, with a further 24% experiencing some distress each time they see or read 
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media coverage as to the likely impacts and consequences of climate change.  Many 
respondents (23%) were upset that there seemed to be so little that they could do to address 
environmental problems such as climate change.  Respondents were less likely to endorse 
items such as “climate change is affecting my quality of life and my assessment of 
environmental quality more generally” (9%), or “I feel some sense of loss because of the 
climate change impacts that are becoming apparent in my area”(12%).  
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Experience of distress in the context of climate change is not uniformly distributed in 
the respondent sample (See Appendix L).  For example, female respondents evidenced 
significantly and appreciably greater distress scores (M = 23.0, p < .001) than did male 
respondents (M = 20.7).  These results are consistent with considerable previous research 
which suggests females tend to be more concerned about the issue of climate change than 
males (e.g., Ashworth et al., 2011, McCright, 2010; Searle & Gow, 2010).  With respect to 
age, respondents under the age of 35 evidenced significantly greater distress scores (M = 
23.2, p < .001) than the 35-54 (M = 22.3) and 55+ age cohorts (M = 20.3), for whom climate 
change distress appeared to diminish moderately with age.  Respondents with a university 
degree had significantly higher distress scores (M = 22.8, p < .001) than respondents with a 
trade/certificate qualification (M = 21.7), or high school education (M = 21.3).  The findings 
suggest that respondents with a university education are more likely to be distressed and 
worried about the threat and implications of climate change than those with a school or post-
school certificate or trade qualification.  Those intending to vote Green at the next Federal 
election evidenced significantly greater distress scores (M = 24.1, p < .001) than did those 
intending to vote for other parties (M = 20.2).  Non-homeowners evidenced significantly 
greater levels of distress (M = 22.7, p < .001) than did home owners (M = 21.5, p < .001).  
Actual mean score differences are in most instances modest, notwithstanding high 
significance levels, and clearly a number of these differences and trends suggest a general 
picture of experienced distress being more frequent and salient for younger respondents, for 
women, and for those with greater education. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Survey results overall suggest appreciable levels of both genuine concern and distress 
at the nature and implications of the threat of climate change for many respondents.  
Appendix K includes pertinent correlational findings for climate change distress.  Analyses 
indicate that psychological distress in the context of climate change is strongly and positively 
associated with climate change concern (r = .78), psychological adaptation (r = .78), risk 
perception (r = .71), responsibility (r = .68), self-efficacy (r = .66), belief in climate change (r
= .62), green self-identity (r = .59), and trust (r = .49), further suggesting important mediating 
roles and outcomes with respect to climate change distress.  Correlations were significant  
p  < .001. 
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COMPARISONS ACROSS LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH DISTRESS GROUPS 
Correlational analyses were complemented by selected group comparisons based on 
levels of distress. Respondents were divided into three groups reflecting their self-reported 
extent of distress in the context of climate change.  Those scoring between 7 and 18 inclusive 
were considered as ‘low distress’ respondents (n = 1047), those scoring between 19 and 30 
were considered ‘medium distress’ (n = 1568), and those scoring 31 to 42 were judged to be 
‘higher distress’ respondents (n = 481).  It is important to note that the items in this 
provisional scale were particularly focused on experienced distress in the context of the threat 
of climate change, its media coverage, and its implications.  These cohort comparisons allow 
for a closer examination of those individuals who could be characterized as reporting salient 
and genuine distress at the threat and implications of climate change.  
Chi-square analyses and analyses of variance (ANOVA) were undertaken in 
comparing the three distress groups across a number of composite variables and single items.  
A significant association was found across attributed human causation and the distress groups 
in response to (#9), Ȥ²(8) = 731.84, p < .001.  An overrepresentation of respondents who 
selected the response “climate change is entirely/mainly caused by natural processes” was 
found in the low distress group, with these respondents correspondingly underrepresented of 
respondents in the medium and higher distress groups.  This is in contrast to the 
underrepresentation found in the low distress group of respondents who endorsed the 
response “climate change is mainly/entirely caused by human activity”, as opposed to the 
overrepresentation of respondents found in the higher distress group (see Figure 21). The 
results indicate that a large proportion of respondents in the high distress group attributed 
climate change to human agency and activities, whereas respondents in the low distress group 
were more likely to believe climate change is largely due to natural processes or partly 
natural/partly human processes. 
                        
Figure 21. Causality and psychological distress 
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These results relating to human causal attribution and agency are interesting and 
provide some possibilities with respect to convergent underlying reasons for this experienced 
distress.  It is possible, for example, that acceptance of human causality also implies some 
measure of collective guilt, and the human agency implied in acceptance of anthropogenic 
forcing also implies both blame and accountability, as well as human efficacy (e.g., Hilton, 
2007; Weiner, 1995).  It is also the case that the role of human agency brings the risk domain 
of climate change into the realm of technological risk, with accompanying dread risk, and 
human interference with natural systems, associations and apprehensions (e.g., Slovic, 2000, 
2010).  Whatever the cogency of such explanations, it would seem to be the case that a 
disproportionate number of respondents scoring higher on this climate change distress 
measure are aware of the importance and significance of this human ‘forcing’ factor which in 
turn would appear to be influencing their general climate change perceptions, understandings, 
and responses, and the overall psychological impact of climate change. 
A significant association was found between temporal distancing and the distress 
groups in response to item (#14) “When, if at all, do you think Australia will start feeling 
the effects of climate change”, Ȥ²(12) = 709.93, p < .001 (See Figure 22).  Low distress 
respondents were underrepresented for those who selected the response, “we are already 
feeling the effects”, whilst medium and high distress respondents were overrepresented.  An 
overrepresentation was observed for respondents in the medium distress group, with respect 
to the response category, ‘in the next 10 years”, with an underrepresentation in the low, and 
high groups.  A similar pattern was found for the final four response options “in the next 50 
years, in next 100 years, beyond the next 100 years, and never”, with an overrepresentation of 
respondents in the low distress group, and an underrepresentation in the medium, and high 
distress groups.  It is important to note that not one respondent from the high distress group 
endorsed ‘never’ as a response category.  The results indicate that the vast majority of 
respondents in the medium and high distress groups believe Australia is already feeling the 
impacts of climate change.  However, a striking 15.7% of respondents in the low distress 
group indicated the Australia would never feel the effects of climate change, suggesting that 
this had become a matter of conviction, tightly held. 
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Figure 22. Immediacy of the climate change threat by psychological distress 
A significant association was found between direct experience and exposure to the 
perceived impacts of climate change across the three distress groups, Ȥ²(2) = 408.11, p < .001 
(See Figure 23).  Respondents with perceived firsthand experience of the impacts of climate 
change were overrepresented in the medium and high distress groups, and underrepresented 
in the low distress group.   As will be discussed later, direct experience with perceived 
evidence of climate change can be both confronting and transforming in terms of a powerful 
and more personal realisation of this global threat and its implications. 
 
Figure 23. Direct experience with perceived climate change impacts by psychological distress 
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An obvious set of questions in the context of the potential psychological impacts of 
climate change relates to how one might best describe or characterise this higher distress 
group.  Table 5 compares the three groupings of respondents on the basis of self-reported 
distress in the context of climate change.  It is clear that those in the higher distress group are 
significantly more likely to reside in areas notionally more exposed to the threat of climate 
change, they are more likely to accept the reality of climate change, more likely to be 
concerned about climate change and to see it as a real risk, more likely to have a strong 
connection with their natural environment, and more likely to see themselves as having a 
‘green’ self-identity.  Importantly, this higher distress group was also significantly more 
likely to be adapting to climate change (e.g., changing their thinking, appraisal of, and/or 
emotional and motivational response to this looming threat and issue), and engaging in 
environmentally significant behaviours than was the case for the low and medium distress 
groups.  
 
“A large number of respondents (38%), for example, were worried about what the 
world will really be like for future generations because of climate change.” 
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Spatial and temporal distancing of climate change was assessed across the three 
distress groups with a number of items (#15a-d).  The mean ratings reported here are based 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).  A significant 
difference was found for  item (#15a), which asked respondents if they viewed climate 
change as happening far away from their own region, F(2, 2901) = 62.73, p < .001, Ș2 = .04.  
Respondents in the high distress group (M = 1.75, SD = 0.97) were significantly different 
from the medium (M = 2.04, SD = 0.92), and low (M = 2.33, SD = 0.95) distress groups.  The 
medium group was also significantly different from the low group.  These results indicate 
respondents in the high and medium distress groups more strongly disagreed with this 
statement than the low distress group, suggesting the former groups see their local region and 
Australia as a whole as equally if not more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and 
that this threat, for them, as not just a distant threat.  
Not surprisingly, a significant difference was found between distress groups with 
respect to climate change affecting the local area (#15b), F(2, 2903) = 311.17, p < .001, Ș² = 
.18.  Respondents in the high distress group (M = 4.24, SD = 0.82) were significantly 
different from the medium (M = 3.78, SD = 0.84), and low distress groups (M = 3.02, SD = 
1.14.).  A significant difference was also found between the medium and low distress groups. 
Respondents in the high distress group perceived the impacts of climate change to be much 
more likely to affect their local area than was the case for the medium and low distress 
groups.  No significant differences were found between the three distress groups on item 
#15c, which explored the extent of respondents’ agreement with the statement that ‘climate 
change would mostly affect developing countries’. 
The final question in this series of items assessing spatial and temporal distancing, 
item (#15d), explored anticipated personal impact of climate change.  A significant difference 
was found between the groups, F(2, 2926) = 618.30, p < .001, Ș² = .30.  Respondents in the 
high distress group (M = 4.24, SD = 0.79) were significantly different from the medium (M = 
3.55, SD = 0.85), and low distress groups (M = 2.58, SD = 1.03).  A significant difference 
was also found between the medium and low distress groups.  Respondents in the high 
distress believed more strongly that climate change was likely to have a big impact on people 
like themselves.  Hence all of these results confirm that the often reported psychological 
distancing effect with respect to the threat of climate change is happening (e.g., Spence et al., 
2011b; Uzzell, 2000), but that this effect, and the anxiety protection afforded, is substantially 
reduced for those who are experiencing climate change distress. 
Respondents were asked to rate the condition of the natural environment in their local 
region of Australia (#31), as well as the world (#33), on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = very poor 
to 6 = excellent).  A significant difference was found between the three distress groups with 
respect to how they viewed the condition of the world, F(2, 3093) = 58.67, p < .001, Ș² = .04,  
and their own local area, F(2, 3093) = 31.73,  p < .001, Ș² = .02.  Respondents from the high 
distress group rated the natural environment (world condition) as significantly different (M = 
3.12, SD = 1.06), from the medium (M = 3.37, SD = 0.98), and low (M = 3.68, SD = 1.01, M
= 4.30) distress groups.  Respondents from the high distress group also rated their local area 
as significantly different (M = 3.87, SD = 1.10), from the medium (M = 4.07, SD = 0.96), and 
low (M = 4.30, SD = 1.09) distress groups.  Overall, the results suggest respondents in the 
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high distress group assessed the environment more poorly at local and global levels than did 
the medium and low distress groups.  Importantly, all three groups assessed the condition of 
their local environment as more favourable than the world environment.  
A significant difference was found between the three distress groups in response to 
item (#25) which assessed the perceived importance of the climate change issue, F(2, 3093) = 
1410.57,  p < .001, Ș² = .48.  Responses from the high distress group (M = 5.47, SD = 0.65), 
were significantly different from the medium (M = 4.64, SD = 0.93), and low groups (M = 
2.78, SD = 1.35) (range; 1 = not at all important to 6 = extremely important).  A significant 
difference was also found between the medium and low distress groups.  Large numbers of 
respondents from the medium and high distress groups believed climate change was an 
extremely important issue. 
A significant difference was found between the distress groups in terms of how 
closely they were following the news about the environment (#39), F(2, 3093) = 329.69, p < 
.001, Ș² = .18.  The range of possible responses for questions #39 and #40 was between 1 = 
not at all to 6 = a great deal.  Respondents in the high distress groups; (M = 4.80, SD = 1.02) 
were significantly different from the medium (M = 3.92, SD = 1.34) and low distress groups 
(M = 3.14, SD = 1.38). The medium distress group was also significantly different from the 
low group.  The groups also differed significantly in relation to how often they were thinking 
about the issue of climate change (#40), F(2, 3093) = 962.25, p < .001, Ș² = .38.  
Respondents in the high distress group (M = 4.92, SD = 0.86) were significantly different 
from the medium (M = 3.82, SD = 1.05) and low distress group (M = 2.48, SD = 1.12).  The 
medium group was significantly different from the low distress group. Overall, the results 
indicate that respondents in the higher distress group are more likely to be thinking about and 
adapting to the issue of climate change than are those in the low and medium groups.  This 
general finding, however, requires immediate qualification as it would appear that while 
psychological adaptation positively mediates the impacts of psychological distress for many 
respondents, for others this experienced distress appears to constitute an ongoing and adverse 
psychological impact colouring experienced quality of life and environment. 
To determine respondents’ respective prior experience with natural disasters, a series 
of questions was asked. Firstly, respondents were asked to indicate, “yes” or “no”, as to 
whether they had experienced a natural disaster warning or impact situation (#52).  Response 
to this question was compared across the three distress groups, with the results approaching 
significance, Ȥ²(2) = 5.74, p = .05.  Fewer respondents in the low and medium distress groups 
indicated that they had experienced a natural disaster, whilst there was an overrepresentation 
of respondents with such experience in the high distress group.  Further analyses included a 
composite measure of prior experience with natural disasters.  This measure was created to 
explore respondents’ exposure to and experience with disasters, where higher scores reflected 
greater exposure and experience.  A significant difference was found between the groups with 
respect to respondents’ prior disaster experience, F(2, 1154) = 11.71, p < .001, Ș² = .02.  
Respondents in the high distress group (M = 9.82, SD = 2.65) were significantly different 
from those in the medium (M = 8.99, SD = 2.93) and low (M = 8.58, SD = 3.10) groups.  
These results suggest that it is not only previous experience with disasters that is important, 
but the nature of that prior experience and personal impacts which in turn influence 
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respondents’ experienced distress in the context of the threat and consequences of global 
climate change.  
A significant difference was also found between the distress groups with respect to 
judgments concerning the extent to which climate change is influencing the frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events (#51), F(2, 3093) = 878.28, p < .001, Ș² = .36.  
Respondents were asked to rate their response on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all to 6 = 
A good deal). Respondents in the high distress group (M = 5.31, SD = 0.80) were 
significantly different from the medium (M = 4.58, SD = 1.08), and low (M = 2.94, SD = 
1.44) groups.  The medium group was also significantly different from the low distress group.  
The results suggest respondents in the high and medium distress groups hold clear and 
relatively strong beliefs that climate change is influencing a spectrum of extreme weather 
events.   
At the end of the survey respondents were asked whether their level of concern about 
climate change had changed over the past several years (#60) on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = 
decreased substantially to 6 = increased substantially).  A significant difference was found 
across the three groups with respect to changes in concern levels, F(2, 3093) = 770.53, p < 
.001, Ș² = .33. Respondents in the higher distress group (M = 4.89, SD = 0.85) were 
significantly different from those in the medium group (M = 4.19, SD = 0.81), both of which 
reported a greater increase in concern than did the low distress group (M = 3.16, SD = 0.96).  
A significant difference was also found between the medium and low distress groups. The 
results demonstrate that concern levels for the higher and medium distress groups have 
increased over the past few years, whilst concern levels have either remained relatively 
stable, or moderately declined for the low distress group.  It is possible that we are beginning 
to see a plateauing of concern levels for the higher distress group, as the level of concern for 
this group is already quite high, and there is understandably a finite ceiling on specific 
worries and concerns in today’s stressful and ever-changing world (e.g., Marx et al., 2007; 
Weber, 2006). 
SUMMARY 
A principal objective in the preceding group comparisons was to examine how those 
respondents scoring relatively highly on psychological distress in the face of climate change 
might differ from other survey respondents across key variables.  Again, 481 respondents, or 
16% of the survey sample achieved distress scores which resulted in their being placed in the 
high distress group.  The findings suggest that this shared and relatively greater level of 
experienced distress was associated with other, convergent, demographic differences and 
psychological responses, through differences between the high and moderate distress groups 
(51% of respondents)were often modest, in contrast with the low distress group (34% of 
respondents).   
 
The high distress group was younger, and better educated, with an overrepresentation 
of women and those intending to vote Labor or Green.  Those scoring in this higher distress 
range were also more likely to accept that climate change was due in large part to human 
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activities, more likely to think that Australia was already feeling effects of climate change 
and/or would experience these effects in the next 10 years, and more likely to judge the 
condition of the Australian and global environment as less favorable.  Respondents in the 
higher distress group were also more likely to have had direct experience of perceived 
climate change impacts, were less likely to be expressing views reflecting geographic or 
temporal distancing, were more likely to see their locality as exposed and vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change, were more likely to be psychologically adapting to the threat of 
climate change, and were more likely to be engaged in pro-environmental behaviours 
associated with climate change mitigation.  Finally respondents in the higher distress group 
were more likely to report that the issue of climate change was personally important and that 
their concern level had increased over the preceding few years.  
 
It would appear that periodic experiences of genuine distress in the face of the climate 
change threat are, in their own way, salutary rather than debilitating for most of the survey 
respondents, and seemingly a source of positive motivation and personal resolve to squarely 
acknowledge and address the threat and problem, however serious and grave.  This is, of 
course, premised on this current, more moderate, and less clinical understanding of ‘distress’.   
It is likely that engaging in pro-environmental behaviours generally, and consciously altering 
one’s lifestyle and habits to reduce one’s own and one’s household’s climate change impact, 
make the specific threat and implications of climate change more ‘real’ and salient. Yet at the 
same time engaging in such actions can by very psychologically adaptive and self-efficacious 
with respect to making a difference and being part of a collective effort to address the 
problem of climate change (e.g., Weber, 2012).  
 
The question of psychological impacts then is not simple. There is a strong case that 
the threat of climate change, particularly as communicated and represented by multi-media 
sources, is having adverse psychological impacts for the majority of respondents 
(approximately two thirds).  The current and cumulative impact of the threat of climate 
change on perceived quality of life and environment, and mental health, appears to be mild to 
moderate for most of these individuals, arguably reflecting, in part, the still somewhat distant, 
global, and abstract nature of this threat, phenomenon, and personal consequences.  But 
awareness of this threat and danger would also appear to be having appreciable psychological 
adaptation, behavioural engagement and adjustment, and resilience-conferring ‘impacts’.  If 
this is the case, it is a very positive finding.  An important caveat is that there appear to be 
strong and convergent forces here by way of protection motivation processes and optimism 
bias which can together result in less adaptive responses to what is undoubtedly a global 
emergency. Indeed the 18 nation findings from Gifford et al. (2009) would suggest that 
Australians are actually the most pessimistic nation, in the longer term, of those surveyed in 
their unprecedented international study.  This possibly reflects the increasingly evident 
exposure and vulnerability of the Australian continent to the potential ravages of climate 
change. 
It is important to reflect on the self-reported increases in levels of concern over the 
past several years for 71% of survey respondents.  Such evident changes in concern levels, 
and by implication distress levels for some, are important in terms of being able to measure 
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and monitor important psychological variables relating to public risk perceptions and 
responses to the threat of climate change over time. Such changes can also constitute and 
reflect arguable psychological impacts of the threat of climate change over time.  But perhaps 
most importantly, the more enduring of such psychological changes in individuals’ thinking 
and feeling about climate change, and in their risk perceptions, appraisals and understandings 
of climate change, are in fact psychological adaptations and adjustments to the threat of 
climate change.  The extent to which reported concern levels have increased or decreased for 
many respondents also constitutes both a measure of change, and the qualitative nature of 
such psychological responses and impacts. It is noteworthy that self-reported concern levels 
increased over the past several years for 71% of respondents.  This occurred at a point in time 
when many journalists and Australian surveys were reporting decreased levels of acceptance 
and concern on the part of Australians. As well, it is arguable that concern levels for many 
were already high, making such increases all the more noteworthy and meaningful, and 
perhaps elevating climate change concern into climate change distress for some respondents.  
These matters of psychological changes relevant to the threat of climate change are again 
raised and discussed in the next section of the report addressing psychological adaptation. 
 
“It is arguable that concern levels for many were already high, making such 
increases all the more noteworthy and meaningful, and perhaps elevating climate 
change concern into climate change distress for some respondents.”  
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PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
A principal focus in this research, and the funding which supported the research, 
relates to adaptation to climate change.  Climate change science and IPCC specifications of 
adaptation in the context of climate change are nonetheless very system-focused whether by 
way of natural biophysical systems or human infrastructure, organisations, and institutional 
systems.  This present more psychological research undertaking has addressed the very 
neglected construct and convergent processes of psychological adaptation as they relate to 
human risk perceptions and responses to the threat and unfolding physical environmental 
impacts of climate change and associated extreme weather events (e.g., Reser & Swim, 2011; 
Reser et al., 2012a).  Adaptation as a multifaceted construct and convergent, multi-level, set 
of organism-environment processes has been an integral and foundational construct and 
perspective within psychology and the social sciences since the inception of these respective 
disciplines (Bateson, 1972; Lazarus, 1966, 1991; Piaget, 1955; Pribram, 1969, White, 1974), 
yet the crucial relevance of these social science-based perspectives on adaptation processes is 
only beginning to be fully appreciated (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2012).  Importantly, 
psychological adaptation also invokes and involves psychological impacts, and both the 
benefits and costs of environmental changes and human adaptations. 
Psychological adaptation to climate change encompasses those intra-individual 
processes (e.g., risk appraisal, motivational responses, coping strategies, decision-making) 
relating to psychological responses, changes, and adjustments to the threat and implications 
of climate change as well as to direct experience with what are perceived to be the unfolding 
impacts of climate change.  Psychological adaptation also encompasses extra-individual 
behavioural responses and adjustments (e.g., community engagement and involvement, 
mitigation, information seeking) to the threat and perceived physical environmental impacts 
of climate change, which are typically mediated by intra-individual psychological processes 
and responses.  The nature of psychological adaptation requires this brief clarification, 
because such within-individual responses and changes are not always recognised as crucial 
aspects of climate change adaptation (e.g., Reser et al., 2012a; Reser & Swim, 2011).  Yet 
considerable policy attention is paid to how public perceptions, attitudes, values, motivations, 
decisions, and understandings might be more effectively influenced and changed, leading to 
behavioural and lifestyle changes (Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2011).  All of these 
changes, whether or not they are influenced by strategic interventions or risk 
communications, are psychological adaptations to climate change.  While the multiple 
psychological processes and factors involved in adaptively responding to perceived 
environmental threats and consequent states of psychological adaptation are not easy to 
represent, Figure 24 attempts to capture salient considerations and processes in the context of 
climate change. 
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Figure 24. Psychological adaptation to climate change 
Note: Copyright 2011 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission from: Reser, J. 
P., & Swim, J. (2011). Adapting to and coping with the threat and impacts of climate change. American 
Psychologist, 66(4), 277-289. No further reproduction or distribution is permitted without written permission 
from the American Psychological Association. 
Figure 24, in addition to bringing together those convergent processes and 
considerations relating to psychological adaptation and psychosocial impacts, attempts to 
highlight and integrate both ongoing environmental stress and stress and coping frameworks, 
the mediating and moderating roles of particular variables and processes, the dynamic and 
transactional character of people-environment interactions, and the nature and importance of 
direct and indirect individual and collective experience and risk appraisal and sense making 
in complex and interacting biophysical, social, and information environments (Reser & 
Swim, 2011). 
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Again, an important objective of the survey focus on public risk perceptions, 
understandings, and responses to climate change and natural disasters has been not only to 
document the present state of such public views and responses, but also to establish a 
database and research platform from which changes in these views can be monitored and 
documented, along with the psychological and social impacts of those risk communications 
and perceived environmental changes on individuals and communities.  Survey results for 
2010 reflect an initial snapshot in time of public perceptions and responses, but it was 
nonetheless possible to assess some important changes through self report from this initial 
2010 data collection – for example, by asking respondents about changes that they may be 
aware of in their own thinking, feelings, and appraisals of the threat of climate change.   
Again, such changes in individuals’ risk appraisals, personal views, understandings, 
motivations, and other psychological responses, made in the context of climate change 
discussions, media exposure, or direct encounters, or which are associated with thinking 
about or emotionally responding to the implications of climate change, constitute important 
psychological adaptations to climate change. 
As with psychological distress in the context of climate change, there were no 
available climate-change specific or psychological scales which measure psychological 
adjustments, adaptations or impacts to the threat of climate change. While emerging social 
science and psychological research has been closely examining public climate change 
attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, intentions, and behaviours (e.g., Brechin, 2010; Brulle et al., 
2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b), this research has not, by and large, 
been framed in adaptation terms, and the focus has been more strongly on mitigation and 
behavioural change.  Perhaps the closest construct, set of processes, and perspective available 
within psychology and currently being employed in the climate change arena is that of coping 
(e.g., Grothman & Patt, 2005; Homburg, Stolberg, & Wagner, 2007; Van Zomeren et al., 
2011).  But coping itself typically relates more particularly to specific and acute stressors and 
situations rather than being a more ongoing response, state, and set of processes for 
maintaining an acceptable and longer term transactional congruence between individual and 
environmental press and change (e.g., Lazarus & Launier, 1978; Reser et al., 2012a).  
Convergent arguments suggest that the ongoing environmental stressor status of global 
climate change and the more encompassing nature and status of psychological adaptation 
processes make a climate change specific and sensitive measure of psychological adaptation a 
very strategic and possibly crucial development and way forward. 
At a number of points in the survey respondents were asked about such changes, with 
this information allowing for some conclusions to be drawn about psychological adaptations 
to climate change.  At the same time, all measures of individual views, judgments, 
understandings, and concerns provided for the possibility of taking subsequent measures and 
readings, thereby allowing for more objective measurement of changes and adaptation to 
climate change over time.  It is also reasonable and useful to consider such responses and 
adaptations to an environmental threat or sequence of environmental changes as 
psychological or social impacts.  Many social and behavioural scientists would describe the 
measuring and monitoring of such changing responses to an environmental threat or stressor 
as an environmental impact assessment exercise, in this case a psychosocial environmental 
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impact assessment and/or monitoring exercise (e.g., Esteves, Franks, & Vanclay, 2012; Reser 
& Bentrupperbäumer, 2001; 2005).  In reality, the threat of global climate change has 
undoubtedly been having psychological and social impacts on individuals, communities, and 
societies for the past few decades, but these have rarely been acknowledged, addressed, or 
systematically measured and monitored (e.g., Doherty & Clayton, 2011; Reser & Swim, 
2011).  
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION 
While many, if not most, of the responses to this survey could be seen to reflect 
psychological impacts of the threat of climate change, and particularly in the case of 
parameters such as climate change risk appraisals, concern levels, beliefs, values, and future 
hopes and fears, those questions most specific to changes in respondent psychological and 
behavioural responses to the threat of climate change and therefore to psychological 
adaptation, are questions #35, #39, #40, #45, #60, and #61.  An objective in including a 
composite scale addressing psychological adaptation was to examine how intra-individual 
adaptation or adjustment to the threat or experienced impacts of climate change might relate 
to other parameters investigated by the survey, such as objective knowledge, direct versus 
indirect experience and exposure, self-efficacy, climate change concern, and psychological 
distress.  Such inclusion also allowed for a latent variable which most closely approximates 
psychological adaptation in the context of climate change for structural equation modeling, 
and for analyses of the putative mediating role which psychological adaptation plays in 
motivation processes generally relating to climate change adaptation and mitigation 
behaviours, and to these behaviours themselves.   
Question #45 constitutes a provisional 7-item psychological scale and measure of 
psychological adaptation in the context of climate change, with all items addressing self-
reported changes in how respondents are thinking, feeling, understanding and acting in 
response to the threat of climate change.  As no existing climate change adaptation scales 
have addressed this matter of conceptualising and measuring psychological adaptation to the 
threat of climate change (e.g., Hamilton & Kasser, 2009; Homberg et al., 2007), this scale 
was developed for the purpose of the survey and subsequent monitoring purposes.  The final 
operational scale included two additional items (#39, #40) and one deletion (#45b) from the 
original 7 items.  This final psychological adaptation measure in the context of climate 
change was the 8-item scale described above.  Participants were asked to rate their extent of 
agreement to items on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree/not at all) to 6 
(strongly agree/a great deal).  The scale contained items such as, “Climate change has 
forced me to change the way I think about and view how we live in and use our natural 
environment in Australia”.  Scores were summed (possible range = 8-48), with higher 
scores indicating greater psychological adaptation (M = 28.65, SD = 8.69).  This scale had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .89, indicating a highly reliable measure.  
Averaged results across all participants indicated substantial self-reported changes in 
thinking about, feeling about, and generally responding to the threat of climate change.  
Inspection of specific items indicated that 57.3% of respondents agreed that they had, 
“changed the way they think about the seriousness of environmental problems because of 
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climate change”, and 55.7% of respondents indicated that, “climate change has forced me to 
change the way I think about and view how we live in and use our natural environment in 
Australia”.  The items in this initial prototype scale have had a stronger focus on thinking and 
risk as analysis rather than risk as feeling, a matter to be addressed in further refinements of 
this measure (e.g., Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic, 2010). 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Female respondents reported significantly greater levels of psychological adaptation 
(M = 29.6, p < .001) than did male respondents (M = 27.6).  Respondents aged between 35 
and 54 years evidenced significantly greater adaptation scores (M = 29.2, p < .05) than did 
older participants aged over 55 years (M = 28.1).  These findings are interesting, given that 
younger respondents were more likely to report being distressed about climate change, but 
older respondents were more likely to report some level of personal adaptation to the threat 
and implications of climate change.  This might reflect the fact that their prior and current life 
circumstances, as well as their available financial resources, made such changes easier and 
less personally impactful.  Respondents with a university degree reported significantly greater 
levels of adaptation (M = 29.9, p < .001), than did respondents with a trade/certificate (M = 
28.9), or high school education (M = 27.3).  Respondents intending to vote Green or Labor at 
the next Federal election evidenced significantly higher levels of adaptation (M = 30.9, p < 
.001), than those respondents intending to vote for another party (M = 26.9).  There were no 
significant differences found in psychological adaptation between groups based on differing 
parental, employment or residential status (i.e., urban/rural), home ownership, or income.  
Overall, the results from this study suggest that those respondents most likely to be adapting 
to the threat and impacts of climate change are female, aged between 35 and 54 years, hold 
post-school qualifications, and likely to vote Green or Labor at the next Federal election. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
The correlation findings across other key survey variables further delineate the 
emerging picture of how differing geographic, life circumstance, and psychological variables 
are associated with psychological adaptation to climate change.  It is noteworthy that 
correlations for geographic parameters relating to exposure, proximity, and direct experience 
in the context of psychological adaptation are strong and robust.  Correlations between 
psychological adaptation and residential exposure ( r = .46), lifestyle exposure ( r = .36), and 
prior disaster experience (r = .20), all suggest that, for at least some respondents, 
psychological adaptation is strongly associated with direct experience with a challenging and 
at times taxing physical environment.  The appreciable positive correlation between 
psychological adaptation and media exposure (r = .32) also suggests that indirect and virtual 
exposure and experience can influence people’s psychological responses and adaptations to 
these social representations and media coverage of this phenomenon and risk domain (See 
Appendix K).  
Measures of association between psychological adaptation and individual self 
perceptions and value stances towards the natural environment indicate further and even 
stronger relationships between psychological adaptation and variables such as green self 
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identity (r = .70); biospheric, altruistic, and egoistic values (r = .61, .62, .54); self-efficacy, (r 
= .69); and felt responsibility, (r = .69).  Similarly, with respect to those measures addressing 
risk perceptions and psychological responses, correlations were strong and convergent.  
Associations between psychological adaptation and belief in climate change (r = .59), climate 
change concern (r = .73), risk appraisal (r = .64), and distress (r = .78) all suggest that 
multiple and interacting psychological changes in thinking, risk appraisal, acceptance, and 
emotional and motivational responses were occurring for a majority of respondents, and that 
the direction of these changes was, on the whole, with respect to a more active and concerted 
engagement with the issue/problem and adaptive response options.  All of these correlations 
are p < .001. 
The strength and direction of these correlations suggest that psychological adaptation 
may play core mediating roles in relation to most other key variables.  The highest 
correlations are particularly interesting in that psychological adaptation appears to be strongly 
associated not only with concern and distress, but also with motivational factors relating to 
self perception in terms of identity, efficacy, responsibility, connectedness to the natural 
world, beliefs and values, and risk appraisal and acknowledgement of the problem.  
COMPARISONS ACROSS LOW, MEDIUM AND HIGH ADAPTATION GROUPS 
Correlational analyses were followed by group comparisons based on respondents’ 
self-reported adaptations (changes in perceptions and responses) to the threat and impacts of 
climate change.  Respondents were divided into low, medium, and high adaptation response 
to climate change groups.  Those scoring between 8 and 21 were regarded as ‘low adapters’ 
(n = 685), those scoring between 22 and 34 were considered to be ‘medium adapters’ (n = 
1559), and those scoring between 35 and 48 were deemed to be ‘high adapters’ (n = 852) 
(total range, 8–48).  These post hoc group comparisons invite both parametric and non 
parametric statistical analysis as some variables and corresponding measures are nominal, 
whereas other variables are continuous, interval level, measures.  Chi-square analyses and 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) were undertaken to compare and contrast the three groups on 
a number of composite variables as well as on some single item measures.  
A significant association was found between psychological adaptation and acceptance 
of some level of human causality for climate change, as operationalised by participant 
responses to (#9), “Thinking about the causes of climate change, which of the following 
best describes your opinion”, Ȥ²(8) = 502.65, p < .001.  The low adaptation group was 
overrepresented in their selection of the response, “Climate change is entirely/mainly caused 
by natural processes”, whereas the medium, and high adaptation groups were 
underrepresented.  Conversely, the low and medium adaptation groups were underrepresented 
in selection of, “Climate change is mainly/entirely caused by human activity”, and 
overrepresented in the high adaptation group.  An underrepresentation was found in the low 
and high adaptation groups with respect to the item, “Climate change is partly caused by 
natural processes and partly caused by human activity”, with an overrepresentation in the 
medium group.  Results indicate that those respondents who accept the anthropocentric 
forcing of climate change were more likely to be in the high adaptation groups, and with 
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these individuals changing their appraisal and views toward this changing environmental 
condition and quite possibly changing their behaviours to reduce their environmental 
footprint. (see Figure 25).   
             
Figure 25. Attributed caused of climate change and psychological adaptation         
A further association was found between perceived temporal immediacy of climate 
change and psychological adaption in the context of (#14), “When if at all, do you think 
Australia will start feeling the effects of climate change”, Ȥ²(12) = 790.12, p < .001 (See 
Figure 26).  Low and medium adaptation groups were underrepresented in the endorsement 
of the response option, “We are already feeling the effects”, as compared with an 
overrepresentation for the high adaptation group.  In the selection of the response category, 
“In the next 10 years”, an underrepresentation was found for the low and high adaptation 
groups, while respondents in the medium adaptation group were overrepresented.   The low 
and medium adaptation groups were overrepresented in their response to, “In the next 25, 50, 
100 years”, with the low adaptation group overrepresented in the selection of response 
category, “Never”. 
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Figure 26. Perceived temporal distance and the climate change threat 
A significant association was found between direct experience and exposure to the 
perceived impacts of climate change across the adaptation groups, Ȥ²(2) = 499.88, p < .001 
(See Figure 27).  Respondents reporting “no” to perceived changes in their environment due 
to the impacts of climate change were overrepresented by both the low and medium 
adaptation groups, in contrast to an underrepresentation for the high adaptation group.  This 
pattern was reversed for participants who responded “yes”, that they had directly experienced 
the probable impacts of climate change.  These findings provide further support for the 
proposition that direct experience and exposure to climate change impacts appear to be 
influencing psychological adaptation responses. 
                   
Figure 27. Direct exposure with climate change impacts by psychological adaptation group 
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Table 6 provides further information characterising those respondents engaged in 
more adaptive responses and behaviours in the context of climate change.  Respondents 
indicating higher levels of psychological adaptation reported a stronger connection to the 
natural environment, higher levels of perceived vulnerability to both the impacts of climate 
change as well as to natural disasters, and scored higher on ‘green self-identity’.  The high 
adaptation group was also more likely to be engaged with the topic of climate change.  For 
example, these individuals reported viewing twice as many climate change-related 
documentaries and films than did the low adaptation group.  This interest and media 
consumption may be reflected to some extent in the respective objective knowledge scores 
for these two groups, with more correct scores recorded for the high adaptation group.  While 
it is understandable that greater levels of concern and distress were evidenced by the high 
adaptation group on both personal (egocentric) and societal (altruistic) grounds, it is arguably 
counter-intuitive that self-efficacy and behavioural engagement (i.e., actions to reduce carbon 
footprint) would also be strongest for the more distressed members of this group.  Yet, on 
reflection, one would expect that individuals who are more knowledgeable (through formal 
and self education as well as from direct experience), more concerned, and who see 
themselves as particularly exposed and vulnerable to the anticipated consequences of climate 
change, might well be galvanised to reassess and re-evaluate this profound risk, and respond 
accordingly, both psychologically and behaviourally. 
 
 
“Those who see themselves as particularly exposed and vulnerable to the anticipated 
consequences of climate change, might well be galvanised to reassess and re-
evaluate this profound risk, and respond accordingly, both psychologically and 
behaviourally.” Photo: Watchsmart
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Additional analyses were undertaken to explore differences across the three 
adaptation groups in relation to the spatial and temporal distancing of climate change impacts 
(#15a, b, c, d) (Range: 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree).  A significant difference 
was found between mean group responses to item #15a, which asked respondents to indicate 
their level of agreement with the statement, “Climate change will mostly affect areas that 
are far away from here”, F(2, 2901) = 103.40, p < .001, Ș2 = .07.  Respondents in the high 
adaptation group (M = 1.73, SD = 0.93) were significantly different from the medium (M = 
2.15, SD = 0.91) and low level adaptation groups (M = 2.42, SD = 0.96) in their 
disagreement of this statement.  The medium level group mean was also significantly lower 
than the low adaptation group mean.  All respondents, regardless of group membership, 
disagreed with this statement to some degree.  However, respondents from the high 
adaptation group were more prone to see their local environments as both exposed and 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.  
A significant difference was found between the groups with respect to the extent to 
which  climate change was seen to be affecting their local area (#15b), F(2, 2903) = 336.49, p
< .001, Ș2 = .19.  Respondents in the high adaptation group (M = 4.19, SD = 0.82) were 
significantly different from those in the medium (M = 3.57, SD =0.91), and low adaptation 
groups (M = 2.89, SD = 1.14) in this respect.  A significant difference was also found 
between the medium and low adaptation group means.  These results again suggest that 
respondents in the high adaptation group viewed climate change as more likely to affect their 
local area than was the case for the medium and low adaptation group respondents.  No 
appreciable differences were found between the three adaptation groups with respect to item 
#15c, which concerned the extent to which climate change was seen to be affecting 
developing countries. 
Item #15d asked respondents to indicate if climate change was likely to have a big 
impact on people like them.  A significant difference was found between the three groups, 
F(2, 2926) = 516.60, p < .001, Ș2 = .26.  Respondents in the high adaptation group (M = 4.07, 
SD = 0.86) were significantly different from the medium (M = 3.29, SD = 0.92), and low 
adaptation groups (M = 2.49, SD = 1.02).  A significant difference was also found between 
the medium and low adaptation group means.  These results suggest that respondents in the 
high adaptation group were more likely to view climate change as likely to have a big impact 
on them personally than was the case for respondents in the medium and low adaptation 
groups. 
A significant difference was also found with respect to the importance of climate 
change for the three adaptation groups, based on item #25, “How important is the issue of 
climate change to you personally?” from 1 (not at all important) to 6 (extremely important), 
F(2, 3093) = 1299.26, p < .001, Ș2 = .46.  The high adaptation group respondents’ scores (M
= 5.37, SD = 0.75) were significantly higher than those of the medium (M = 4.17, SD = 1.14) 
and low adaptation groups (M = 2.54, SD = 1.28).  A significant difference was also found 
between the medium and low adaptation group scores.  These results suggest that high 
adaptation group respondents viewed climate change as a substantially more important and 
personally relevant issue, as did those in the medium adaptation group.  It is crucial to note 
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that the rated personal importance of this issue has been one of the strongest and most 
consistent predictors of associated attitudes and behaviours in the context of climate change, 
and is an important tracker item in many national surveys (e.g., Krosnick et al., 2000; Villar, 
Krosnick & Koczela, 2011). 
A significant difference was found between the three adaptation groups and 
respondents’ assessment of the condition of the natural environment across the world, F(2, 
3093) = 48.53, p < .001, Ș2 = .03, as well as with respect to their own local region in 
Australia (#31, 33), F(2, 3093) = 9.44, p < .001, Ș2 = .006.  (Range between 1 = very poor to 
6 = excellent).  Respondents in the high adaptation group viewed the condition of the natural 
environment as significantly poorer, both in the world and their own local region (M = 3.20, 
SD = 1.08; M = 4.01, SD = 1.08), as compared with respondents in the medium (M = 3.45, 
SD = 0.97; M = 4.13, SD = 0.99) and low adaptation groups (M = 3.71, SD = 0.98; M = 4.24, 
SD = 1.07).  A significant difference was also found between the medium and low adaptation 
groups in their ratings of the condition of the natural environment for the world, however, 
this was not found for ratings of respondents’ local region in Australia.  Whilst a significant 
difference was found, caution is required when interpreting the results given the small effect 
size.   
A significant difference was found between the low, medium, and high adaptation 
level groups in respect of the composite measure of prior experience with natural disasters, 
F(2, 1154) = 24.27, p < .001, Ș2 = 04.  Respondents in the high adaptation group were 
significantly different (M = 9.75, SD = 2.90) from the medium (M = 8.86, SD = 2.81) and 
low adaptation groups (M = 8.07, SD = 3.17) in their cumulative disaster experience scores.  
The medium adaptation group mean was also significantly higher than the low adaption 
group mean.  These results suggest that respondents with greater experience and exposure to 
natural disasters are psychologically adapting (i.e., change their thinking, views and 
responses to, the threat and impacts of global climate change) to a greater extent than are low 
and medium disaster experience and exposure respondents. 
A significant difference was found between the three groups with respect to self-
reported changes in climate change concern levels over the past several years (#60), F(2, 
3093) = 681.62, p < .001, Ș2 = .31.  Respondents in the high adaptation group reported 
greater increases in concern (M = 4.72, SD = 0.88) than did those in the medium, (M = 3.93, 
SD = 0.87), and low adaptation groups (M = 3.04, SD = 0.94).  A significant difference was 
also found between the medium and low adaptation group means.  These results indicate a 
significant increase in concern levels over the past few years for the high adaptation group, 
with reported concern levels remaining relatively constant for the medium and low adaptation 
groups.  
SELF-REPORTED CHANGES IN CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERN  
Item #60 asked respondents whether their level of concern about climate change had 
increased, decreased or remained the same over the past several years on a six-point rating 
scale (1 = Decreased substantially to 6 = Increased substantially) (M = 3.95, SD = 1.07).  
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Item #61, an open-ended question asked respondents, “If your views have changed at all, 
could you briefly explain why and how they have changed?”  Responses to this open-
ended question fell into the categories provided in Table 7 and 8.  The data coding was based 
on a sub-sample of 2000 respondents, note that all respondents did not answer this question.  
It is noteworthy that the great majority of these responses related to increases in levels of 
concern about climate change.  The most populated category (106 responses) related to 
increased awareness and knowledge about the nature, magnitude, and concrete consequences 
of climate change.  The next highest categories were media coverage and perceived lack of 
action by government (92 responses each), perceived increases in the frequency and severity 
of natural disasters and extreme weather events (85), changes to seasonal patterns in one’s 
local and known environment (75), and a perceived increase in scientific evidence and 
scientific concern (71 responses).  The relative frequencies across categories are in many 
instances counter-intuitive, and provide a corrective to a seeming widespread acceptance that, 
for example, the anticipated increased costs of living associated with climate change (26), or 
concern for future generations (22) are particularly salient.  These findings again validate this 
substantial increase in self-reported concern levels in recent years for a majority of 
respondents, and begin to illuminate the reasons for such increases, notwithstanding already 
high levels of concern.   
  
These finding validate this 
substantial increase in self-
reporting concern level.  
Photo: Angus Veitch 
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Table 7. Reasons given for increased levels of concern about climate change 
 
  
Category (illustrative response)  
Frequency 
 
% 
More awareness/knowledge (“I guess I have just become more aware of how fragile our 
ecosystems are and if we continue to abuse these, our planet – like anything – will just dry 
up and crumble”)  
106 12.3 
More media attention (“I've learnt more about it through reports in the media and on TV. I 
realise it's much more serious than I thought, and have learnt more about how much our 
government needs to act on its promises regarding climate change”) 
92 10.7 
Lack of action by the Government (“There has been more instances of events that could be 
related to climate change and the government does not seem to be acting – am now more 
concerned that climate change will not be addressed”) 
92 10.7 
Increase in frequency/severity of natural disasters (“Far more natural disasters since then – 
cyclones, bush fires. They seem to be way more frequent nowadays”) 
85 9.9 
Noticing changes in the immediate environment (“Even the fruit trees in my yard are 
fruiting less – winters are no longer cold”)  
75 8.7 
Increased scientific evidence/information (“Constant concern expressed by scientists and 
others indicates that it is imperative to consider the issue. I consciously do my tiny little bit 
but often consider how ineffective it is”) 
71 8.2 
Changes in weather patterns (“Because of the weather changes they have started to scare me 
with how bad they are”) 
48 5.6 
Increased information seeking (“Read more scientific data about the effects of climate 
change. More aware of the changes in wild weather and drought that have affected my 
local area. Saw a map of my local area projecting areas affected by rising sea levels – 
opened my eyes to the possible enormity of the problem more than just hearing levels 
quoted etc”) 
28 3.2 
Increases in cost of living (“I think all the natural disasters that have occurred around the 
world in the past year have made a lot of people think about climate change. Also the 
rising costs of electricity and petrol have made everyone think about alternatives that are 
both cost effective and environmentally sustainable”) 
26 3.1 
Experiencing drought (“returned to the rural area, where the lower lakes are dying before 
our eyes”) 
24 2.8 
Concern for future generations (“Having experienced 2 earthquakes in different countries – 
one almost resulting in floods, it has certainly made me think about the impacts that are to 
come in my child's future. I am frightened for her”) 
22 2.5 
Impacts of climate change are increasing (“I am more concerned than ever that not enough 
is being done and that there are more and more examples of phenomena that can be 
linked to climate change”) 
20 2.3 
Water restrictions/availability (“I feel more concerned about it. Given the extremes of 
weather, the bushfires and the lack of water as my children grow older I worry more 
about the world we are leaving to them”)
19 2.2 
Linking climate change and natural disasters (“I have become more aware of our 
surroundings, due to the increased number of and increased severity and regularity of 
natural disasters being shown in the media”) 
18 2.1 
Increased availability of energy efficient choices and alternative power (They’ve changed a bit 
because I’ve just finished a major project on redesigning an object to use an alternative 
power source and designed the product to be eco-friendly and sustainable.  I’m more 
aware now of what I can do, what we should be doing”)
15 1.7 
Normative influences (“I believe my levels of concern have increased due to natural events 
on a worldwide scale - more adverse conditions, more power cuts, more storms and more 
land lost to the sea levels that have made me question the situation. I think there have been 
more informative high profile documentaries that have also helped influence my thought 
process over climate change”) 
10 1.2 
Total 751 87.2 
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Table 8. Reasons given for decreased levels of concern about climate change 
 
A number of researchers have reported and addressed the matter of fluctuating levels 
of concern about climate change, and in particular modestly decreased levels of concern over 
the past few years according to a number of national survey findings in North America, 
Britain, and Australia (Brechin, 2010; Brulle et al., 2012; Krosnick, 2008; Krosnick & 
MacInnis, 2011; Krosnick & Villar, 2010).  There are a number of points worth making.  
There have been many national and global events over the past few years that could readily 
explain such variability, with these including the vagaries of the global financial crisis, the 
particular concentration and intensity of extreme weather events that occurred over the past 
few years across these three countries, the sensationalism of much media reporting, as well as 
the dramatic drop in media coverage of climate change for several years, the ‘climategate’ 
aftermath and concerted efforts of sceptic and vested interest lobby groups, the political 
discord and discourse surrounding the Copenhagen Summit, and strident national political 
debates and polarisation of views (e.g., Boykoff, 2011; Shwartz, 2010; Villar, Krosnick & 
Koczela, 2011, Washington & Cook, 2011).  As well, of course, these modest reported drops 
in concern levels are hardly surprising, coming off a very high base level, the likely 
contributions of” issue fatigue” and “finite worry”, and amidst multiple other appreciable 
concerns, such as the escalating political instability in the Middle East, andNorth Africa and 
the continuing global financial crisis. 
 
The open-ended responses from those reporting a decrease in their concern levels in 
response to # 61 provide some local context for Australian survey respondents.  Interestingly 
the most frequent category of response would appear to relate to increased self-efficacy and 
optimism, and some measure of psychological adaptation, whereas the second most frequent 
category relates to increasing disenchantment with the nature of the political debate and 
exploitation of this issue by politicians and vested interests.  For some respondents, there 
would appear to have been a polarisation of responses to the issue over time, with this 
 Category (illustrative response) Frequency % 
Natural cyclical phenomena (“Become more skeptical that it is all human – I think it could 
be due to natural causes as well. But, at the same time, I am far more conscious about how 
environmentally friendly I am, and how I teach it to my daughter”)
31 3.6 
Political deception (“I think that more research needs to be undertaken regarding climate 
change, at the moment it seems as though politicians etc are using it to win elections and 
profit from the introduction of taxes that will not necessarily be useful without further 
research being conducted”) 
24 2.8 
Conflicting evidence  (“After reading evidence from scientists both for and against climate 
change, I now believe that it is a myth and we are just going through a cycle which is part 
of nature”) 
22 2.5 
Climate change does not exist (“I am no longer certain that we are experiencing ’climate 
change’. This is not to say I am not concerned by environmental issues or sustainability 
because I am! I am just not sure convinced of global warming”)
15 1.7 
Media sensationalism (“Lack of definitive / subjective information worldwide without 
vested interests and media hype giving a biased viewpoint. There are a few books around 
but are expensive and not necessarily available for research”)
13 1.7 
Desensitised (“didn't really think much about it, I guess reading and hearing more has 
changed my views and thinking ...”) 
5 0.6 
Total 110 12.8 
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resulting in both increased concern as well as increased scepticism.  Also noteworthy is a 
palpable media fatigue and disillusionment with what is perceived to be considerable and 
transparent media sensationalism, hype, and inflation of the scepticism debate in Australia.  
The representative respondent statements in Table 9 provide a rich and informative picture of 
reflective public sentiment. It is important to appreciate that in the case of these open-ended 
items, the data base includes responses from substantial proportions of the 3096 sample, often 
providing paragraph length and very strongly felt responses  Finally, it is important to note 
that this focus on reported concern in the context of climate change adaptation and 
psychological impacts makes considerable sense, in that such a self-reported state and 
changing response to an environmental threat or issue is one of the most valid, meaningful, 
and sensitive indicators available with respect to respondent views, appraisals, and the 
psychological impacts of a threat such as climate change. 
. 
Psychological adaptation to climate change encompasses those intra-individual processes 
(e.g., risk appraisal, motivational responses, coping strategies, decision-making) relating 
to psychological responses, changes, and adjustments to the threat and implications of 
climate change as well as to direct experience with what are perceived to be the unfolding 
impacts of climate change. 
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l a
da
pt
at
io
n 
11
1 
Ta
bl
e 
9.
 Il
lu
st
ra
tiv
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 re
as
on
s f
or
 c
ha
ng
ed
 le
ve
ls
 o
f c
on
ce
rn
 a
bo
ut
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
Th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 w
ith
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 th
at
 it
 h
ap
pe
ns
 so
 sl
ow
ly
. W
ith
 th
e 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
gi
ng
 so
 sl
ow
ly
 a
nd
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 so
 fa
st
, I
 b
el
ie
ve
 it
 w
on
’t 
be
 lo
ng
 b
ef
or
e 
w
e 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 
re
ve
rs
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s o
f c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
, s
o 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
ne
ed
 fo
r i
m
m
ed
ia
te
 c
on
ce
rn
 (M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, m
al
e,
 2
6 
ye
ar
s)
. 
Ev
er
y 
da
y 
on
e 
re
ad
s m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
nd
 im
pa
ct
s o
n 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
. I
t's
 fr
ig
ht
en
in
g 
(M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 4
4 
ye
ar
s)
.
I a
m
 a
 lo
t m
or
e 
aw
ar
e 
of
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
s i
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
in
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
 a
nd
 w
e 
ha
ve
 h
ad
 a
 lo
t o
f n
at
ur
al
 d
is
as
te
rs
 a
ll 
ov
er
 th
e 
w
or
ld
 th
at
 is
 re
po
rte
d 
by
 m
ed
ia
 to
 b
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 (P
er
th
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 4
3 
ye
ar
s)
.
I t
hi
nk
 a
ll 
th
e 
na
tu
ra
l d
is
as
te
rs
 th
at
 h
av
e 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 a
ro
un
d 
th
e 
w
or
ld
 in
 th
e 
pa
st
 y
ea
r h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
a 
lo
t o
f p
eo
pl
e 
th
in
k 
ab
ou
t c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
. A
ls
o 
th
e 
ris
in
g 
co
st
s o
f e
le
ct
ric
ity
 a
nd
 p
et
ro
l 
ha
ve
 m
ad
e 
ev
er
yo
ne
 th
in
k 
ab
ou
t a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
 th
at
 a
re
 b
ot
h 
co
st
 e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
lly
 su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
(B
ris
ba
ne
, f
em
al
e,
 3
3 
ye
ar
s)
.
I f
ee
l m
or
e 
fr
us
tra
te
d 
be
ca
us
e 
I f
ee
l I
 c
an
’t 
do
 a
ny
th
in
g 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
an
yt
hi
ng
, b
ut
 I’
m
 a
ls
o 
ca
lm
er
 b
ec
au
se
 I'
ve
 c
om
e 
to
 a
cc
ep
t t
hi
s (
Sy
dn
ey
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 4
0 
ye
ar
s)
.
I b
el
ie
ve
 m
y 
le
ve
ls
 o
f c
on
ce
rn
 h
av
e 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
du
e 
to
 n
at
ur
al
 e
ve
nt
s o
n 
a 
w
or
ld
w
id
e 
sc
al
e 
- m
or
e 
ad
ve
rs
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s, 
m
or
e 
po
w
er
 c
ut
s, 
m
or
e 
st
or
m
s a
nd
 m
or
e 
la
nd
 lo
st
 to
 th
e 
se
a 
le
ve
ls
 
th
at
 h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
m
e 
qu
es
tio
n 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n.
 I 
th
in
k 
th
er
e 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
iv
e 
hi
gh
 p
ro
fil
e 
do
cu
m
en
ta
rie
s t
ha
t h
as
 a
ls
o 
he
lp
ed
 in
flu
en
ce
 m
y 
th
ou
gh
t p
ro
ce
ss
 o
ve
r c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
(S
yd
ne
y 
m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 2
9 
ye
ar
s)
.
I w
ou
ld
 su
gg
es
t t
ha
t t
he
y 
ha
ve
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 m
ar
gi
na
lly
 si
m
pl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
I d
on
't 
ha
ve
 e
no
ug
h 
en
er
gy
 to
 c
on
si
st
en
tly
 w
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 it
, t
hu
s I
 n
ee
d 
to
 le
ar
n 
to
 d
o 
w
ha
t I
 c
an
 b
ut
 n
ot
 m
ak
e 
m
ys
el
f i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 a
nx
ie
ty
 to
 tr
y 
an
d 
fix
 th
in
gs
 (M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 2
9 
ye
ar
s)
.
A
t t
ha
t p
oi
nt
 it
 w
as
 a
 b
ig
 m
ed
ia
 is
su
e 
an
d 
it 
w
as
n'
t b
ro
ug
ht
 to
 m
y 
at
te
nt
io
n,
 b
ut
 n
ow
 th
at
 y
ou
 se
e 
th
e 
si
de
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f c
lim
at
e 
co
nt
ro
l (
i.e
., 
B
la
ck
 S
at
ur
da
y)
, I
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
w
id
er
 lo
ok
 a
t i
t 
an
d 
th
ey
 w
ay
 it
 is
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
us
 a
ll 
(M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 3
0 
ye
ar
s)
.
Ju
st
 th
e 
aw
ar
en
es
s o
f w
ha
t’s
 g
oi
ng
 o
n,
 su
ch
 a
s o
zo
ne
 d
ep
le
tio
n.
 T
he
 G
re
en
la
nd
 ic
e 
sh
ee
t a
nd
 A
nt
ar
ct
ic
a 
m
el
tin
g 
aw
ay
, s
ea
 le
ve
ls
 ri
si
ng
, e
xt
in
ct
io
n 
of
 sp
ec
ie
s u
ps
et
tin
g 
ec
o 
sy
st
em
s a
ll 
ov
er
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 n
at
ur
al
 d
is
as
te
rs
 (M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, m
al
e,
 5
2 
ye
ar
s)
.
I t
hi
nk
 b
ec
au
se
 I 
am
 b
ec
om
in
g 
m
or
e 
aw
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t n
ow
, a
nd
 I 
ha
ve
 g
ra
nd
ch
ild
re
n 
an
d 
I w
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 th
ei
r f
ut
ur
e 
liv
es
 (M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 5
4 
ye
ar
s)
.
Th
er
e 
ha
s b
ee
n 
m
or
e 
in
st
an
ce
s o
f e
ve
nt
s t
ha
t c
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
la
te
d 
to
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t d
oe
s n
ot
 se
em
 to
 b
e 
ac
tin
g 
- a
m
 n
ow
 m
or
e 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
th
at
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 w
ill
 n
ot
 
be
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 (M
el
bo
ur
ne
 m
et
ro
, f
em
al
e,
 3
6 
ye
ar
s)
.
B
eg
in
ni
ng
 to
 b
e 
a 
lit
tle
 sk
ep
tic
al
.  
N
o-
on
 c
an
 a
gr
ee
 a
bo
ut
 it
 n
ot
 sc
ie
nt
is
ts
 o
r e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
lis
ts
.  
O
nc
e 
w
e 
ha
d 
an
 ic
e 
ag
e 
- b
ut
 w
e 
al
so
 h
ad
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
.  
C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 b
ei
ng
 
us
ed
 a
s a
 w
ea
po
n 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 c
os
ts
.  
Ev
er
yo
ne
 b
la
m
es
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 fo
r p
ut
tin
g 
up
 th
ei
r p
ric
es
.  
It’
s b
ec
om
e 
an
 e
co
no
m
ic
 b
an
dw
ag
on
 (S
un
sh
in
e 
co
as
t, 
fe
m
al
e,
 5
6 
ye
ar
s)
.  
I b
el
ie
ve
 th
e 
re
po
rts
 o
f c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
re
 p
ol
iti
ca
lly
 e
xa
gg
er
at
ed
 (P
er
th
, f
em
al
e,
 5
3 
ye
ar
s)
. 
Psychological adaptation 
112 
We know that threat appraisal plays a central role in stress and coping responses to 
acute threats and personal stressors (e.g., Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and that psychological 
adaptation to and coping with perceived threats and accompanying stress is a crucial mediator 
of longer term psychological impacts and behavioural engagement (Lazarus, 1991).  The 
threat of climate change, unlike more acute personal stressors and extreme weather events, 
constitutes an ongoing and background environmental stressor of profound global 
consequence.  Hence it could be expected that psychological adaptation and coping responses 
to continuous risk communications regarding the threat of climate change are likely to differ, 
reflecting diverse strategies and the role of important individual dispositional and life-history 
differences influencing differences in coping with a consequential but, for many, 
psychologically distant and amorphous threat (Reser et al. 2012a; Reser & Swim, 2011).  The 
status of climate change as an ongoing and global environmental stressor to which people are 
continuously exposed through media coverage would seem to clearly matter.  The nature of 
these psychological processes and responses to the threat of climate change such as 
reappraisal, avoidant coping, and behavioural engagement are crucially important to 
understanding and addressing psychological impacts and psychological and behavioural 
adaptation and adjustment to climate change.  Climate change concern is perhaps best viewed 
as both a conceptual umbrella and a specific type of more general environmental concern(s) 
which serves as a measurable and informative indicator and barometer of changing public 
risk perceptions, responses and impacts in the context of monitoring important climate 
change-related changes and impacts in the human landscape. 
These qualitative responses relating to why respondents’ concern levels have changed 
are particularly informative with respect to respondents’ thoughts and observations about 
changes in their own psychological responses and views (and likely perceived changes in 
others’ responses and views). Such qualitative data brings us much closer to the actual 
content, processes, and mindful reality of psychological adaptation and adjustment. 
Notwithstanding necessary qualifications when dealing with such self report data (e.g., 
Schwarz, 1999; Strack & Schwarz, 2007), an important reality is that people are often the 
most knowledgeable and available observers of their own internal responses and changing 
views as well as changing motivations and behaviours.  The explanations provided by 
respondents to this and other questions were often quite detailed and articulate, and not 
typically self-serving or reflective of social desirability.  Respondents appeared to be very 
honestly and genuinely engaging with this question about why, in their judgment, their 
concern level about climate change had altered over the past several years.  Equally 
impressive is the fact that concern levels of 71% of respondents had increased over this 
relatively short time period, and in the context of the associated and very contested social, 
political, and environmental issue status of this global threat, for many from an initial already 
high level.  These qualitative findings both complement and inform the convergent 
quantitative findings picture of high levels of acceptance, concern, and appreciable 
psychological adaptation in this national sample of Australia respondents. 
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BEHAVIOURAL ENGAGEMENT 
The behavioural inventory was adapted from a similar listing of behaviours engaged 
in by survey respondents in North America, based on the work of Jon Krosnick, at Stanford 
University and the Woods Institute for the Environment, and the ABC News polls (Krosnick, 
2008).  This listing is similar to many being used in such national surveys (e.g., Leiserowitz 
et al., 2010a, 2010b; Roser-Renouf & Nisbett, 2008; Steg & Vlek, 2009) but adapted to the 
Australian context, while still allowing for meaningful comparisons.  It is important to stress 
that this survey component relates to actual behaviours, not behavioural intentions, and that 
this is a self-report checklist.  Behavioural engagement is particularly important in the context 
of this research as such ecological or environmentally significant behaviours in terms of 
environmental sustainability, energy conservation, and carbon emission minimization are 
both a logical and strategic outcome variable, which relates directly to climate change 
adaptation and adjustment, as well as to climate change mitigation (Gardner & Stern, 2002).  
Equally, taking action in the context of climate change has as much to do with the 
psychological significance of behaviours as it has to the environmental significance of 
behaviours in terms of addressing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Reser & 
Swim, 2011; Stern, 2000).  
 Hence a composite measure of behavioural engagement provides a robust and 
conventional parameter which can serve as the predicted outcome variable in regression or 
structural equation modelling examining the predictors and mediators, of individual level 
adaptation and mitigation.  It is noteworthy that from a psychological perspective, climate 
change adaptation and mitigation are interrelated in multiple ways (Reser et al., 2012a).  
Additionally, of course, behavioural engagement can be an excellent indicator of motivations, 
barriers, and the relative success of policy initiatives.  Such behavioural checklists do tend to 
have a strong pro-environmental and climate change mitigation focus, however the present 
collaborative research undertaking and the comparison benefits of standardised survey items 
determined this selection and listing.  The listing of action possibilities was also developed 
independently of more recent rank orderings of the environmental significance of such 
behaviours in terms of relative contribution to greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Gardner & 
Stern, 2008). 
To measure behaviour, respondents were asked to indicate what actions they were 
currently taking to reduce their carbon footprint (#34).  Participants were presented with a list 
of 15 pro-environmental behaviours and were asked to tick those activities which reflected 
their current behaviours and actions.  Respondents were also able to indicate additional 
behaviours which reduced their carbon footprint by ticking the response option “other”. 
Results indicated that a large proportion of respondents engaged in recycling 
behaviours 88.2%, and used compact florescent light bulbs 82.8%.  Close to 50% of 
respondents reported using less fuel, driving less, and taking alternative modes of transport 
(i.e., walking, riding, scootering).  Interestingly, 39.9% of respondents indicated that they 
were buying local food (e.g., organic), and/or growing food as an action to reduce their 
carbon footprint.  Not surprisingly, respondents reported buying or using more fuel-efficient 
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cars, 34%, and a further 25.9% indicated they were using public transport.  Just less than one 
quarter of all respondents indicated that they were reducing air travel, and 17.9% were buying 
energy from renewable sources.  Smaller numbers of respondents indicated that they were 
carpooling (9.8%) and buying carbon offsets (5.8%).  Only 2.8% of respondents reported 
doing nothing.  (Refer to Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28. Actions taken to reduce carbon footprint 
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF BEHAVIOUR 
Question #34 was used to create a composite measure of self-reported behaviour 
comprising 15 out of the 17 response categories (‘other’ and ‘nothing’ were excluded).  
Scores were summed (possible range 0-15), with higher scores indicating a greater number of 
carbon-reducing behaviours (M = 6.43, SD = 2.89).   
BEHAVIOUR CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
The correlations between behavioural engagement and key survey variables indicate 
strong positive relationships, for example, between behaviour engagement and green self-
identity (r = .70), adaptation (r = .53), responsibility (r = .48), self-efficacy (r = .50), 
objective knowledge (r = .46), distress (r = .42), residential exposure (r = .46), and climate 
change concern (r = .44). (Refer to Appendix K).  All correlations are significant at p < .001.  
These correlations are logical and relate to reasonably self-evident explanations for why 
respondents would be motivated to engage in pro-environmental and own footprint-reducing 
behaviours.  These motivating factors are no doubt acting independently in some instances 
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and interactively in other circumstances, and for different individuals.  It is noteworthy that 
such actions are strongly correlated with green self-identity.   
BEHAVIOUR DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
An exploration of behavioural engagement across demographic cohorts provides 
further insights into these findings (see Appendix L).  Female respondents were engaged in 
significantly greater carbon footprint reduction behaviours (M = 6.6, p < .001) than were 
male respondents (M = 6.2).  Environmental behaviours increased with age, with respondents 
aged over 55 (M = 6.6, p < .001) evidencing significantly higher mean scores than those aged 
under 35 (M = 6.1).  Respondents with a university education reported significantly greater 
behavioural scores (M = 6.7, p < .001) than those with a high school education (M = 6.2).  
Respondents who reported that they were not working evidenced significantly greater mean 
scores (M = 6.7, p < .001) than respondents who were currently employed (M = 6.2).  Voting 
intention exhibited clear and significant differences in behavioural engagement, with those 
respondents intending to vote Green or Labor indicating significantly greater mean scores (M
= 6.9, p < .001) than those who intended to vote for another party (M = 6.1).  Interestingly, 
those respondents reporting a lower income (less than $60,000) reported significantly greater 
mean scores (M = 6.7, p < .001) than those earning between $60,000 and $100,000 (M = 
6.2), or those earning over $100,000 (M = 6.1).  Additional demographic variables, such as 
parent/grandparent status, residential location, and home ownership accounted for no 
significant or noteworthy behaviour differences across respective groups. 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSES 
Psychological processes underlying behavioural engagement were indirectly 
addressed through a number of open-ended items.  Following the behaviour item #34, 
respondents were asked to think about the main reasons for taking action to reduce their 
carbon footprint.  This was the first open-ended question in the survey and prompted a large 
response from the majority of participants.   Table 10 presents frequencies and percentages 
by coding categories for the first 500 respondents to #35, “What do you think are the main 
reasons for taking these actions?” The rationale for this question included an examination 
of respondents’ own views of their motivations, and the relative salience and importance of 
these motivations.  As well, these responses tell us something about respondents’ 
explanations and accounts of their own behavioural responses to the anthropogenic carbon 
emissions issue.  An individual’s response could indicate several different reasons or 
motivations, and in such instances all distinct reasons were coded and entered as multiple 
category entries.  
The ordering of response categories by relative frequency in Table 10 immediately 
shows that associated cost-saving benefits were very salient, though most frequently 
mentioned as an accompanying comment such as, “Because I can do these things easily 
without a huge change to my lifestyle, then I can save some money for myself and I feel like I 
am doing my bit to help the environment”.  ‘Making a difference’ and or ‘a contribution’, and 
‘doing one’s bit’, the second most frequent motivation/explanation offered, overlapped in 
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some ways with the third most reported motivation, that of protecting, assisting, and 
preserving the natural environment.  Illustrative examples included, “I want to feel I’m taking 
a small part in shaping the future”, and “The welfare of my community and to help maintain a 
planet that will be able to sustain itself for millions of years to come”.  Together these, and 
related ecocentric reasons, put financial considerations into a more balanced perspective.  
Emergent coding categories of ‘felt responsibility’, ‘to do something’, ‘because of who I am’, 
‘to do the right thing’, ‘I want to do these things’, underscore the importance of how 
respondents see themselves, and how their environmental responses and actions are an 
important part of this self-perception, self-presentation, and identity.  These responses also 
emphasise the personal importance of these issues and convergent environmental threat, as 
well as the symbolic importance and significance of one’s actions.  ‘Normative expectations 
of others’, ‘perceived moral responsibility’, and ‘need to be a good citizen’ were also salient 
considerations for respondents, and reflect the very real power and influence of such 
considerations (e.g., Cialdini, 2003).   
While it is noteworthy that few respondents in this sub-sample of 500 respondents 
mentioned climate change specifically, it must be remembered that this was a larger 
contextual theme in the survey. One’s carbon footprint was specifically mentioned in #34, 
and over 5% of respondents mentioned reducing one’s carbon footprint while not specifically 
mentioning climate change.  Hence it is reasonably clear that climate change provided the 
broader context for many respondents.  While such responses in some ways suggest expected 
or stereotypic reasons, responses overall indicated very diverse and often seemingly deeply 
felt personal values and views. It must also be considered that in the context of such a 
question, immediately following the reporting of one’s own behaviour, and given limited 
access to one’s own motivations, responses need not accurately reflect actual or objective 
motivations and needs (e.g., Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977; Schwarz, 1999).  Nonetheless the 
richness of responses, the evident desire to communicate why on the part of most 
respondents, the ubiquitous disregard of what might be considered socially desirable 
responses, and the passion and reflective awareness of many respondents, was truly 
impressive.  
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Table 10. Reasons for reducing carbon footprint 
Overall this qualitative data substantially informs motivational, explanatory, and other 
psychological considerations underlying reported behavioural engagement, albeit from the 
respondent’s own perspective.  The richness of this qualitative data, in this item and in the 
case of our other open-ended survey items, also confirms the very genuine engagement of 
respondents in this exercise and issue, and the clear reflective consideration they have given 
to their behavioural responses to the threat of climate change.  This qualitative data also 
confirms and complements the appreciable levels of concern, distress, and psychological 
adaptation evident in more quantitative and psychometric survey items.  While no separate 
coding category was established relating to the personal importance or psychological 
significance of one’s behavioural actions or involvements, as this is a rather different coding 
exercise, the content of these responses clearly indicated that, for many respondents, the 
actions they were taking were very personally significant and meaningful.  Very few 
Response category (n = 500 respondents) Frequency Percentage 
Associated financial benefit, necessity, save money, reduce costs 127 17.3 
Making a difference, doing my bit, making a contribution   100 13.6 
To protect, help, save, preserve the environment, sustainable future 77 10.5 
Normative expectations, everyone does it, everyone expects me to do 
the above, collective moral responsibility, to be a good citizen 
46 6.3 
Concerns for the environment, caring for the environment 40 5.4 
Reducing one’s own carbon footprint, impact 38 5.2 
For future generations, for my children 35 4.8 
Counters the wasting of conserves, finite resources 33 4.5 
Felt personal responsibility 30 4.1 
Because it’s easy to do, actions don’t impact my life and don’t cost me 
more 
27 3.7 
Other responses that don’t quite fit the question asked 26 3.5 
To do something, to feel like you are doing something 21 2.9 
Because of who I am, It is what I do, have always done these things, it 
is part of my everyday life 
17 2.3 
To do the right thing 14 1.9 
To address climate change 13 1.8 
It makes sense to conserve, sensible 11 1.5 
Media and community encouragement, advertising and education 9 1.2 
Because of external controls and restricted options 9 1.2 
Because of my education, upbringing 8 1.1 
Felt guilt 8 1.1 
Other reasons/explanations (e.g., be a good role model, children nag 
me, reduce distress, to be self reliant, to feel better) 
44 6.0 
Total 733  
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responses directly referred to net environmental significance or greenhouse gas emission 
reduction, raising an interesting question about the relative salience and importance of 
objective environmental significance (i.e., greenhouse gas emission reduction) (e.g., Gardner 
& Stern, 2008; Stern, 2000).  
An alternative way of framing and interpreting these motivational and explanatory 
responses is to ask whether many of these seem to serve or reflect psychological needs as 
contrasted with financial or situation-specific circumstances and constraints. It is clear that 
many of these responses fall into categories which relate more to psychological significance 
and personal meaning than to objective environmental significance or financial benefit. It is 
difficult to not see and interpret many of these diverse motivations and explanations as 
reflecting various ways of coping with a disturbing and for some profoundly distressing 
threat and likely prognosis for the environmental future (e.g., Reser et al., 2012a).  Such 
coping strategies are difficult to distinguish from adaptation. From conventional stress and 
coping models in psychology the distinction between psychological adaptation and mitigation 
is basically the distinction between primary and secondary coping, with this secondary 
coping being largely focused on changing one’s appraisal of the threat and reassessing or 
reframing one’s own exposure and ability to deal with the situation. This self-focused 
adaptation and internal emotional and motivational state regulation is well captured in many 
of the respondents’ answers to #35: 
IDENTIFYING BARRIERS TO PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR 
The next question in the survey (#36), asked respondents to indicate why it is that 
they were not taking more actions to address climate change.  Similar to the behaviour 
checklist, respondents were asked to tick as many of the ten provided response categories that 
applied.  Respondents also had the opportunity to indicate the response category “other” and 
specify additional reasons why they were not taking more actions.   The principal finding was 
that just over half of all respondents reported that such behavioural engagement was “too 
expensive”.  Smaller numbers of respondents indicated that it was “too big a problem for me 
to have any impact” (16.6%), or that it was “too inconvenient or too much effort” (15.9%).  
Interestingly, 14.8% of respondents selected the response option ‘don’t know what else to 
do’, whilst 13% of participants didn’t think it was necessary.  Ten percent of respondents did 
not think it will do any good to take further actions, with a further 10% indicating a lack of 
interest and motivation.  A number of respondents indicated that they didn’t believe climate 
change was happening and therefore were not prepared to take further action to address the 
problem (10.3%).  The asserted non-belief in climate change for 10.3% of respondents is 
surprising, but in the context of explaining why one is not engaging in such behaviours and 
associated self-presentation considerations this is understandable (Refer to Figure 29).   
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Figure 29. Reasons for inaction 
As shown in Figure 29, a large number of respondents (14.9%) ticked the “other” 
response category.  A subsample comprising the first 1000 respondents was used to 
investigate the specific reasons included in the “other” category.  A number of categories 
emerged from the data, such as, some respondents indicated they ‘were already doing 
enough’; whereas other respondents cited ‘a lack of resources’ (e.g., renting versus owning, 
lack of public transport).  As one respondent noted, “Due to the location where we live it 
would be too difficult to car pool or use vehicles less; we live in a rural location”.  Many 
respondents suggested ‘others were to blame’ (e.g., big business, government, other 
countries), whilst some respondents perceived ‘a lack of outcome efficacy and personal 
control over the problem’, and “I don’t believe I can reduce my carbon footprint to a degree 
that it would make a difference”.   A number of respondents reported a ‘lack of knowledge 
and/or evidence’ as the reason behind not taking further action, whilst for other respondents a 
much stronger non-belief in climate change was evident.  ‘Laziness’, ‘lack of time/interest’ 
and ‘health issues’ were other emergent categories from this sub sample of n = 1000. 
The behaviour engagement findings overall might be viewed as more relevant to 
climate change mitigation than adaptation.  We have hopefully made it clear that, from a 
psychological and individual level perspective, adaptation and mitigation are closely 
intertwined.  These survey results suggest that respondents are, on the whole, not only very 
actively engaged in some pro-environmental and carbon footprint-reducing behaviours, but 
that this engagement appears to be both mindful and quite ‘psychologically significant’ or 
personally meaningful for many.  This in turn would suggest that climate change is an 
important and salient concern and issue for most survey respondents.  To the extent that this 
behavioural involvement, and underpinning perceptions and motivations, have been changing 
over time, these findings would suggest that individual level psychological adaptation to the 
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threat of climate change is certainly taking place.  Unfortunately this 2010 database by itself 
cannot provide this change data in terms of changed behaviours themselves.  An additional 
and important purpose of behavioural engagement data has been to provide a behavioural 
outcome measure, albeit self-reported, which would allow for model-based analyses of 
theoretically important and psychological adaptation relevant mediating and moderating 
variables and processes.  These structural equation modelling results are presented and 
discussed following a consideration of our extreme weather and natural disaster findings, and 
an analysis of demographic differences for key climate change variables. 
 
Noteworthy environmental changes compel us to ask why, with perceived human 
casual contribution and felt responsibility being a potent motivational driver of 
behaviour change. Photo: Peripitus 
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THE NEXUS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL DISASTER 
RISK PERCEPTIONS, EXPERIENCES, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND 
RESPONSES 
The Australian survey addressed public risk perceptions, understandings, and 
responses to extreme weather events and natural disasters as well as to climate change.  There 
were a number of reasons for this. The funding for the Australian component of this cross 
national project was principally provided by the Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency (DCCEE) and the National Climate Research Facility (NCCARF) through their 
Disaster Management Research Plan.   An important rationale for the research was to be able 
to compare and contrast the threat and risk domain of climate change with that of natural 
disasters and extreme weather events in terms of public risk perceptions and responses.  In 
addition, there was good reason to think that there might well be a strong interrelationship 
between public perceptions and understandings of climate change and extreme weather 
events, given that the more concrete and visible manifestations of climate change are 
noteworthy changes in weather patterns and associated changes in the nature, intensity, 
frequency, magnitude and seasonality of extreme weather events.  As well, media coverage 
and representations of climate change are typically in the context of extreme or dramatic 
weather fronts, specific events, or natural disasters (e.g., Boykoff, 2008; Boykoff & Smith, 
2010; Yumul, Cruz, Servando, & Dimalanta, 2011).   
Known weather-related phenomenon are understandably much easier to imagine and 
think about than the abstract, complex, and geographically and temporally distant 
phenomenon of ‘global climate change’ and associated planetary climatic systems and 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (e.g., D’Agnese, 2000).  Weather has also 
always been a powerfully salient aspect of the natural environment that individuals, 
communities, and cultures are attuned to, engaged with, and routinely use, analogically and 
metaphorically, in their ongoing monitoring of their environment and its contingencies (e.g., 
Lockhart, 1988; Morrow, 1996).  Hence, public perceptions of and understandings about 
extreme weather events should provide some insights concerning how public understandings 
of climate change might differ from climate change science accounts of climate change.  
Finally, there exist extensive research and practice literatures on disaster risk perception, 
communication, appraisal, preparedness, and response which might well inform climate 
change adaptation, mitigation, public communication, and engagement initiatives (e.g., APA, 
2006; Goldstein, 2005; Gow & Paton, 2008; Laughery, Wogalter, & Young, 1994; Reyes & 
Jacobs, 2006).  Documentation of an important nexus between climate change and natural 
disasters in public risk perceptions, understandings, and responses would warrant a more 
serious exploration of how this rich and existing body of disaster research and best practice 
might be better utilised in the context of climate change and vice-versa (e.g., IPCC, 2011: 
Marx et al., 2007; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). 
Specific research objectives were: 
x to examine the relative salience and strength of climate change as a risk and threat 
within these two quite distinct contexts of other threats and concerns;  
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x to examine these in a way which would allow for consideration in the context of other 
published findings on the relative ranking of climate change as a public issue and 
concern;  
x to examine the possible nexus between climate change and natural disaster risk 
perceptions and understandings, and especially the extent to which experiences of the 
latter inform understandings of the former; 
x to examine the nature and extent of respondents’ direct experience with natural 
disaster events and with the perceived impacts of climate change. 
It is important to appreciate that this national survey of pubic risk perceptions and 
responses to climate change and natural disasters followed several years of extreme weather 
events and natural disasters both in Australia and globally (Refer to Appendix F & G).  
Globally these included, in the initial seven months of 2010, the Haiti earthquake (Jan), a 
massive earthquake in Chile (Feb), severe floods in China (May) and Pakistan (July), an 
extensive heatwave across the Eastern United States and Canada (July), and extensive 
bushfires in Southern California (July). 
In Australia vast sections of the continent were still in the grip of the Millennium 
drought.  In 2009 Australia experienced a significant heatwave in late January and early 
February, affecting four states, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, and Southern NSW.  
During this period a large number of temperature records were broken.  Victoria experienced 
extreme fire weather conditions, with these conditions resulting on Saturday, 7 February, in 
two days of devastating bushfires and apocalyptic scenes, with many centres having their 
hottest day on record accompanied by winds exceeding 100 km/h, creating the conditions for 
one of Australia worst bushfire disasters, Black Saturday (Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), 
2010, 2011).   
2010 was ushered in with three cyclones crossing the North Australian coast 
(Lawrence 14-23 December 2009; Olga 23-30 January; Paul 27 March to 3 April, and a 
fourth cyclone, Hamish, paralleling the Queensland coast between March 4-10.  These events 
were accompanied by a severe thunderstorm in Perth on the 22nd of March, with 5-6 cm 
hailstones, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of damage, and a similar severe storm 
in Melbourne on the 6th of March.  What is perhaps most salient, other than the Black 
Saturday inferno, were the widespread floods in Queensland from the end of February 2009 
through the first week of March, 2010. 
Globally, 2010 was the world’s equal warmest year on record, along with 2005 and 
1998, and ended the warmest ten year period (2001-2010) on record (BOM, 2011).  2010 was 
also Australia’s second wettest year on record, commencing with end of an El Niño system 
through the first five months and transitioning to a strong La Niña system which was well-
established by July, effectively ending the Millennium drought of the preceding decade. July 
2010 was Australia’s wettest July since 1998, and rainfall from August through December 
was the highest on record across Queensland and parts of the Northern Territory. 
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While such extreme weather systems and Southern Oscillation shifts characterise the 
Southern Pacific Ocean latitudes of Australia, the extreme weather events bridging 2009 and 
2010 were clearly exceptional, though no longer present at the time of the survey, as 
substantial seasonal changes were then in place across the ‘winter’ period encompassing June 
and July.   
It is arguable that these dramatic and extreme weather events and natural disasters 
might well have made the nature and threat of natural disasters more salient in the context of 
a survey running from mid-June to mid-July, 2010.  Given the widespread media coverage of 
global climate change during this same period, there are reasonable grounds for arguing that 
the Australian public was exposed to extensive virtual coverage of both climate change and 
natural disasters over the 12 months preceding the survey, with this coverage of actual global 
and national events providing at the same time a very relevant and real-world context for the 
survey questions which participants were asked to respond to.  A cogent argument can also be 
made that the relatively normal weather conditions prevailing over the period of the survey 
minimized the probability of any proximal national weather conditions or ‘primes’ 
influencing survey results (e.g., Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010). 
PERCEIVED INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
NATURAL DISASTERS 
An important objective of the research was to examine possible commonalities, 
differences, and interrelationships between public risk perceptions, understandings, and 
responses to the threat of climate change and natural disasters.  Items #23 and #24 were the 
first survey sections to directly address these potential interrelationships and relative risk 
salience.  Item #23 had respondents rate and effectively rank order a spectrum of natural 
disaster and ecosystem threats and phenomena with respect to their own level of concern.  
‘Climate change’ was provided as the last item in this 13 item sequence.  In item #24 
respondents were then asked to again indicate relative level of concern for a set of ten non-
environmental threats and phenomena, with ‘climate change’ once more being provided as 
the final item and ‘natural disasters’ and an additional collective environmental threat item 
also included in this list (See Appendix I).  The questions asked were in the form of: “How 
concerned are you that each of the following environmental threats [issues and threats] 
might directly [adversely] affect you, your family, or your local environment in the 
foreseeable future?”  The questions were posed in this way to encompass not only the 
individual respondent, but their significant others, their local region, and a more natural and 
meaningful time frame.   
The findings are themselves interesting, but benefit from related survey response 
results to fully interpret. The post-survey administration rank ordering of natural disaster and 
ecosystem threats, including climate change, are provided below (see Figure 30).
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Figure 30. Relative concerns about specific environmental threats 
It is noteworthy that the lowest mean rating for these threats approached 4 on a 6-
point scale, going from  (1 = not at all concerned  to 6 = very concerned), suggesting that all 
of these risks were viewed as matters of real concern by most respondents.  The highest 
concern rating was for water scarcity and the lowest was for cyclone threat.  While ‘impacts 
of climate change’ is ranked overall as 8th in this listing of 13 risks, it is worth noting that 
56% of respondents gave climate change a rating of either 5 or 6, with this rating not 
appreciably different from ratings given for health threats relating to the environment, 
technological disasters, and severe storm activity.  These results suggest that all of these 
disaster and environmental threats are salient and important matters of concern. It must be 
kept in mind that this is an aggregate national ‘picture’ reflecting ratings from all 3096 
respondents, and therefore reflects a strong representation not only of rural and remote 
residents, but also of urban and suburban residents living in higher density regions of 
Australia. 
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Severe storm activity
Heatwaves
Species extinctions
Threatened environmental quality and…
Drought
Water scarcity
1 = Not at all concerned to 6 = Very concerned
How concerned are you that each of the following environmental threats might 
directly affect you, your family, or your local environment in the foreseeable 
future?
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Figure 31. Relative concerns about specific non-environmental threats 
The rank ordering of the “additional issues and threats” on the basis of concern mean 
ratings in Figure 31 are again interesting.  Again, this rating task for mostly ‘non-
environmental’ threats and risk domains, allowed for an examination of relative concern 
levels with respect to the threats of climate change and natural disasters.  Climate change still 
comes 8th in such a ranking on the basis of rated concern level, as contrasted with natural 
disasters, which as a single issue and threat domain, now comes 4th.  Again it is possible that 
the framing of the items and overall task, as well as the context of the preceding natural 
disaster and extreme weather event exercise, may have influenced individual item concern 
ratings and consequent overall rank orderings of individual item mean ratings.  In many ways 
the wording of instructions and the response format in effect set up a continually changing 
judgment task in which the comparison anchors and contexts are simultaneously changing as 
respondents progress through the items.  But in practical terms and considering the survey 
results as a whole, it seems clear that environmental risks and threats invoke different 
perceptual anchors and frames of reference for risk judgments and ‘concern’ appraisals.  
Reported personal concern about ‘the impacts of climate change’ would appear to become a 
less immediate and distinct threat and concern when directly compared with the more 
‘available’ concerns of everyday life and contemporary and more accessible and easily 
understood threats (e.g., global financial crisis, health problems, unemployment) (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  It is also worth noting that the concern rating for climate change was 
similar in item #23 (environmental threats) as well as item #24 (additional issues and threats) 
(M = 4.44, M = 4.30). 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Terrorism
International conflicts and security…
Impacts of climate change
Family pressures/crises
Unemployment
Serious health problems
Natural disasters
Population growth and pressures
Global financial crisis
Crime
How concerned are you that each of these additional issues and threats may 
adversely affect you or your family in the foreseeable future?
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It must be kept in mind that the level of concern ratings with respect to the above risk 
domains came one third of the way through a survey exercise in which respondents would 
have moved into a particular associative space and attentional focus.  One might argue that 
this could have either heightened or attenuated emotional and associative responses related to 
concern ratings.  But in either case the ratings were not done in the context of a more neutral 
and less-engaged reflective space, but in a context of seriously thinking about and responding 
to a survey addressing energy concerns, societal issues, environmental matters generally, and 
the implications of global climate change.  In this broader context, it is clear that concerns 
about the impacts and implications of climate change are roughly equal in intensity to other 
environmental threats, on average, and indeed encompass a number of these other threats. 
These findings pertaining to climate change vis-à-vis natural disaster and other issues 
and concerns must be considered with respect to a number of possible context and framing 
effects, and in the larger context of the present survey findings as a whole.  The stated focus 
of the survey was “Public understandings, risk perceptions, and responses to climate change 
and natural disasters”, and respondents would have completed a number of preceding items 
relating to energy futures and security, climate change beliefs and concerns, policy choices 
and preferences, etc.  Hence they would have been particularly mindful of a specific set of 
considerations relating to climate change and other salient environmental and social issues.  It 
is also the case that individual responses were likely influenced by particular beliefs relating 
to the nature and credibility of the climate change threat and climate change science, and by 
their own direct exposure to and experience of both the climate change threat and natural 
disaster and severe weather events, with these latter considerations influenced by residential 
location and circumstances and occupation and lifestyles.  The survey sampling design and 
sample numbers allow for a meaningful breakdown of respondents by residential and 
occupational exposure, as well as by specific natural disaster and extreme weather event prior 
experience.  
When those individuals residing in cyclone prone regions are examined, the risk of 
cyclones is seen to be a far more salient concern. Compare, for example, Figure 30 (n = 3096) 
with Figure 32 (n = 206, respondents living in cyclone prone areas) where cyclones are the 
source of least, and most, concern respectively.  When one considers the geographic exposure 
and historical distribution of disaster and climate change threat across Australia, it is evident 
that disaster risk perceptions, exposure, and experience must differ regionally.  To the extent 
that these risk factors are perceived and understood as being co-extensive with anticipated 
impacts of global climate change, it is, again, understandable that everyday discussions and 
understandings of climate change are strongly interlinked with understandings, concerns, and 
experiences with natural disasters and extreme weather events. 
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Figure 32. Relative concerns over environmental threats for respondents residing in cyclone prone 
regions 
Referring back to our convergent methods for examining possible interlinkages 
between climate change and natural disasters in public risk perceptions and understandings, 
an important strategy with high face and construct validity was to simply ask respondents 
whether, in their view, climate change is influencing the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather events.  Responses to such a question provide further insight and evidence regarding 
public acceptance of the reality of climate change, as well as causal attribution processes and 
knowledge of consequences. The formal question asked was #51, “Overall, how much do 
you think climate change is influencing the frequency and intensity of weather events 
like storms and droughts?” (See Figure 33).  
            
Figure 33. Perceived nexus between climate change and extreme weather events 
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Bushfires
Health threats related to the environment
Technological disasters
Drought
Impacts of climate change
Sea level rise
Heatwaves
Water scarcity
Floods
Threatened environmental quality and…
Species extinctions
Severe storm activity
Cyclones
1 = Not at all concerned to 6 = Very concerned
Cyclone prone areas: Townsville, Cairns (Qld), Darwin (NT), and 
Broome (WA)
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Not at all (1)
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Seventy-one percent of respondents endorsed one of the initial three rating options of 
this six point scale relating to greater causal contribution of climate change to extreme 
weather events, and 47.9% within the first two scale points, indicating that this perceived 
influence of climate change on current weather events is a very widespread perception and 
belief in Australia.  This finding also supports other evidence from the survey that 
respondents do by and large understand the projected consequences and unfolding impacts of 
climate change, and how these will likely be associated with extreme weather events and 
natural disasters, as well as the nature and magnitude of the climate change threat.  It is 
noteworthy that North American respondents in a recent Yale Survey (Leiserowitz et al., 
2011a) reported thinking that worldwide, ‘global warming’ will cause more intense cyclones 
(57%), many more droughts and water shortages (62%), severe heatwaves (64%), many more 
forest fires (59%), and many more floods (57%) if nothing is done to address it.  The majority 
of respondents also reported that climate change made each of the following events worse, 
and was in part responsible for record high temperatures in the U.S. in 2011 (67%), the 
drought in Texas and Oklahoma in 2011 (65%), the Mississippi spring floods in 2011 (60%), 
record snowfalls in the U.S. in 2010 and 2011 (60%), and Hurricane Irene (57%).  These 
results are very consonant with our Australian findings of an important association in public 
understandings between climate change and extreme weather and natural disasters.             
The survey research required a careful consideration of how to best examine possible 
interlinkages between the threat of climate change and the threat of natural disasters and 
extreme weather events both objectively and phenomenologically.  This task was framed and 
addressed as a comparison and contrasting of two arguably distinct risk domains whilst 
acknowledging that media representation of climate change, and the unfolding impacts of 
climate change, typically find expression in terms of extreme weather events and natural 
disasters. Data sources included the following: 
y Participant perspectives in response to direct questions 
y Rating of concern about environmental threats, non-environmental issues and threats, 
along with natural disasters and impacts of climate change 
y Reported direct experience with climate change (local/global) 
y Perceived interlinkages between climate change and intensity of weather events (e.g., 
storms, droughts) 
y Reported direct experience with natural disasters and quantification and categorisation 
of the nature of these events and associated experience 
y Reported impact of these events: property damage, anxiety and stress, subjective 
vulnerability, with respect to the disaster event 
y Open-ended items regarding the details of these perceived climate change encounters 
 
Findings relating to these considerations are found not only in this section, but throughout the 
report, and more specifically in Appendix I. 
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EXPOSURE AND VULNERABILITY 
The geographic stratification of the survey sample was based on sampling regions and 
communities across the spectrum of natural disaster and climate change threats and judged 
relative exposure.  These considerations overlapped to the extent that climate change impacts 
for particular regions would be expected to manifest as extreme weather or natural disaster 
events, both chronic and acute, such as drought or cyclone intensity.  Clearly there is a 
difference between objective exposure and/or vulnerability to the threat and/or impacts of 
climate change and extreme weather events, and subjective or perceived risk or exposure 
(e.g., Breakwell, 2007; Malone & Engle, 2011; Zahran, Brody, Peacock, Vedlitz, & Grover, 
2008).  In the context of public risk perceptions and appraisals, as distinct from formal risk 
assessments (e.g., Gifford, 2007), it is arguable that subjective exposure is the more 
substantive issue and concern, though it is important to investigate whether the risk 
perceptions of residents in a particular region accurately reflect objective risk exposure and 
assessment.  These matters are frustrated by the fact that there do not currently exist accurate 
risk or vulnerability maps as such for Australia as a whole relating to natural disaster threat 
and/or climate change impacts. It is nonetheless possible to identify ‘disaster-prone’ regions 
and communities for specific types of recurrent events, such as cyclones, floods, bushfires, 
and drought. 
The above matters are all germane to this national survey exercise.  Where one resides 
in Australia can make particular threats and events more local and immediate, or more 
distant, both in psychological terms as well as in objective physical distance terms (Spence et 
al., 2011b; Uzzell, 2000).  It might be expected that individuals residing in areas that have 
designated ‘seasons’ for recurrent events such as cyclones, floods, or bushfires, would see 
such threats as more relevant, familiar, and ‘real’ than would those living at considerable 
distance from such phenomena.  Similarly individuals living in areas characterised by 
specific and recurrent threats might well be expected to have greater prior life experience of 
such events and conditions, with risk perceptions and responses, and experienced 
vulnerability, being substantially influenced by such exposure and experience (e.g., Sattler, 
Kaiser, & Hittner, 2000; Siegel, Shoaf, Afifi, & Bourque, 2009; Zahran et al., 2008).  
The more straightforward matters of objective exposure and subjective perceptions 
and experience with respect to climate change and natural disasters are compounded by the 
fact that individuals and communities are also ‘exposed’ to extensive media coverage and 
representations of climate change and natural disaster threats and events, with these virtual 
threats and events also being local, national, and global.  Hence most individuals in Australia 
have differing levels of both direct and indirect exposure to and experience with ‘climate 
change’ and natural disasters, with this virtual exposure being as likely to be global as 
national.  Importantly this indirect exposure and experience of these environmental changes 
and impacts can have powerful psychological impacts on individuals, and upon risk 
perceptions, understandings, experienced vulnerability, and on psychological and behavioural 
responses (Nabi & Wirth, 2008; Reser et al., 2011; Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002).  A 
related matter and question is ‘to what extent does direct experience with climate change or 
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natural disasters influence perception of and response to media coverage of such threats and 
impacts?’  There are related considerations with respect to social problem construction, the 
social representation of risk, and the social amplification and attenuation of risk, etc (e.g., 
Bauer & Gaskell, 2002; Pidgeon et al., 2003; Renn, 2011). 
Both the residential circumstances of respondents and the framing of survey questions 
in terms of local, regional, national, and global considerations allowed for more specific 
consideration of these matters.  The previous consideration of relative concern with respect to 
a spectrum of natural disaster and risk domains reflected the importance of objective and 
perceived proximity and relative exposure, with extent of concern about particular extreme 
weather risks largely paralleling event probabilities and more recent occurrences.  The 
situation of climate change is arguably distinct in that this phenomenon and threat itself 
encompasses a spectrum of extreme events and impacts, and ‘climate change’ is also of a 
more global and chronic nature as a changing and much longer-term environmental condition 
and stressor (e.g., Evans & Cohen, 1987; Evans & Stecker, 2004; Reser & Swim, 2011).  
Nonetheless climate change appears to have particular salience, immediacy, and meaning for 
respondents in terms of their local environment and their exposure to and experience with 
extreme weather events (e.g., Leduc, 2010; Scannell & Gifford, 2011). It is noteworthy that 
when asked “When, if at all, do you think Australia will start feeling the effects of 
climate change?”, 54% of respondents reported that they were already feeling the climate 
change effects as compared with 41% of British respondents.  A further 16.7% of Australian 
respondents expected that they would be feeling the effects of climate change within the next 
25 years. 
COMPOSITE MEASURE OF RESIDENTIAL EXPOSURE 
For the purpose of further statistical analyses, a three-item composite measure of 
residential exposure and vulnerability was created.  Participants were asked to rate on a 6-
point Likert scale how vulnerable (1 = not vulnerable to 6 = very vulnerable) their own 
residential region is to natural disasters and how vulnerable it is to the impacts of climate 
change (#56, #57).  Respondents were also asked to indicate how close they live to areas 
frequently affected by extreme weather events or natural disasters (#73).  Scores were 
summed (possible range 3-17), with higher scores reflecting a greater perceived vulnerability 
and exposure to natural disasters and the impacts of climate change. This scale achieved a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .66, an acceptable level of reliability for a 3-item scale.   
RESIDENTIAL EXPOSURE CORRELATIONAL ANALYSES 
Correlational analyses indicated that perceived residential exposure was strongly and 
positively correlated with climate change concern (r = .46), adaptation (r = .46), risk 
perception (r = .45), distress (r = .42), belief in climate change (r = .38), self-efficacy (r = 
.38), responsibility (r = .36), direct experience with climate change (r = .35), connection to 
the environment (r = .34), and green self-identity (r = .33), and was moderately correlated 
with objective knowledge (r = .31), behaviour (r = .26), prior disaster experience (r = .25), 
trust (r = .23), and media exposure (r = .15).  Correlations are all significant at p < .001. 
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These correlational findings are very consistent with the published literature on 
perceived environmental risk exposure and vulnerability (e.g., Brody et al., 2008).  The 
modest strength of some of these associations perhaps reflects the less than ideal reliability of 
the composite scale and the more difficult nature of #Q57, relating to the judged vulnerability 
of one’s own region to the impacts of climate change.  Taken together, these findings suggest 
that variables such as acceptance of climate change, prior disaster and climate change 
experience, self-efficacy, and objective knowledge all contribute to judgments as to the 
salience, local relevance, and perceived importance of known and anticipated environmental 
threats. 
RESIDENTIAL EXPOSURE DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
Analyses of the demographic data found that female respondents had significantly 
higher levels of perceived vulnerability and exposure to both climate change and natural 
disasters (M = 11.1, p < .001) than did male respondents (M = 10.2).  Respondents aged 35 – 
54 evidenced significantly higher scores of vulnerability (M = 10.9, p < .001) than those aged 
<35 (M = 10.5), and respondents aged over 55 years (M = 10.4).  Participants with a 
certificate/trade qualification had significantly higher scores (M = 10.9, p < .001) than those 
with a high school certificate (M = 10.4).  Rural residents evidenced significantly higher 
vulnerability scores (M = 11.7, p < .001) than urban residents (M = 10.2), and those 
respondents intending to vote Green or Labor at the next Federal election had significantly 
higher scores (M = 11.1, p < .001) than those intending to vote for another party (M = 10.3).   
The more noteworthy differences here related to gender, urban versus rural context, 
and voting intention.  These findings are not surprising but are important in terms of the 
emerging picture regarding public risk perceptions and understandings.  The relatively strong 
finding here respecting urban/rural differences is interesting in that this finding does 
correspond with real differences in objective exposure, and the reality than nonacceptance of 
climate change does not preclude a realistic appraisal of local environmental risks.  Equally, 
political affiliation and associated subscription to a particular world view can clearly 
influence risk perceptions and appraisals associated with a phenomenon like climate change, 
which is a highly politicised social and political issue, as well as environmental issue (e.g., 
Dunlap, & McCright, 2008; McCright, & Dunlap, 2011b). 
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DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH NATURAL DISASTERS 
An important area of common interest and overlap in these two national surveys 
(AUS and UK) was that relating to whether prior experience with natural disasters or extreme 
weather events might influence climate change acceptance, risk perception, concern, and/or 
carbon emission reducing behavioural engagement.  In the British context, periods of intense 
rainfall and consequent widespread flooding across different regions of the country over the 
past decade, and in the year preceding the survey, was arguably the most salient natural 
‘disaster’ for the British public (e.g., Pidgeon & Butler, 2009).  In Australia a broad spectrum 
of extreme weather events and natural disasters characterised the decade preceding the 
national survey, including a drought affecting much of the country, until broken in the 
Australian summer period prior to the 2010 survey, coinciding with a very strong La Niña 
regime and wet season, inundating extensive regions of Australia.  Direct experience with 
natural disasters of course equates with prior experience of disasters, a topic for which a 
substantial literature exists. 
BRITAIN 
Nineteen percent of Cardiff survey respondents reported having experienced flooding 
in their local area recently.  Multiple-mediation analyses were conducted to explore the 
differences in climate change perceptions (i.e., perceived instrumentality, concern, 
uncertainty, perceived vulnerability) and preparedness to reduce energy consumption to 
combat climate change for those who had experienced flooding and those who had no such 
experience.  Results showed that respondents with flooding experience expressed greater 
levels of concern over climate change, were less uncertain that climate change was really 
happening, and felt more confident that their actions would have an effect on climate change.  
Respondents with recent flood experience were also more willing to reduce their energy use 
to tackle climate change (Spence et al., 2011a). 
AUSTRALIA 
In the Australian survey respondents were asked whether they had ever experienced a 
natural disaster warning or impact situation (#52).  No time frame was provided.  If 
respondents answered “yes”, they were then asked to indicate the type of event(s), and the 
approximate number of times they had experienced each type of event (#53).  The objective 
was to document both extent of such experience over time, as well to record the self-reported 
situational and psychological impact of the event(s).  In comparison with the Cardiff research 
this assessment of direct experience was notionally over one’s lifetime and not confined to 
one’s local region, rather than ‘recently’ and in one’s local area. 
Thirty-seven percent of Australian respondents (i.e., 1158 individuals) indicated that 
they had had one or more such experiences.  Table 11 presents the relative proportions of 
respondents (i.e., out of 1158 individuals) reporting prior first-hand experience across 
differing types of natural disaster events. 
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Table 11. Experience of type of disaster event(s) and frequency 
Note: Percentage figures relate to the 3096 total survey respondents. 
Clearly cyclones, bushfires, drought, and floods occurred with similar frequency for 
this group.  The relative frequencies of events categorised as ‘other’ in Table 11 indicate that 
a substantial number of respondents had also directly experienced earthquakes (52), tsunami 
warnings or impacts (47), major storms and hailstorms (66), tornados, typhoons or hurricanes 
(22),  and dust storms (5), as well as volcanoes, tidal waves, and damaging winds (13).  
Typhoons and hurricanes are alternative names for cyclones, and hence the number of 
respondents with direct experience of this disaster type is actually 681, or 22% of survey 
respondents overall.  
It is important to keep in mind that many respondents had experienced these extreme 
weather and climatic events multiple times, with the number of people experiencing such 
events on over four occasions being quite high.  These frequencies, and respondents’ overall 
direct experience, are noteworthy considering that 70.2% of survey respondents were from 
urban and suburban regions of Australia.  For many individuals disasters are a recurring and 
familiar aspect of life in their residential region.  Urban dwellers are not immune to natural 
disaster threats, with bushfires, cyclones, and floods having put many Australian cities on red 
alert, and in a number of cases directly in harm’s way (e.g., Cyclone Tracy, the bushfires of 
Black Saturday, the Brisbane floods of 1974 and 2011). 
Of the 1146 respondents who reported experiencing natural disaster warning or 
impact situations, 624 or 54% had experienced four or more such events.  The survey sample 
included 188 individuals, or 16% of those with direct disaster experience, who reported 
having experienced more than ten such events, with 9 of these respondents having 
experienced 20 or more disaster situations.  An examination was made of all of those 
respondents who had experienced four or more disaster situations across a number of core 
survey variables, that is, 624 individuals.  The comparison figures for this subgroup of 
respondents with high levels of prior disaster experience are given in Table 12.  
Cyclone Bushfire Drought Flood Other 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Experienced the event on one occasion 233 7.5 283 9.1 193 6.2 222 7.2 108 3.5 
Experienced the event twice 170 5.5 167 5.4 134 4.3 162 5.2 43 1.4 
Experienced the event three times 87 2.8 55 1.8 84 2.7 73 2.4 16 0.5 
Experienced the event four times 37 1.2 13 0.4 21 0.7 33 1.1 4 0.1 
Experienced the event five times or more 132 4.3 75 2.4 103 3.3 131 4.2 15 0.5 
Total 659  593  535  621  186  
Direct experience with natural disasters 
134 
Table 12. Selected comparison findings for those with prior experience of 4 or more disaster events 
Item
number if 
applicable 
Construct 
Respondents 
experiencing 
four or more 
disasters events 
(n = 624) 
Full national survey 
(n = 3096) 
 Belief acceptance 73% 74% 
 
Certainty of climate change (strongly, 
tend to agree) 72% 71% 
 Acceptance of human causal contribution 92% 90% 
#7 Concern  (Very, fairly concerned) 69% 66% 
#10 
How serious a problem is climate change 
for Australia (Very serious somewhat 
serious) 76% 78% 
#56 
Vulnerability of own region to natural 
disasters (Very, vulnerable)  55% 38% 
#57 
Vulnerability of own region to climate 
change (Very, vulnerable)  41% 33% 
 
Direct climate change 
experience/encounter 44% 45% 
#55 
Experienced anxiety and stress 
(Considerable, appreciable) 49% 18% 
#51 
Climate change influence on extreme 
weather events  
(A good deal, substantially) 50% 48% 
 Climate change distress score 22% 22% 
 Psychological adaptation score 30% 29% 
 Urban to rural ratio 56%/44% 70%/30% 
What is immediately apparent is that this substantial disaster experience group is not 
markedly different from other respondents with no or much more limited natural disaster 
exposure and experience across the variables examined.  The 69% of those individuals 
reporting being ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned about climate change is not very different from 
the 66% figure for the national sample as a whole.  Seventy-three percent of this sample 
thought that the world’s climate was changing (#8), a figure almost identical to the 74% 
figure for the full Australian survey sample.  A marked difference does appear with respect to 
perceived vulnerability of own region in the case of both natural disasters and climate 
change, with those who have had appreciable disaster experience, reporting that their own 
region was more vulnerable to natural disasters and to the impacts of climate change.  
Similarly those individuals with repeated experiences of natural disasters reported 
experiencing considerably greater stress and anxiety than those with fewer disaster 
experiences.  It is noteworthy that the ratio of urban to rural respondents was 56% to 44%, 
reflecting the fact that respondents living in rural regions of Australia are more likely to be 
exposed to and to directly experience natural disaster events.  These finding are very 
consistent with the correlation data which examined relationships between our composite 
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measure of disaster exposure and experience and the above variables. See Appendix K.  
While all such correlations were significant, they were modest. 
What these and other survey findings suggest is that prior natural disaster experience, 
no matter how extensive, does not appear to appreciably influence parameters such as belief 
or acceptance of climate change, concern about climate change, or climate change distress or 
psychological adaptation.  Indeed it would appear that periodic exposure and repeated 
experience with extreme weather and natural disaster events likely normalise these 
occurrences for some, but such prior experience also appears to be associated with a raised 
collective consciousness, wariness, and felt exposure and vulnerability to such events.  
Interestingly, this group of disaster-experienced respondents were not dismissing the threat of 
climate change, and indeed 44% of this group reported experiencing noteworthy changes and 
events which they thought might be due to climate change (as compared with 45% for the full 
national sample).  What is very clear in the research findings, though, is that direct experience 
and encounters with what is seen as a probable manifestation of climate change (and for 
many this was reported as an extreme weather event) seems to dramatically influence the 
salience and importance of other core variables in the survey, as indicated in Table 14.  This 
further suggests the importance of the way extreme weather events and natural disasters are 
being framed and understood by individuals and communities. If such events are viewed 
through a climate change-imbued understanding of global climatic changes, then the 
significance and importance of these same events appears to be far more consequential in 
terms of psychological responses and impacts. 
While the event category achieving the highest reported frequency was that of 
cyclones (57%) of the 1158 respondents, followed closely by floods (54%), it was clear from 
other qualitative data in the survey that drought (46%) was possibly the most salient and 
symbolically powerful natural disaster in respondents’ experience.  This is not surprising 
given the ‘slow disaster’ nature of drought, its reach and landscape impact, and its ongoing, 
background stressor status, not unlike the nature and status of global climate change as a 
chronic environmental stressor (e.g., Anderson, 2010; Reser & Swim, 2011).  It is also the 
case that many regions of Australia had been experiencing considerably more than the 
‘decade of drought’ that preceded the 2010 survey and water scarcity was a very serious 
concern throughout much of Australia including many urban areas.  But the spectre and 
desolation of drought can be forgotten in the context of sudden and acute disaster events, 
hence retrospective accounts of specific events and disasters can underemphasise the 
powerful psychological, social, and regional impacts of an ‘event’ that can span a decade and 
dramatically change the appearance and status of landscapes and human communities (e.g., 
Anderson, 2010; Gleick & Heberger, 2012; Healey, 2005).  
It is difficult to compare these prior direct experience figures with findings from other 
research samples or national populations as such figures are seldom published or 
encountered.  It is noteworthy that the prior experience figure of 37% compares with a figure 
of 20% for our comparison national sample from Britain, though this British survey question 
related specifically to the only noteworthy natural disaster phenomenon directly affecting 
British residents ‘recently’, namely flooding.  Ironically, at the time of completing this report, 
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in March of 2012, an ongoing disaster stalking Britain was that of drought which had been a 
very unusual but recurrent condition in 2010 and 2011.  Preliminary analysis of 2011 July-
August Australian survey data (n = 4347) indicates that 28% of respondents reported 
experiencing a natural disaster threat or impact situation in the past 12 months with many 
individuals experiencing cyclone, flood, bushfire, or drought situations two or three times 
over this very eventful one year period (Reser et al., 2012c).   
The relative instances of disaster events are no doubt somewhat more complex than 
Table 11 might suggest.  Clearly some disaster events tend to merge, as with cyclonic rain 
and flooding, and extended drought and bushfires. It is likely, though, that most convergent 
disaster events were simply counted once by respondents, with the accompanying floods of a 
cyclone in Northern Australia, for example, being entered as a single cyclone event. As well, 
over one’s lifetime, it is likely that a number of specific events, however dramatic, might not 
be recalled in the context of an online survey such as the present one.  This would suggest 
that the actual incidence of such events and associated direct experience is in fact greater than 
what these figures would suggest.  As well, the research team deliberately included ‘severe 
warning situations’ as very real, direct experience events, as such warning situations can be 
quite terrifying and disruptive to community life, and can certainly have longer term 
psychological and social impacts (e.g., Reser, 1996; Reser & Morrissey, 2008).  
PRIOR EXPERIENCE AND IMPACT OF EVENTS  
There is considerable convergent evidence that prior disaster experience can make a 
substantial difference with respect to resilience, adaptive capacity, future preparedness, and 
short and longer term psychological distress (e.g., Adeola, 2008; Faust, Black, Abrahams, 
Warner, & Bellando, 2008; Reyes & Jacobs, 2006; Russell, Goltz, & Bourque, 2011). 
However this literature is mixed with respect to whether such prior experience confers 
unalloyed benefits in terms of future preparedness or psychological resilience and learned 
resourcefulness (e.g., Norris, Smith, & Kaniasty, 1999; Siegrist & Guscher, 2008; Tierney, 
Lindell, & Perry, 2001).  Much depends upon the nature of this prior experience, which also 
relates to the nature of the disaster event.  If an individual has coped reasonably well and was 
able to exercise a modicum of control in extraordinary circumstances, this can be a positive 
albeit challenging and stressful experience, conferring enhanced self-efficacy and confidence.  
If an individual or group has had an experience of being overwhelmed, not able to cope 
effectively, and possibly traumatised, the experience can substantially undermine self-
efficacy, self confidence, and adaptive capacity in future disaster or emergency contexts 
(Reser & Morrissey, 2008). 
In the context of this 2010 survey a brief assessment was attempted of the general 
psychological and situational impacts of respondents’ reported experiences with these natural 
disaster events.  Responses to questions #54 and #55 provide some indication of the 
infrastructure and psychological impacts resulting from direct experiences with extreme 
weather events (see Figure 34 and 35).  These results suggest that 7.3% of respondents with 
such experience suffered substantial property damage in the context of the event, and 17.8% 
of respondents experienced appreciable stress during these circumstances.  Certainly the 
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disaster mental health literature would argue strongly that such events and experiences are 
profoundly impactful for many people, and often traumatic (e.g., APS, 2009; Norris et al, 
2002a, 2002b; Ursano, Fullerton & Norwood, 2003).      
               
Figure 34. Natural disasters and property damage 
                        
 
Figure 35. Natural disasters and psychological response 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
The matter of prior experience with natural disasters and how this might relate to 
acceptance of, adaptation to, and behavioural engagement with, climate change was a matter 
of explicit focus for our Cardiff research collaborators as well as ourselves, and of particular 
interest to our funding body, NCCARF.  Our cross-national comparisons with Britain are of 
particular interest as Britain’s most salient, recurrent, and damaging natural disaster 
phenomenon over the past decade has been flooding, though, again, drought has become a 
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salient issue and condition over the past several years.  As well, there appears to have been a 
noteworthy change in public understandings with respect to the nature and probable causal 
influence of climate change on extreme weather events, notably prolonged rain and flooding.  
Whereas such events would rarely be attributed to climate change a decade ago in Britain, 
such causal attributions would appear to be becoming increasingly common, in media 
coverage as well as with respect to public understandings (e.g., Spence et al., 2011a).  Data 
collected in 2003 showed that respondents who had or who had not experienced flooding 
differed very little with respect to climate change perceptions and self-reported actions 
relating to the threat of climate change (Spence et al., 2011a; Whitmarsh, 2008).  Of 
particular relevance were strategic analyses of those 2010 British survey respondents who 
had direct personal experience of flooding, a total of 363 individuals, or 19.2% of their 
national sample of 1822 respondents.  Reported flooding experiences were significantly 
associated with perceptions relating to climate change and, indirectly, with behavioural 
intentions relating to energy reduction.  In the case of our parallel Australian survey, a 
distinct difference was global climatic location and geography, and quite serious exposure to 
both the full spectrum of natural disasters and to the projected impacts of climate change.  As 
with the Cardiff data, our findings clearly evidence that prior experience with natural 
disasters is associated with psychological adaptation to climate change and behavioural 
engagement, though the strength of these relationships are modest.  What appears to be a far 
stronger predisposing and mediating factor is direct experience with environmental changes 
and events which are thought to be associated with climate change.  Such significant 
experiences appear to be strongly associated with multiple key psychological variables and 
processes relating to psychological adaptation to and the psychological impacts of climate 
change. 
Direct experience with climate change 
139 
DIRECT EXPERIENCE WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 
While the Cardiff survey did not explore the question of perceived climate change 
experience or encounters, the Australian survey specifically asked whether respondents had 
experienced any noteworthy changes or events in their local natural environment, or 
elsewhere in Australia or the world, which they thought might be due to climate change.  This 
allowed for a closer examination of the role of ‘direct’ exposure and experience in public risk 
perceptions and understandings of climate change, psychological impacts as measured by 
climate change concern and distress, as well as self-reported behavioural engagement in own 
carbon emission reduction behaviours, as contrasted with the importance and impacts of 
direct experience across a spectrum of natural disaster encounters.  Question #47 asked 
“Have you experienced any noteworthy changes or events in your local natural 
environment which you think might be due to climate change?”  Thirty-six percent of 
respondents answered yes, with many of these individuals providing very detailed 
information in response to an open-ended follow-up question asking about what these 
changes or events were or are.  Appendix M presents these reported changes and events by 
category.  In response to a subsequent and similar question with respect to such experiences 
or encounters “elsewhere in Australia or the world”, 25% of respondents indicated that 
they had experienced noteworthy changes which they thought “might be due to climate 
change”.  Adjusting for the fact that a number of survey participants responded affirmatively 
to both questions, it becomes clear that 45% of respondents reported direct experience with 
environmental changes or events which they deemed to be the likely consequence and/or 
manifestation of climate change.  This is arguably a very high proportion of respondents and 
attests to the acceptance and importance of climate change.  It is interesting by way of 
international comparison that 35% of North American respondents in the most recent Yale 
Climate Change Communication Survey also reported having personally experienced the 
effects of global warming (Leiserowitz et al., 2012b). 
Participant responses to open-ended question 48, “Can you briefly indicate what 
these changes or events were or are?” are interesting on a number of counts.  The 
engagement on the part of respondents with this initial open-ended item was impressive, with 
many participants writing multiple sentences in this on-line survey, with this question 
completed by many more than the 45% who indicated that they had personally seen changes 
or events which might be due to climate change.  Indeed many respondents emphasized that 
they had seen no such changes or events.  But the majority of the examples and explanations 
from participants who had experienced changes or events which they thought might be due to 
climate change were detailed, heart-felt, and clearly very salient to these respondents.  
Appendix M provides examples of these statements, and a taxonomy of changes and events 
into which comments fell.  It is interesting and informative that many of the comments 
referred to particularly sensitive and meaningful everyday indicators, such as dropping water 
levels in dams, cracked and parched earth, dying trees and lawns, local beach erosion, 
changing growing seasons for plants, the decreasing presence of frogs and birds, the seeming 
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events, the increasingly impacted and 
fragile touchstones of the Murray River, the Great Barrier Reef, the state of local parks or 
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nature strips, etc.  Clearly, a very substantial proportion of this largely urban and peri-urban 
national population are seeing what they interpret to be the unfolding impacts of global 
climate change in their own local regions and backyards. 
EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT EXPERIENCE 
WITH NATURAL DISASTERS AND THE PERCEIVED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
Appendix K includes those more relevant correlational findings with respect to 
previous experience with natural disasters, core psychological and other demographic 
variables, including direct experience with climate change.  These results indicate that 
personal encounters with the perceived impacts of climate change are strongly associated 
with psychological adaptation (r = .44), climate change concern (r = .43), belief (r = .41), 
risk perception (r = .39), distress (r = .39), self-efficacy (r = .35), responsibility(r = .35), 
residential exposure (r = .35), objective knowledge (r = .31) and behaviour (r = .26).  
Correlations were all significant at p < .001.   
More modest but significant associations were found between prior disaster 
experience and residential exposure (r = .25), adaptation (r = .20), risk perception (r = .20), 
distress (r = .16), behaviour (r = .15), media exposure (r = .14), responsibility (r = .13), 
climate change concern (r = .12), and belief (r = .07).  These overall correlational findings 
immediately suggest that direct, personal encounters with what are perceived to be events or 
impacts associated with climate change are particularly salient and meaningful, and that these 
associations appear to be much more psychologically and symbolically significant than is the 
case for direct prior and cumulative experience with extreme weather or natural  disaster 
events. 
These findings invited a further comparison of differences between those respondents 
with and without direct disaster experience and key climate change focused-psychological 
variables, as contrasted with group comparisons for those with and without direct climate 
change encounters and experience on key psychological variables.  Table 13 presents the 
mean scores on selected variables for respondents who have had previous experience with 
disasters, as contrasted with corresponding mean scores for those who have had no such 
experience. The scores are based on item #52, “Have you ever experienced a natural 
disaster warning or natural disaster impact situation”.  Only two statistically significant 
differences across these groups were found, and these were very modest. This is a very 
surprising finding as we know that direct experience with disaster events is actually very 
psychologically salient and impactful for most people.  What these findings suggest is that 
the nature and impact of indirect, virtual, and vicarious experience with disasters is itself very 
powerful and consequential, with such impacts appearing to be as salient and impactful as in 
the case of direct experience.  A related argument here is that all respondents are likely to 
have been exposed to ubiquitous media coverage of natural disasters over the past several 
decades, with this being a very general and nondiscriminating experience.  
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Table 13. Direct experience of a natural disaster warning or disaster impact situation 
Note: Asterisks are placed to the right of the higher group mean. Differences between means are expressed as: 
**p  < .01.  ***p  < .001. 
Table 14 presents the mean scores on selected variables for respondents who indicated 
that they had had direct experience with climate change related- instances, events, or impacts.  
These latter results are strikingly different from consideration of the effects of direct 
experience with natural disaster or extreme weather events.  In every instance mean 
differences are appreciable, as well as being statistically significant.  Climate change 
encounters are associated with greater knowledge, stronger belief, greater concern, greater 
distress, stronger felt responsibility, and greater psychological adaptation and behavioural 
involvement in addressing climate change. What might account for this? It may be that 
‘seeing/experiencing’ is more than ‘believing’, that such direct encounters with perceived 
climate change impacts and events change understandings, adjustments, and motivations, and 
elevate not only concern and distress, but feelings of responsibility and self-efficacy.
Range Yes (n = 1157) No (n = 1939) d
Objective knowledge 
 
-7-10 
 
2.8 
 
2.6 
 
Belief in climate change 
 
4-20 
 
15.8 
 
15.9 
 
Climate change concern 7-32 23.3 23.4
 
Risk perception 5-30 19.0 18.9 
 
Distress 7-42 22.2 21.7 
 
Self-efficacy 5-28 18.5 18.3 
 
Personal responsibility 4-20 12.7 12.7 
 
Adaptation 8-48 29.8*** 28.0 
.22 
Behaviour 0-15 6.6** 6.3 
.12 
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Table 14. Direct experience of perceived climate change impacts in both Australia and overseas 
Note: Asterisks are placed to the right of highest group mean. Differences between means are 
expressed as: **p  < .01.  ***p  < .001.  
The survey findings overall would suggest that natural disasters and extreme weather 
events are indeed understood as phenomena directly associated with global climate change, 
and hence the ultimate rank ordering of mean concern ratings in items #23 and #24 is more 
notional than actual or psychological in terms of how these threats and risk domains are 
understood and responded to.  That is, climate change is effectively being rated and hence 
ranked against extreme weather phenomena which are themselves perceived to be 
manifestations of climate change.  This understanding of the climate change threat in terms of 
natural disaster and extreme weather events is particularly evident in open-ended responses to 
items 48 and 61.  This is also consistent with research findings from North America and 
Europe with respect to elicited associations to climate change and global warming, with the 
most frequently mentioned first associations by British respondents, for example, relating to 
weather (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 
2006). 
Range Yes (n = 1936) No (n = 1702) d 
Objective knowledge -7-10 3.7*** 1.9 
.64 
Belief in climate change 4-20 17.8*** 14.4 
.91 
Climate change concern 7-32 26.5*** 20.8
.98 
Risk perception 5-30 21.5*** 16.9 
.86 
Distress 7-42 25.5*** 19.0 
.86 
Self-efficacy 5-28 20.4*** 16.8 
.76 
Personal responsibility 4-20 14.1*** 11.6 
.76 
Adaptation 8-48 32.9*** 25.2 
.99 
Behaviour 0-15 7.3*** 5.7 
.55 
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DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSES 
RESULTS FOR URBAN AND RURAL 
For the purpose of group comparisons by community/region type, a national 
comparison was operationalised by combining urban and suburban respondents (70.7%) and 
rural, rural residential, and country town respondents (29.3%).  Across all of the substantive 
23 variables reported in Appendix L, only eight evidenced very modest differences, though 
these were statistically significant (p < .001). The more salient of these modest differences 
were, as might be expected, with rural and country town respondents reporting being more 
connected to nature, more exposed to the natural environment and its elements through 
residential location and lifestyle, and having somewhat greater disaster experience.  This in 
itself might account for much of the above reported differences.  Acceptance of climate 
change was also marginally less, with rural respondents having a mean belief score of 15.5 as 
compared with 16.1 (p <. 001), and a climate change concern score of 22.0 as compared with 
23.5 (p <. 05).  Rural respondents also scored modestly lower on overall trust in scientists, 
government and media sources, with a mean trust score of 11.7, as compared with 12.2 (p <. 
001).  These findings appear to be very similar to those reported by the authors of CSIRO’s 
sequenced 2010 and 2011 national climate change surveys (Leviston & Walker, 2010, 2011).  
Notably, no real differences were found with respect to environmental values, the perceived 
importance of climate change, objective knowledge, risk perception, climate change distress, 
climate change self-efficacy, personal responsibility, perceived direct experience with climate 
change, psychological adaptation, or pro-environmental behavioural engagement. 
It is unfortunately difficult to compare these findings with other research being 
undertaken in Australia examining the risk perceptions, understandings, and responses of 
nonurban communities as there have been very few studies where the focus, methodologies, 
and measures have been comparable.  The sequenced 2010 and 2011 CSIRO national surveys 
report gross findings very similar to ours, that is they found in both years that respondents in 
rural areas were slightly less likely to think that climate change was happening than those in 
capital cities or regional towns (Leviston & Walker, 2011).  However these reports, too, 
provide insufficient information on how geographic area and residence location items were 
framed and answered, or how matters relating to the urban rural continuum were 
operationalised.  In the case of our own research, our selected radiating postcodes from 
designated population centres combined did not allow for the sensitivity we had hoped for 
with respect to sensitively sampling this continuum. 
URBAN TO RURAL/REMOTE  
At the time of the writing of this report, many reported Australian studies and 
conference papers were addressing the matter of whether the rural community in Australia 
was, on the whole, less accepting of the reality of climate change, and less concerned about it.  
The impression generated was that the rural community was both more sceptical and less 
concerned than were urban and suburban Australians.  Many of these reported ‘survey’ and 
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focus group discussion findings, however, appear to reflect the input of key primary producer 
organisation members, and other selected groups and communities, rather than being more 
representative and unbiased samples of particular regions.  Nonetheless there do appear to be 
a number of published studies regional studies which are reporting similar findings relating to 
differences between rural and urban communities, though data is typically collected in rural 
communities and compared, notionally, with perceived or elsewhere reported urban views. 
(e.g., Buys, Miller, & van Megen, 2011; Commonwealth of Australia, 2008, 2010; Donnelly, 
Mercer, Dickson & Wu, 2009; Evans, Storer, & Wardell-Johnson, 2011; Thwaites, Curtis, 
Mazur, & Race, 2008).  Our own survey findings have not found the marked urban-rural 
differences reported by others to any significant extent.  There are reasons, as stated 
previously in this report, why this might be the case, with these relating, for example, to the 
problematic categorisation and establishment of the urban, peri-urban, and country town 
residential status of many respondents, who may well be rural residents for all practical 
purposes. The urban/rural membership of our service provider survey panel might also be 
raised.  However, our demographic data and survey responses overall, and the panel 
membership of our service provider, would suggest these possible explanations accounting 
for little difference between urban and rural respondents across most measures are not 
compelling.   
Discussions with other colleagues and researchers working in rural regions would 
indicate that there are other cogent reasons why some differences may be found.  One is that 
there are political correctness and party identification issues tied to one’s more public views 
on climate change, which in rural regions of the country might well reflect the conservative 
side of politics and a prevailing anti-carbon tax legislation view.  As well rural residents are 
well aware of and inured to the extreme weather events projected for climate change, which 
have become part and parcel of the stereotype and national narrative of ‘the man [family] on 
the land’.  It is likely that the resilient, she’ll be right stereotype of rural Australians, 
cumulative individual and community experience, local public discourse, and the political 
conservatism of many rural communities would lead to somewhat lower survey readings of 
public acceptance and concern with respect to climate change, and regional exposure and 
vulnerability in some rural communities.  Another possibility is that the climate change 
narrative and explanation for more recent extreme weather events has had somewhat less 
traction in some rural communities as the competing narrative of dramatic nonanthropogenic 
and shorter term climate change provides a very powerful and pervasive alternative account 
of what seems to be happening locally and nationally in terms of weather and landscape 
change, based on direct experience and media coverage of extreme weather events and global 
climate change.  In essence it would appear that extreme weather events in recent years that 
could well be tied to climate change are instead being normalised as outlier events not 
inconsistent with the historically extreme and less predictable weather patterns of rural 
Australia, i.e., that these are manifestations of unusual ‘climate variability’ not anthropogenic 
‘climate change’. 
These same colleagues, though, and many rural mental health workers across 
Australia, also affirm that there is a less public but high level of climate change acceptance 
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and concern in the rural community, which find ready expression in those contexts where it is 
ok to speak of such matters.  It is arguable that most individuals with a close connection to 
their local natural environment through residence and occupation, and typically strong 
attachment and sentiment, are very aware of increasingly visible signs of environmental and 
weather pattern changes that are out of their experience and of concern.  Our own survey 
findings, and our quantitative as well as qualitative survey items, are suggesting that levels of 
acceptance and concern about climate change between urban and rural regions in Australia 
are actually surprisingly similar, and do reflect very real psychological well being and 
perceived quality of life and environment impacts for many (e.g., APS, 2011, Morrissey & 
Reser, 2007; Reser, Morrissey & Ellul, 2011). 
While considerable research effort is currently underway in Australia examining the 
views and adaptive capacity and resilience of the rural sector, and in particular Australian 
farmers and graziers, there clearly exist multiple challenges in carefully documenting and 
monitoring changing risk perceptions, public understandings, and responses to the complex 
risk domain and phenomenon of climate change, and the concurrent environmental, social, 
political, economic, and policy and governance issues associated with climate change.  
Certainly a first step is to more clearly demarcate this nonurban ‘rural’ sector in a 
standardised way, that accurately captures and characterises very different demographic and 
socioeconomic groups, communities, and regions of Australians.  Equally important is a 
standardisation of best practice in methodologies and measures which can foster meaningful 
and coherent national and regional databases.  The matter of sensitive and valid objective 
measures is fundamental.  Unfortunately it has simply not been possible to extract a clear and 
coherent picture of urban rural differences emanating from other studies with which to 
compare our own findings. 
REGIONAL AND SETTLEMENT COMPARISONS 
Not only are geographically and climatically distinct regions of Australia 
differentially exposed to the threats of climate change and extreme weather events, regional 
cultures have differing risk perceptions and understandings of particular threats and 
phenomenon, associated with histories and local cultures based on long experience and 
established patterns of adaptation and adjustment (e.g., Cohen, 2007).  Our sampling 
stratification, within the limitations of region-specific respondent numbers, allows for 
comparisons across states, regions, settlement types, and hazard exposure and history.  In that 
section of the report examining the relative salience of and respondent concern about climate 
change, particular extreme weather events, and other risk domains, it becomes clear that, for 
example, in cyclone-prone northern coastal communities, respondents were more concerned 
about cyclones, severe storm activity, and floods, than other natural disaster or extreme 
weather events. 
COMPARISONS BY STATE 
The results for state comparisons across core variables (see Table 15) are not easy to 
interpret.  There were relatively few instances where statistically significant differences in 
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mean scores occurred.  This undoubtedly reflects the somewhat arbitrary status of state 
boundaries, and the very heterogeneous nature of Australian states, geophysically, 
geographically, and demographically.  Nonetheless these instances of significant differences 
are worthy of brief comment.  It is interesting that objective knowledge scores of respondents 
from the Northern Territory were significantly different from other states, yet very close to 
scores for ACT respondents.  It should be noted that both ‘states’ (i.e., Territories) had the 
highest per capita educational achievement levels as indicated by #65 “Please indicate the 
highest level of education you have completed”.   As well, state coverage of the issue of 
climate change may well have been greater than in other states, though for differing reasons, 
relating to political salience in the case of the ACT and relative climate change exposure in 
the case of the Northern Territory.  The significantly greater acceptance of climate change in 
the Northern Territory might well reflect the objective exposure of this state to climate 
change impacts as well as the lifestyle exposure of its residents to changing natural 
environments.  That climate change concern was significantly greater for Western Australian 
respondents is more difficult to explain, though in virtually all of these instances of a 
significant difference, the actual mean differences are not very marked.  The higher mean 
distress scores for Northern Territory participants might well be associated with the 
previously noted differences relating to objective knowledge and acceptance of climate 
change.  That Victorian respondents scored highest on risk perceptions might well reflect the 
fact that the convergence of drought, a historic heat wave, and the bushfires and fatalities of 
Black Saturday in 2009, arguably constituted one of the worst and most ‘apocalyptic’ natural 
disasters in Australia’s recent history. 
Finally, the fact that Northern Territory respondents achieved significantly higher 
mean scores on residential exposure, and perceived direct experiences of climate change, is 
no doubt related to the relative exposure of this state to climate change impacts and 
associated extreme weather events, and its location, in combination with those factors 
previously noted.  But it would be fair to say that these state comparisons are more 
noteworthy for the absence of appreciable or patterned differences.  
To further explore the contribution played by region of Australian in explaining 
variance in the key climate change variables, a series of two-level (individuals within 
regions) multilevel analyses were performed.  Region was operationalised by grouping 
similar postcodes to form 32 geographically-homogenous regions ranging in size from 18 to 
282 participants.  Not surprisingly, significant proportions of the variance in lifestyle 
exposure (16.5%), residential exposure (13%), and past adverse experience (11.6%) were 
explained at the between-region level (with the remainder explained at the between-
individual level).  However, region explained little of the variance in most other variables, 
including Belief (1.4%), Concern (1.6%), Distress (1.3%) and Behaviour (0.07%).  
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GENDER 
Consistent gender differences in climate change risk perceptions and responses is one 
of the clearest findings in the climate change survey literature (McCright, 2010; Zelezny, 
Chua, & Aldrich, 2000).   In Australia, for example, research undertaken by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2008) found that male respondents were less concerned about climate 
change and water shortages than were female respondents.  More recently, a national study 
undertaken by the CSIRO National Research Flagship Energy Transformed measuring 
Australian attitudes to climate change found that female respondents were more likely to 
believe that climate change is happening than were male respondents (Ashworth et al., 2011).  
These results are very consistent with other Australian survey research which further 
documents that females are not only more likely to believe in human-induced climate change, 
but also to believe that they will be impacted during their lifetime (e.g., Ipsos-Eureka, 2010, 
Leviston & Walker, 2010, 2011; Sweeney Research, 2010).  The 2010 Australian findings 
reported here are no different.  The remarkable consistency and strength of these findings are 
nonetheless noteworthy and of particular value, given the broader suite of psychological 
measures in this Griffith research (e.g., climate change concern, distress), and the Australian 
context, providing for a more in-depth consideration of these gender differences.  
 
Consistent and often substantial gender differences were found across all key survey 
variables with the exception of lifestyle exposure.  These differences were almost exclusively 
in the direction of female respondents being more concerned, reporting greater acceptance of 
climate change, greater perceived importance, greater distress, a stronger sense of personal 
responsibility, greater vulnerability and exposure to climate change impacts and natural 
disasters, higher levels of self efficacy, and greater risk appraisal, adaptation and behavioural 
engagement.  Female respondents also reported higher levels of exposure to and experience 
with natural disasters and perceived impacts of climate change, although modest differences 
are noted.  Interestingly, females achieved significantly higher scores on objective knowledge 
than did male respondents.  This result however is reversed for subjective knowledge levels, 
with males reporting greater knowledge than females.  These findings are consistent with 
recent results obtained in the US relating to gender and knowledge.  Females evidenced 
greater levels of climate change knowledge than did males, whilst at the same time males 
reported greater perceived understanding of climate change than did females (e.g., McCright, 
2010).  While it seems that women have a greater understanding of climate change science 
than men, they appear to underestimate this level of knowledge relative to males.  
 
Male respondents were more sceptical about the issue of climate change than were 
female respondents, with 2.1% of males and 1% of female respondents classified as a 
disbeliever or strong sceptic (on the basis of an operational specification of genuine 
scepticism, i.e., this was based on responses to items #8, #9, #12, #14).   When using a less 
conservative calculation (#8 plus two out of the remaining three items), 4.3% of males and 
2.3% of females would be regarded as genuine climate change sceptics. 
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Other Australian researchers have explored the role of gender, personality, and 
vulnerability factors in predicting climate change distress.  Searle and Gow’s (2010) research 
was one of the few studies to empirically measure and document how people are 
psychologically responding to climate change.  The three most common responses provided 
by their survey respondents, when thinking about climate change, were concern (61%), worry 
(39%), and anger (32%).  This study found that female respondents evidenced greater levels 
of distress than did male respondents.  Similarly, Agho, Stevens, Taylor, Barr and Raphael 
(2010) found that females were much more likely to change their way of living due to the risk 
of climate change than were males.  Overall, it seems females are more likely to be concerned 
and distressed about the threat and impacts of climate change, but they are also more likely to 
be adapting to the challenges of climate change than are males.  
EDUCATION 
It is important to note that educational achievement was spread across the respondent 
sample, with 17.9% of respondents having achieved less than year 12 studies, a further 17.1% 
having completed Year 12, whilst 33.4% had obtained a diploma or trade certificate.  Thirty 
percent of respondents had an undergraduate or postgraduate degree (See Appendix I).  The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics Education and Work Report released in May 2011, found 29% 
of people aged 15-64 had completed Year 11, with a further 21% finishing Year 12. 
Seventeen percent completed a Certificate III or IV, and 24% obtained a Bachelor Degree or 
above.  These figures suggest that educational achievement among the current sample is 
somewhat higher than the national sample. 
Positive associations were found between education and a number of key variables, 
belief/acceptance (r = .08), risk perception (r = .05), concern (r = .08), distress (r = .07), felt 
responsibility (r = .09), psychological adaptation (r = .12), self efficacy (r = .08), objective 
knowledge (r = .11), subjective knowledge (r = .11), green self-identity(r =. 08), media 
exposure (r = .11), and behaviour (r = .08).  Trust was not associated with education.  All 
correlations were significant (p < .001) but very modest. 
For the purpose of group comparisons, respondent educational attainment was 
categorised as having completed high school or less, post high school subjects or training 
(e.g., trade, apprenticeship), and university degree (e.g. undergraduate, postgraduate). 
Overall, educational differences were found across the key variables. Respondents with 
university education demonstrated significantly greater levels of objective and subjective 
knowledge, belief, concern, felt responsibility, heightened risk perception, adaptation, and 
behavioural engagement, as well as greater climate change distress and felt efficacy.  Actual 
mean differences in scores across educational groups were not large, though there is a clear 
pattern and association between education and climate change belief and concern evident in 
these results.  These findings do strongly suggest, though, that public risk perceptions and 
responses to climate change are not all about education. There are clearly multiple other 
considerations and determinants involved.  Refer to Appendix L. 
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AGE 
The age distribution of respondents differed somewhat from the national profile, with 
the 2010 sample containing proportionally fewer younger respondents in the 15 to 24 
category (7.8% vs 17.5%), proportionally more respondents in the 25-54 age bracket (60% vs 
54.2%), and proportionally more respondents in the 55 plus age group (31.6% vs 28.3%) than 
in the broader Australian population (ABS, 2006).  It is noteworthy that 12% of the survey 
sample was over the age of 65. 
Negative associations were found between age and a number of key variables, with 
age being inversely related to climate change belief/acceptance (r = -.14), risk perception (r
= -.13), concern (r = -.13), distress (r = -.14), felt responsibility (r = -.09), self efficacy (r = 
-.09), objective knowledge (r = -.09), and trust (r = -.14).  A small, but positive association 
was found between age and behavioural engagement (r = .07), connection to nature (r = .07), 
and subjective knowledge (r = .06).  All correlations were significant p < .001, but again 
modest.   Psychological adaptation was not significantly correlated with age. 
Significant age differences were found across key survey measures.  Respondents 
aged over 55 were much more likely to have a connection to the natural environment, spend 
time outdoors, score high on subjective knowledge, and engage in more pro-environmental 
behaviours than did younger respondents.  Interestingly, this same age cohort scored lowest 
on belief, importance, concern, risk perception, distress, personal responsibility, residential 
exposure, trust, objective knowledge, self-efficacy and psychological adaptation.  
Respondents aged less than 35 scored highest on the key variables, with the exception of 
residential exposure and adaptation, in which respondents age 35-54 scored the highest. 
It would appear that respondents over the age of 55, while on the whole accepting the 
reality of climate change and concerned about it, are relatively less accepting and concerned 
than younger respondents.  This age cohort has seen considerable weather variability in their 
lifetimes, feel less trusting of information sources and government action, and generally feel 
less responsible, or able to undertake many substantive or meaningful adaptation or 
mitigation measures.  Nonetheless it is interesting that this group was significantly more 
likely than younger age groups to be engaged in pro-sustainability behaviours.  
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MULTIVARIATE MODELS PREDICTING CLIMATE CHANGE BELIEFS AND 
BEHAVIOURS 
The final stage of the data analyses involved estimating and testing two ‘families’ of 
climate change structural models.  The criterion in the first set of models was strength of 
belief in the existence of climate change (hereafter labelled Belief), while the criterion in the 
second set was the number of carbon footprint- reducing behaviours currently engaged in 
(hereafter, Behaviour). Our aims were: (a) to determine the overall goodness of fit of the 
hypothesised models, (b) to compare the fit of these models with that of competing models, 
(c) to assess the direct, indirect and total contributions of each predictor to the explanation of 
the criteria, and (d) to determine the extent to which the criteria - Belief and Behaviour - are 
explained by these sets of predictors.  
All modelling was performed using LISREL 8.72 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996) and maximum 
likelihood estimation procedures. The following parameter constraints were common to all 
models: 
x questionnaire items were specified as loading on a single designated factor, with all 
item cross-loadings and error covariances constrained to zero; 
x unless otherwise specified, loadings and factor variances were estimated freely;  
x covariances between all exogenous variables, and between disturbances in the 
endogenous factors at the same level of the models, were also freely estimated. 
The fit of the models was assessed by several indices. These were the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA, where a satisfactory fit is indicated by values less than 
.08), the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI, where a satisfactory fit requires values greater than 
.95), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI, interpreted as for the NNFI), and the Standardised Root 
Mean-Square Residual (SMR, with the cut-off for a satisfactory model fit similar to those for 
the RMSEA) (Byrne, 1998; Kline, 1998; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The chi-square 
statistic was not relied upon because of its tendency to be inflated when sample sizes are 
large.  However, the relative fit of nested models was assessed using the chi-square difference 
test (ǻȤ2 test).  Due to departures from normality in the distribution of most measurement 
items, the Satorra-Bentler robust chi-square statistic was interpreted (e.g., Du Toit, Du Toit, 
Jöreskog, & Sörbom, 1999).  Model parsimony was assessed using the Parsimony Normed 
Fit Index (PNFI, where smaller values indicate a better fit).  After re-coding of “no opinion” 
and “don’t know” responses to a value equal to the scale midpoint, all 3,096 cases were 
available in all analyses.  Figure 36 provides an overview of the data modelling stages. 
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Figure 36. Overview of SEM Analyses 
MODEL 1: PREDICTING CLIMATE CHANGE BELIEFS 
Model 1 sought to predict strength of belief in the existence of climate change by way 
of seven exogenous and nine mediating variables.  The level 1 (exogenous) variables were: 
gender (0 = female, 1 = male), age (in years), highest educational attainment (7-point 
ascending ordinal scale), parent or grandparent status (0 = no, 1 = yes), voting intention (6-
point ordinal scale, in ascending order of political parties’ sympathies for environmental 
issues), a latent variable tapping perceived proximity of one’s place of residence to climate 
threats (hereafter labelled Residential Exposure), and a latent variable tapping extent of 
engagement with, and activity in, the natural environment (Lifestyle Exposure).  
These level 1 variables were hypothesised to predict strength of belief in climate 
change via the following level 2 (mediating) variables: connection to nature (herein labelled 
Connection), Schultz’s (2001) three environmental values scales (Biospheric, Altruistic, and 
Egoistic values), self-identification with “green” issues and causes (Green Self-Identity), 
consumption of televised and film media regarding climate change (Media Consumption), 
trust in what authorities say about the environment (Trust), objective knowledge about 
climate change (Knowledge), and prior adverse experience of extreme weather events 
(Experience).  There was a single variable at the third level of the model, belief in 
(acceptance of) climate change (Belief), with all of the preceding variables expected to 
predict, either indirectly (in the case of the level 1 variables) or directly (level 2 variables), 
this criterion.  Details of the items used as indicators of the latent variables are available in 
Appendix J.  Capitalised and italicised variable names are used for those composite scale 
measures which have been used to operationalise particular constructs. 
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Following Anderson and Gerbing (1988), prior to testing the structural models the 
measurement model was assessed by way of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  Results 
indicated that all parameters were highly significant (ps < .001), and the model provided a 
good fit to the data, Ȥ2 (860) = 5,801.67, RMSEA = .043 (90% CIs = .042 - .044), NNFI = 
.99, CFI = .99, SRMR = .062, AIC = 14,078.18, and PNFI = .82. 
The hypothesised version of the structural model was highly-saturated and nearly-
fully mediated.  Only three of the level 1- to- level 2 structural paths were not expected to be 
significant, namely, those to Experience from each of gender, education, and voting intention.  
This model was found to fit the data well, Ȥ2 (896) = 4,730.18, RMSEA = .037 (90% CI = 
.036 - .038), NNFI = .99, CFI = .99, SRMR = .074, AIC = 15,543.8, and PNFI = .86.  Of note 
is the finding that each of Media Consumption and Prior Adverse Experience explained 
virtually no variance in Belief, and that the effects of Connection and Egoistic values were 
negative, indicating that – in the context of this multivariate model - belief in climate change 
became stronger as levels of these two predictors declined.  (These negative effects, in the 
presence of positive bivariate correlations, were presumably a consequence of the high 
correlations between Connection and Egoistic values and the other predictors in the model).  
The model explained 54% of the variance in Connection, 42% of that in Biospheric values, 
50% in Altruistic values, 36% in Egoistic values, 42% in Green Self-Identity, 12% in Media, 
29% in Trust, 27% in Knowledge, 18% in Prior Experience, and 57% in Belief in climate 
change.  All of the level 1 variables had significant indirect effects on Belief, with the 
strongest indirect effects associated with (in order) Residential Exposure, voting intention, 
and gender (all p < .001).  
In the next stage of analysis, model modification was undertaken in a step-wise 
fashion using the modification indices, and the significance of the parameter estimates, as 
guides.  This process aimed to add predictive paths and trim the model of redundant paths - 
thereby achieving greater parsimony - without significant losses to the closeness of model fit.  
This iterative process resulted in the following changes to the hypothesised model: 
1. Nine paths from a level 1 to a level 2 variable were eliminated: these were the paths 
from age to Media Consumption, from education to each of Biospheric values, 
Altruistic values and Trust, from parental status to Knowledge, from voting intention 
to Egoistic values, and from Lifestyle Exposure to each of Altruistic values, Egoistic 
values and Knowledge. 
2. Direct paths from the level 1 variables, age, (grand)parental status, and Residential 
Exposure, to the level 3 criterion, Belief, were added.   
3. Paths from the level 2 variables, Media Consumption and Biospheric values, to Belief
were removed.   
When revised in these ways, the model provided a very good fit to the data, Ȥ2 (904) = 
4,535.88, RMSEA = .036 (90% CI = .035 - .037), NNFI = .99, CFI = .99, SRMR = .076, AIC 
= 15,097.38, and PNFI = .86.  Indeed, the chi-square difference test indicated that this model 
fitted the data better than did the hypothesized model, ¨Ȥ2 (8) = -194.3, p < .001, and was 
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more parsimonious (with eight fewer structural parameters).  As was the case with the 
hypothesised version of model 1, Residential Exposure had the strongest and most consistent 
direct effects on the level 2 variables, but, in contrast to the hypothesised model, Residential
Exposure was also a strong predictor of Belief in climate change. As in the hypothesised 
model, the level 2 variables, Altruistic Values, Knowledge, and Trust were strong predictors 
of Belief, and Egoistic values was a strong negative predictor of Belief. However, in contrast 
to the hypothesised model, with Media Consumption and Biospheric values replaced as  
predictors of Belief by three level 1 variables, Experience was significantly, but negatively, 
related to Belief.  
The model explained the same or slightly less (between 0% and 5%) of the variance 
in each of the level 2 variables (specifically, proportions of the variances accounted for were: 
Connection (53%), Biospheric values (40%), Altruistic values (47%), Egoistic values (35%), 
Green Self-Identity (40%), Media Consumption (11%), Trust (24%), Knowledge (25%), and 
Prior Experience (16%)).  However, the revised model explained more of the variance in
Belief (64%) than did the hypothesised model (57%).  All of the level 1 variables, except 
(grand)parental status, had significant indirect effects on Belief, with the strongest indirect 
effects associated with Residential Exposure and voting intention. 
MODEL 2: PREDICTING CLIMATE CHANGE BEHAVIOURS 
The second set of models aimed to predict the number of carbon footprint-reducing 
behaviours currently enacted (Behaviour).  Model testing and evaluation were conducted as 
per model 1.  CFA results indicated that all parameters were highly significant (ps < .001), 
and the measurement model provided a good fit to the data, Ȥ2 (752) = 10,379, RMSEA = 
.064, NNFI = .98, CFI = .98, SRMR = .050, AIC = 20,197 and PNFI = .91.  
The hypothesised model is shown in Figure 37.  It comprised four levels.  The single 
exogenous variable, at level 1, was belief in the existence of climate change.  Belief was 
hypothesised to predict five level 2 mediating factors: extent of concern regarding climate 
change (Concern), perceived risk of climate change impacts (Risk Perception), distress and 
related negative emotions associated with the threat of climate change (Distress), self-
efficacy in relation to climate change (Self-Efficacy), and felt personal responsibility and 
willingness to act in relation to climate change (Responsibility).  These variables were, in 
turn, expected to predict the level 3 mediator of psychological adaptation to climate change 
(Adaptation), which was proposed to directly predict the criterion, Behaviour.  In addition to 
their indirect effects, the two behaviourally-oriented level 2 variables, Self-Efficacy and 
Responsibility, were expected to directly predict Behaviour.  
This model was tested and shown to fit the data quite well, Ȥ2 (757) = 10,412, 
RMSEA = .064 (90% CI = .063 - .065), NNFI = .99, CFI = .99, SRMR = .051, AIC = 20,267, 
and PNFI = .91.  Figure 37 presents the standardised parameter estimates and variances 
explained in the endogenous variables.  As expected, Belief significantly predicted all Level 2 
variables; Distress, Risk, and Responsibility each significantly predicted Adaptation; and Self-
Efficacy and Adaptation each significantly predicted Behaviour.  In addition, Belief had a 
Multivariate models 
155 
significant (p < .001) indirect effect on each of Adaptation and Behaviour, while Distress (p 
< .001) and Self-Efficacy (p < .01) had indirect effects on Behaviour.  Contrary to 
expectations, however, neither Concern nor Self-Efficacy predicted Adaptation, and
Responsibility did not predict Behaviour.  These unexpected findings are likely due to the 
high correlations between these and other predictors.  
Modifications to model 2 proceeded in two phases: first, stepwise additions (in order 
of descending modification indices) of all previously-constrained paths; second, stepwise 
omission of all non-significant paths.  In the first phase, five models were tested - one 
involving the addition of each of the paths that had been constrained to zero in the 
hypothesised model.  Results indicated that the addition of both the path from Belief to 
Adaptation and that from Distress to Behaviour resulted in a significant improvement in fit 
over models that included only one of these paths.  
A drawback of this expanded model is that it includes five non-significant paths.  
Application of the chi-square difference test indicated that removal of only one of these 
paths, that from Responsibility to Behaviour, improved model fit, ¨Ȥ2 (1) = -4.79.  With these 
changes made, the model fitted the data well, Ȥ2 (756) = 10,352, RMSEA = .064 (90% CI = 
.063 - .065), NNFI = .99, CFI = .99, SRMR = .050, AIC = 20,219 and PNFI = .91.  Several 
features of this model are noteworthy.  First, the path directly from Distress to Behaviour is 
negative (ȕ = -.23, p < .001), whilst the indirect path from Distress, via Adaptation, to 
Behaviour, is positive (ȕ = .33, p < .001).  Overall, the effect of Distress on Behaviour is 
positive, but modest.  These findings suggest the possibility that Distress has two effects on 
climate change behaviours: it leads to psychological adaptation, which in turn promotes 
carbon-reducing behaviours, but it also inhibits such behaviours, through other unmeasured 
processes (possibly, by inducing a sense of helplessness, a process of denial, or even a state 
of panic).  Second, while the Responsibility to Behaviour direct path was non-significant and 
was omitted, the total effect of Responsibility on Behaviour was stronger (.17, p < .01) than 
was that of Concern (.01, ns), Risk (.04, p < .01), or Distress (.09, p < .01).  The variables 
with the largest total effect on Behaviour were Adaptation (.63, p < .001), Belief (.40, p < 
.001) and Self-Efficacy (.24, p < .001).  The strong influence of our measure of Adaptation on 
behaviour is consistent with theory and worthy of particular note.  
SUMMARY OF STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING 
 We used structural equation modelling to fit and estimate a series of multivariate 
predictive models of the correlates (and likely antecedents) of beliefs in climate change and 
of mitigating behaviours enacted in response to climate change. In summary, we found that: 
x the best-fitting models explained approximately 64% of the variance in Belief and 
34% of that in Behaviour 
x in general, the hypothesised (fully or partially) mediated models were supported in 
that most predictors had their effects on the criteria via variables that had been 
specified to act as mediators at later stages of the model.  Major exceptions were the 
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direct effect of Residential Exposure on Belief in model 1, and the direct effect of 
Distress on Behaviour in the revised version of model 2. 
x in model 1, Belief was best predicted by the level 1 variable of Residential Exposure, 
and by the level 2 variables of Altruistic values, Knowledge, Trust, Green Self-Identity 
and (negatively) by Egoistic values.  Thus, respondents who had the strongest beliefs 
in climate change tended (a) to live in areas that are most exposed to climate change 
threats, (b) to hold altruistic environmental values, (c) to have superior knowledge of 
climate change phenomena, (d) to place trust in what authorities say about climate 
change, (e) to self-identify with environmental groups, issues and causes, and (f), with 
these other predictors in the model, to not hold egoistic environmental values.
x in model 2, Behaviour was best predicted by the level 3 variable of Adaptation, and 
by the level 2 variables, Distress and Self-Efficacy, with the latter two variables 
predicted by level 1 variable, Belief.  Thus, respondents who enacted the most 
behaviours aimed at reducing their carbon footprint tended (a) to have adapted 
psychologically to the threat and reality of climate change, (b) to display high levels 
of distress due to climate change, and (c) to possess high levels of self-efficacy 
regarding what they can do to mitigate the effects of climate change.  
While these conclusions follow from our analyses, some cautionary remarks are in 
order.  In particular, we emphasise that the findings are based on a single cross-sectional, 
self-report study that used a panel sample of Australian residents, that assessed only one 
subset of all possible variables, and that measured each of these variables in only one of 
many possible ways.  Different findings may be obtained using different research designs, 
variables, measures, and samples.  In addition, the models developed and tested, while fitting 
the current data set well, may have taken advantage of random variation present only in the 
current sample.  Model fit may be different in other data sets.  Finally, the models suggest 
linear associations between the variables; they do not include possible non-linear effects, and 
they cannot be taken to imply causality. 
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The SEM analyses help clarify the ‘big picture’ to emerge from our data.  Perhaps 
most importantly, these analyses highlight the strong pattern of associations between belief in 
climate change, feelings of distress, psychological adaptation, and engagement in mitigating 
behaviours.  The modelling of the relationships between these variables suggests a 
metaprocess in which internal cognitive states (beliefs) serve as antecedents to 
complementary changes in affect (distress reactions) and shifts in attentional, motivational 
and behavioural tendencies (psychological adaptation), which, in turn, are manifested and 
realised in overt behavioural engagement.  Examination of the final structural model reveals 
that, while behaviour is directly predicted by three variables (distress, self-efficacy, and 
psychological adaptation), the most influential of these paths is that through adaptation, with 
most of the effects of belief, distress, risk perception, felt responsibility to act, and several 
other variables, all channelled through adaptation.  This modelling underscores a theme 
emphasised throughout this report, namely, that the processes of psychological adaptation are 
critical to understanding how internalized psychological variables affect overt human 
responses to global climate change.  As important as this point is, however, the reality may be 
more complex.  Thus, while it is tempting to infer causal paths that flow in just this one 
direction (i.e., from internal processes towards overt behaviour), there is likely to be some 
reciprocal determination, with distress, self-efficacy, adaptation and behaviour each 
influencing each other.  The next wave of data collection in our ongoing program of research 
will present longitudinal findings that shed light on these critical interrelationships.
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COMPARISONS WITH OTHER SURVEY FINDINGS 
While the numbers of ‘climate change’ surveys being reported worldwide may seem 
substantial, the reality with respect to in depth social science surveys is rather different, 
reflecting in part the very different kinds of surveys being undertaken.  Appendix C provides 
a selective listing of Australian surveys which have included and reported at least several 
items relating to public perceptions and responses to climate change.  The most frequently 
reported surveys are those from organisations such as Australian Newspoll and News.com.au, 
which are typically limited telephone surveys relating to a small number of newsworthy 
items, with few specifics provided concerning survey objectives, content, question framings, 
response format, or sample.  There also exist a number of what are now annual national 
survey exercises in Australia undertaken by research organisations and commercial 
enterprises which have included some items on climate change embedded within surveys of 
more general scope and focus.  These would include, for example, the ANUpoll, conducted in 
2008, 2009, and 2010 with a national random sample of 1200 respondents, and including four 
climate change questions out of 47 items in their 2010 survey (Lamberts et al., 2010; 
McAllister, 2008, 2009).  The frequently cited Lowy Institute Poll has been undertaken 
annually since 2007, with the 2010 survey (Hanson, 2010) including five climate change 
questions out of a total of 32 questions.  Commercial polling companies such as the Social 
Research Institute of Ipsos-Eureka have been running annual climate change focused on-line 
surveys in Australia since 2007, with the Institute’s 2010 survey consisting of 22 exclusively 
climate change-focused items.  Similarly, the company Thermometer Surveys provides an 
updated and climate change-focused ‘Thermometer Survey Report’ to organisational clients, 
but without using standardised items or conventional research reporting transparency 
(Thermometer Survey, 2008).  The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has undertaken 
several ‘Environmental Views and Behaviour’ surveys which included some climate change 
items, as do their periodic ‘Environmental Issues’ surveys, but with very few climate change-
specific items (ABS, 2008).  The more substantive and research institution-based climate 
change surveys have been undertaken by CSIRO, Griffith University (NCCARF), University 
of Queensland (Global Change Institute), and ANU (ANUpoll).  (See Appendix C).  
There have been a number of published overviews of social science-based surveys 
examining public perceptions, attitudes, knowledge, beliefs, understandings, and 
psychological and behavioural responses to the threat and phenomenon of climate change - 
and associated policy and political preference considerations.  These include a particular 
history of work relating to public knowledge and understanding of climate change (e.g., 
Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994, Bostrom et al.,2012; Read Bostrom, Morgan, 
Fischhoff, & Smuts, 1994; Reynolds et al., 2010), and more generic reviews of climate 
change survey research with a broader issue and socio-political focus (e.g., Bord, Fisher, & 
O’Connor, 1998; Brechin, 2003, 2010; Brulle et al., 2012; Nisbet & Myers, 2007).  A very 
good and insightful review of more qualitative ‘survey’ research studies examining public 
risk perceptions and understandings of climate change is that of Wolf and Moser (2011) with 
this review including several Australian studies.  The general conclusions of these generic 
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overviews relevant to constructs and variables discussed in the context of this report are the 
following: 
x There have been very few authoritative summaries of substantive national social 
science-based survey work addressing public perceptions and responses to climate 
change, and their findings and trends, other than those cited here. 
x Since 1986 when only 39% of the American public reported having “heard or read 
anything about the greenhouse effect” public awareness of the phenomenon, threat, 
and issue has increased dramatically in North America, Europe, and the industrialised 
world.  In 2006 this awareness measure had jumped to 91% in the United States (Pew) 
(Nisbet & Myers, 2007). Available evidence would suggest that the Australian 
context is, in many respects, very similar to that in North America and the UK. 
x Similarly, public knowledge of the phenomenon and underlying popular science 
explanation of climate change has grown modestly, though issues relating to what is 
being measured and how continue, with most surveys employing self report measures 
of extent of knowledge.  Nisbet and Myers, for example, report that 40% of 
respondents to a Gallup sample in 1992 reported understanding the issue ‘very well’ 
or ‘fairly well’, with this steadily increasing to 76% in 2007.  More recent research 
using objective measures of climate change knowledge suggests that a correct public 
understanding of current scientific accounts of climate change is relatively modest 
(Nisbet & Myers, 2007).  Brechin, in his 2010 review, concurs that the studies he 
examined suggested that public understanding of climate change had gradually 
increased over the past decade, though many remain relatively uninformed. 
x With respect to belief or acceptance of the reality of contemporary climate change, 
figures in North America from as early as 1992 were suggesting that 68% of 
Americans accepted that global climate change was taking place.  Across four ABC 
News surveys undertaken in 1997, 1998, 2006, and 2007 acceptance figures for the 
reality of global warming/climate change were 76%, 80%, 85%, and 84% respectively 
(Nisbet & Myers, 2007). 
x In the 2010 review by Brechin specific consideration was given to survey research 
findings relating to anthropogenic causes of climate change.  A very noteworthy 
international survey (BBC World Service, 2007) finding here was that across the 21 
countries surveyed, in response to the question of whether or not human activity was a 
‘significant’ or ‘not a significant’ cause of climate change, the overall averages were 
slightly over 75%, i.e., three quarters of these global respondents in 2007 agreed that 
human beings were playing an important contributing role in climate change. 
x With respect to climate change concern, prevailing measures have covered a spectrum 
of approaches.  In the Nisbet and Myers review, consideration was given to 
assessments of the perceived ‘personal importance’ of climate change and ‘how 
dangerous’ global warming/climate change was.  Across the 14 year period examined 
by Nisbet and Myers, ‘extremely’ and ‘very’ importance ratings went from 27% in 
1997 to 42% in 2007, and ‘extremely’ and very’ dangerous ratings basically remained 
level, going from 41% in 1993 to 43% in 2007 (Nisbet & Myers, 2007).  Brulle et al. 
(2012) have a strong focus on the determinants of public concern about climate 
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change in their major review.  They note for example, that in Gallup polls in 2004 in 
the United States, 26% of respondents reported that they worried ‘a great deal’ about 
climate change, by 2004 this percentage of respondents had grown to 41%, but by 
2010 this proportion had fallen to 28%, with such observations reflecting a repeated 
reporting of fluctuating levels of climate change acceptance, causal attributions, and 
concern by some researchers. 
x Brulle et al. (2012) present an intriguing case for the overwhelming importance of 
political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups in influencing public climate 
change concern levels and fluctuations, as compared with other well-researched 
determinants of public concern, namely, extreme weather events, public access to 
accurate scientific information, and media coverage, with their analysis of 74 surveys 
over a 9-year period, but based on a very different method of aggregate opinion 
measures. 
Space has allowed for only a brief characterisation of the findings of these reviews in 
the context of this present report, but this larger picture is arguably quite important when 
interpreting the Australian and UK findings reported here.  It is worth noting that reference to 
Australia in these largely North American and intermittently global studies is understandably 
limited, but where such reference is found, it is clear that acceptance, concern, and pessimism 
levels are high and have remained so. Several final comments by Brechin are salutary: 
What conceptual frameworks best capture the place of global climate change in the 
hearts and minds of individuals across the globe?  Can universal frameworks be found 
or developed?  Or will we find that frameworks are too context specific, that local 
social, political and cultural experiences are too dominant to be universal? . . . Would 
we find similar or very different results in other countries?  If different, what does that 
say about individualised factors affecting support for public policy?  In short, how 
local or global can our efforts be in understanding the public’s role in shaping the 
response to climate change? (Brechin, 2010, p. 204) 
In addition to these reviews of survey research mentioned, the work of a number of 
other research teams and centres must be acknowledged, with this work continually 
informing our own.  The Research Centres are the Yale Project on Climate Change 
Communication at Yale University, the Woods Institute for the Environment at Stanford 
University, and the Understanding Risk Research Centre at Cardiff University, Wales, and 
the principal respective lead researchers at each are, Professor Anthony Leiserowitz, 
Professor Jon Krosnick, and Professor Nick Pidgeon. 
Of particular relevance to the current report is a recent summary and overview of 
principally Australian survey research findings undertaken in 2011.  CSIRO researchers 
undertook a requested review for the Garnaut Climate Change Review team of recent studies 
(January 2008 to March 2012) examining public views of climate change, beliefs about the 
role of human activities in producing climate change, and support for various policy 
responses to climate change (Leviston et al., 2011). The mandated focus included:  
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x the extent of community views in Australia that climate change is happening, 
x whether it is attributable to human activity or is a natural variation, 
x whether community views of climate change have altered in recent years, 
x differences between sectors of the community (e.g., rural vs. urban) in views about 
climate change,  
x comparability of views in Australia with views in the UK and the USA. 
(Leviston et al., 2011, p. 1). 
Seventeen of these studies were Australian studies, with nine being from academic 
and research institutions, and eight constituting national polls and contract research by 
government agencies, and including one not-for-profit organisation.  Five of these studies 
were from research and academic institutions, and polling and contract research 
organizations, in the UK, New Zealand and the United States. The stated summary 
conclusions from the 17 Australian studies examined were the following (Leviston et al., 
2011): 
x Most Australians believe the climate is changing, but fewer believe that the change is 
attributable to human activity. 
x Belief in climate change and its anthropogenic drivers has waned in recent years, 
reflecting trends in other countries. 
x Responses to questions about climate change vary systematically with question 
wording and response formatting, but these differences do not negate the overall 
conclusions above. 
x Beliefs about climate change are strongly related to political preferences, voting 
behaviours and gender, but no clear relationships between these beliefs and location, 
age or income have emerged. 
x Most Australians believe that Australia should take action on climate change without 
waiting for global consensus. 
x There is no clear consensus on what policy actions Australians prefer, such as setting 
a carbon price or establishing an emissions trading scheme. 
This overview of Australian survey findings and selective comparisons with overseas 
studies has particular salience to the current survey findings in that the Griffith survey and 
that of our collaborators at Cardiff University were included as two of the studies in this 
review, which themselves constituted a cross-national study with many identical items.  The 
review is also particularly relevant to the current report and discussions as the above mandate 
seemingly also separates the issues of acceptance of contemporary climate change from the 
integrally related matter of an anthropogenic causal contribution.  Importantly, this review is 
very nonspecific in its discussion of these research studies and their respective objectives, 
contexts, associated parameters, and ultimate findings.  Hence, few conclusions about 
Australian public risk perceptions and responses to climate change can really be drawn.  As 
well, the nonstandardisation and ultimate noncomparability of many procedures, survey item 
framings, and response options made such a review and overall comparisons challenging 
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(e.g., Li, 2010).  Certainly there does not appear to be a comprehensive, detailed, or in-depth 
review of Australian survey research findings addressing public risk perceptions and 
responses to climate change similar to the international reviews reported above.  Our own 
research findings, and our reading of the social science-based survey research literature on 
climate change, do not accord with the initial summary conclusions of the CSIRO review 
referred to. 
These international and Australian survey findings overall provide a valuable but 
arguably fragmented and disparate set of findings, and there remain serious challenges to 
meaningful comparisons as sample selection, mode of presentation, question framings, 
response formats and options, and survey contexts tend to differ markedly across institutions 
and organizations. As well, the purpose of the majority of these surveys has been primarily a 
reporting of ‘public opinion’ rather than investigating public understandings, risk perceptions, 
or psychosocial responses or impacts over time. An additional shortcoming, reflecting the 
nature and purpose of these surveys, is that they rarely include substantive psychometric 
scales or measures of dispositional or experience-based individual differences. As well, there 
has not emerged a more standardised convention or agreement for measuring, interpreting, 
and reporting survey research and findings, and interpretations of similar findings can and do 
vary substantially. The current status quo in Australia is that there does not exist a reference 
data base or programmatic research and monitoring framework or institution addressing 
changing public risk perceptions, understandings, and psychological responses and 
adaptations, relating to climate change, or the associated psychosocial impacts of the threat 
and unfolding physical environmental impacts of climate change. Such strategic research 
could document and explore how these changes in public risk perceptions and understandings 
might be reflecting, and/or themselves mediating, psychological, social, and societal 
adaptation. 
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DISCUSSION 
The research reported in this monograph reflects a major project and milestone.  This 
has involved not only a comprehensive national survey undertaken in mid 2010 addressing 
public risk perceptions, understandings and responses to climate change and natural disasters, 
involving 3096 respondents, but the development and establishment of a research platform, 
standardised measures and indicators, and a national data base for monitoring and addressing 
important human dimensions changes over time.  The online survey itself involved 81 
numbered questions, with these involving 198 separate items, and with 147 of these 
comprising psychometric rating scales.  A number of these rating scales constituted 
components of selected psychological measures relating to objective knowledge, risk 
perception, environmental concern, connection to the natural environment, climate change 
self-efficacy, climate change distress, and psychological adaptation to climate change, for 
example.  The survey is arguably one of if not the most comprehensive national survey which 
has been undertaken addressing public perceptions and responses to climate change.  A 
subsequent and selectively modified national survey of similar length undertaken in mid 
2011, involving 4347 new respondents and 1037 repeat respondents, provides the first 
iteration of this national monitoring research program, and longitudinal data for 1037 repeat 
respondents (Reser et al., 2012c). 
In the discussion which follows we have addressed a number of interrelated topics, 
issues, and findings which benefit from further discussion than that provided in the preceding 
reporting of results.  We have nonetheless attempted, throughout the report, to provide some 
commentary, and where possible comparative findings, in the context of reporting our 
specific survey findings.  This presentation and reporting format addresses a serious 
limitation in almost all available substantial survey research reports and articles addressing 
public risk perceptions and responses to climate change.  The discussion section reflects a 
modest selection of topics and considerations given the scope of this research exercise and 
the extensive data set which exists from our two national survey undertakings.  An important 
objective has been to communicate the importance of such psychology and social science-
based climate change research, and the nature, relevance, and crucial mediating roles of a 
number of neglected psychological processes and variables. A further aim has been to address 
a number of underlying conceptual, methodological and cross-disciplinary issues which 
continue to frustrate critical interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary collaboration (National 
Research Council, 2010c; Nelson, West & Finan, 2009; Stokols, Hall, Taylor, & Moser, 
2008).  The discussion topics selected also allow for modest reference to our rich qualitative 
research findings, which complement the very substantial quantitative methodology 
conventionally employed in such national surveys, and which together begin to address and 
explicate public understandings of climate change in Australia. 
BELIEF AND ACCEPTANCE 
 As discussed at several points in the preceding report, belief or acceptance of climate 
change is a core matter when considering public risk perceptions, understandings and 
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responses to climate change.  Such acceptance is itself integral to risk perception, sense 
making, risk appraisal, motivational responses generally, and specific psychological 
adaptation responses and behavioural engagement.  But acceptance or belief in the reality of 
such a profound and consequential threat as climate change encompasses more than a rational 
acceptance, as there is a necessary and emotion-laden ‘coming to terms’ with what is not only 
a very frightening and challenging set of changes to the world as we know it, and what all of 
this might imply for one’s personal world and circumstances as well as for global 
communities, at individual and cultural levels (e.g., Langford, 2002; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006; Weissbecker, 2011).  And of course we live in a world of 
multiple threats and concerns, with many of these more serious threats and risks being 
continually questioned and minimised in the service of self-protection, and in conjunction 
with the necessary reality-testing of multiple conspiracy theories and often unwarranted 
worries and concerns (e.g., Furedi, 2005; Hamilton, 2010; Hulme, 2009).  
‘Beliefs’, ‘values’, ‘risk’ perceptions, and ‘knowledge’ all provide differing 
conceptual and disciplinary windows on public understandings of a phenomenon and threat 
such as climate change, often reflecting rather different assumptions, constructs, and interests 
(e.g., Sarewitz, 2011; Schwartz, 1992; .  The construct of ‘belief’ within social psychology 
has had a somewhat troubled past, both in specification as well as measurement, as its broad 
scope covers more specific tenets about matters both real and ideal, as well as more 
encompassing world views and belief systems (e.g. Kruglanski & Higgins, 2007).  From a 
philosophy-based perspective, belief refers “to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we 
take something to be the case or regard it as true” (Schwitzgebel, 2011).  Public beliefs about 
the phenomenon and threat of climate change has its own difficulties, as the implicit 
reference in much conversational and research discussion is often not about the truth or 
reality of the phenomenon, but about the science, the politics, and the respective credibility of 
such sources, or media representations about this changed and changing condition of 
atmospheric global weather systems.  For most the critical matter and issue is not with respect 
to the assertion and belief that climate changes, but whether the phenomenon of 
contemporary climate change is in part the product of human activities and anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions. But beliefs, in the context of climate change, are nonetheless 
fundamental to human understandings and behaviour, risk perceptions and responses, and 
successful public engagement in the context of risk communication, and effective adaptation 
and mitigation policies and initiatives. 
The social science and national survey-based research findings for Australia for 
acceptance of climate change have been extraordinarily consistent.  Refer to Table 16. 
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Table 16. Australian research findings and acceptance of climate change 
It is important to note that where ‘don’t know’ or ‘unsure’ response options were available, 
these figures were relatively high (Reser et al., 2010 survey, DK 8%, Ashworth et al, 2010 
survey, DK 15%).  Additionally, dichotomous yes/no response options were effectively 
requiring respondents who were genuinely unsure of their position to choose a response 
which did not accurately reflect their actual view.  While such forced choice response formats 
are common, and can be very useful, they may be particularly problematic when examining 
public understandings of a complex and contested matter such as climate change and are not 
ideal or very sensitive when measuring important but nuanced changes in views and 
understandings over time (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, 2011; Krosnick & Presser, 2010).  This 
picture from Australia is not very different from that for North America. 
 Public opinion about global warming, it turns out, has been remarkably stable for the 
better part of two decades, despite the recent decline in expressed public confidence in 
climate science. Roughly two thirds of Americans have consistently told pollsters that 
global warming is occurring.  By about the same majority, most Americans agree that 
global warming is at least in part human-caused, with this majority equally divided 
between those believing that global warming is entirely caused by humans and those 
who believe it to be a combination of human and natural causes. And about the same 
two thirds majority has consistently supported government action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions since 1989 (Norhaus & Shellenberger, 2009, p. 1). 
 Despite recent news reports questioning the credibility of climate science, the vast 
majority of Americans continue to trust the scientists who say that global warming is 
real, according to new Stanford University study. “In recent months, we have seen a 
spate of news stories suggesting that the American public is cooling on global 
warming – that fewer people now believe that the planet has been heating up than they 
did a year ago”, said Jon Krosnick, a professor of communication and of political 
science at Stanford. “But our work shows that the percentage of Americans who 
believe in the existence of global warming has only dipped 5 points, from 80% in 
Survey findings Date Accept/believe Don’t 
know/unsure 
Do not accept 
Leviston and Walker 
(CSIRO) 
July/Aug, 2010 82% No option 17% 
Reser et al. 
(Griffith University) 
June/July 2010 74% 8% 18% 
Ashworth et al. 
(CSIRO) 
Oct 2010 78% 15% 7% 
Leviston and Walker 
(CSIRO) 
July 2011 77% No option 23% 
Reser et al. July/Aug 2011 74% 8% 18% 
Commercial survey 
findings
   
Newspoll Feb 2010 73% 5% 22% 
Newspoll Dec 2010 77% 5% 18% 
Newspoll April/May 2011 78% 6% 16% 
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2008 to 75% in 2009, and that public confidence in climate scientists has remained 
constant over the past few years… It’s really important to recognize that 75 percent is 
a huge majority of Americans, and 5 percent of Americans shifting is a pretty small 
movement.” (Shwartz, 2010). 
There is a simple but pervasive problem with most recent discussions and debates 
about public disbelief and scepticism about the reality of global climate change.  The 
scientific discussion about ‘global climate change’ over the past three decades and more has 
been about anthropogenically-forced or human-induced climate change, through greenhouse 
gas emissions related to human activities over at least the past several hundred years.  
Therefore the appropriate and reasonable gloss for ‘climate change’ in almost all 
contemporary discussions or media coverage about climate change should be anthropogenic 
climate change, (i.e., this currently changing global climatic regime reflecting a system 
destabilisation caused by an increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases due to post-industrial 
human activities).  While it should be unnecessary to talk about this integral human causal 
contribution when discussing contemporary climate change, the contested reality of this 
significantly different and profoundly consequential contemporary climate change, and 
whether or not it is due in large part to a collective human carbon footprint, have become 
largely constructed and artificially separated issues (e.g., Hulme, 2009; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011a, 2011b; Petttenger, 2007).  Within the discourse context of the IPCC authors have been 
at pains to contrast the underlying importance and incompatibility of the definitions of 
climate change used by science and policy organizations (e.g., Pielke, 2004), and to argue 
that, from a pure science perspective, climate change should be defined broadly as “any 
change in climate over time whether due to natural variability or as a result of human 
activity” (31).  The cogent argument for this, however, has very little to do with, and indeed 
effectively ignores, the social meaning and currency of ‘climate change’ in everyday 
language and media coverage, and indeed the specification of climate change in the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
All of this matters in the context of a survey such as the present one, as findings such 
as those reported here relating to public acceptance and ‘belief’ are inevitably challenged by 
some with the argument that acceptance of ‘climate change’ (glossed as ever-changing global 
climate patterns) does not imply belief in a human causal role or ‘forcing’.  We are 
nonetheless dealing with public understandings, and inherent degrees of both scientific and 
public understanding uncertainties, and some respondents might well be somewhat unsure 
about just what ‘climate change’ does mean and imply, in both general conversation and in 
the context of a survey such as the present one (e.g., Max et al., 2007; Trenberth, 2010; Zehr, 
2000).  Hence we have been at pains to both document and probe these public understandings 
of and psychological responses to ‘climate change’, using convergent and standardised items 
and measures where possible, while being mindful of the political and contested nature of the 
issues and such research findings.  In the end we feel that our findings with respect to 
respondent acceptance of the reality of contemporary, anthropogenic, ‘climate change’ are 
very robust and strong.  Where discrepant findings have been reported in the Australian 
context, we would argue strongly that these are an artefact of both question framing and 
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response option provision, as illustrated in Appendix N, and that social science-based survey 
findings in Australia, Europe, and North America are very supportive of and consistent with 
the findings and interpretation of the present report.  The recent and extensive coverage of 
public acceptance of climate change based on the research of Jon Krosnick at Stanford 
University is but one of many examples of a ‘correction’ to media coverage of such findings 
(e.g., Boykoff, 2011; Jordan, 2012; Krosnick, Villar, & MacInnis, 2011; Krosnick & 
MacInnis, 2011; Romm, 2011; Shwartz, 2010; Villar et al., 2011).  See Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38. Survey of Americans who believe in global warming. (Romm, 2011). 
CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS AND ACCOUNTS 
At an everyday ‘lived experience’ level people around the world are trying to make 
sense of the seemingly ubiquitous media coverage and threat of climate change, and appraise 
its real nature and implications.  This is not so easy as what is being referred to in any 
particular situation or conversation is actually quite complex and fluid, and often simply very 
unclear (e.g., climate change as phenomenon, threat, consequences, political and social 
issue).  As well, the immediate threat and environmental consequences of climate change, 
while very media salient, and ubiquitously ‘present’, are arguably temporally and 
geographically ‘distant’ from most individuals’ lives.  But such a global threat, and its media, 
humanitarian, and political salience and presence, require mindful attention and 
consideration.  Fundamental to human sense-making are the obvious questions of what is it, 
why is it happening, is human agency involved, if so who is responsible, and what can be 
done about it.  But in the case of contemporary ‘climate change’ the phrase, construct, and 
underlying phenomenon is already formally and informally designated and defined as being 
in large part caused by human activities, i.e., that which is being referred to and discussed is 
almost invariably anthropogenic or human forced climate change.  In the context of the 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change, climate change “refers to a change of climate 
that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over 
comparable time periods” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007, p. 6).
In the context of everyday conversations, television coverage, and newspaper headlines, 
‘climate change’ also means a much more consequential and longer term change in global 
weather patterns ‘precipitated’ by human activities, lifestyles, and industries, as a matter of 
serious scientific concern with this being seen by the public.  
This matter of what climate change means and refers to in public discourse and 
everyday conversation is quite important for multiple reasons, as embedded causal 
attributions strongly influence risk perceptions, motivations, felt responsibility, individual 
and collective efficacy, and behavioural engagement (e.g., Bandura, 2006; Hilton, 2007; 
Pelletier, 2002).  A recent overview of national and international survey research and a 
further international study also documents the importance of causal attributions and thinking 
to public support for climate change policies (Bostrom et al., 2012).  Did survey respondents 
understand that the ‘climate change’ being referred to was human-forced climate change?  
This would certainly appear to be the case, that is, in almost all instances some level of 
human causality and agency was presumed by the phrase and this seems to be entirely 
consonant with and validated by how respondents answered such questions, and whether or 
not they personally accepted that such ‘climate change’ was really happening. 
The finding that 90% of Australian survey respondents accepted some level of human 
causality (89.3% for British respondents), when required by the question asked and the 
response options given, to really think about this, provides an important insight into both 
human risk perceptions and understandings.  In addition to informing respondents’ 
explanations of climate change, such human causal attributions immediately raise issues of 
responsibility, accountability, and guilt, as well as human agency more generally, and the 
possibility that if humans are partly responsible for this problem they may well be able to do 
something about it.  This matter of human causality also raises an interesting and important 
question with respect to the status of this seeming ‘disaster’:  Is it ‘natural’ or ‘technological’, 
or what has become an increasingly common hybrid of both, as in the case of the products of 
biotechnology (e.g., Baum et al., 1983; Haque & Etkin, 2007)?  This ascribed status has 
multiple implications in terms of human accountability and agency, as well as fundamental 
sense and meaning making in a capricious and risk filled world (e.g., Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 
2006; Lerner, 1980; Reser & Muncer, 2004).  Our findings are clearly indicating that climate 
change does appear to be a risk domain that shares elements of natural and technological 
causation and nature, and that in this respect climate change straddles the often problematic 
distinction between natural and technological disasters and stressors (e.g., Bell, Greene, 
Fisher, & Baum, 2001; Cuthbertson & Nigg, 1987; Cutter, 1993).  This complexity does not 
relate only to the role of human-generated greenhouse gas emissions, however, as a spectrum 
of human interventions, such as the creation of vulnerabilities to natural disasters by the 
location of human settlements and suburbs, can be seen, both pre and post disaster, as an 
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event and set of outcomes involving substantial human agency and commission (Berkes, 
2007; IPCC, 2012; Malone & Engle, 2011).  
RISK PERCEPTIONS, APPRAISALS, AND CONCERNS  
There exist convergent but nonetheless quite distinct theoretical and research 
literatures addressing environmental risk perception, threat appraisal, and environmental 
concern.  Diverse sources addressing environmental risk perception can be found in 
environmental psychology, geography, disaster preparedness and response, and natural 
resource management, among other disciplinary perspectives (e.g., Bell et al., 2001; 
O’Riordan, 1995; Renn & Rohrmann, 2000; Zube, 1991).  Within psychology and the health 
sciences a focus on threat appraisal reflects a more specific consideration of immediate and 
personal situation threat as distinct from extended environmental threat, and threat appraisal 
is an integral feature of stress and coping models and perspectives (e.g., Folkman, 2011; 
Taylor, 2009).  The ‘environmental concern’ literature is more characteristic of 
environmental and social psychology approaches in which the focus is less on the external 
nature or state of the environmental threat and more on the nature and intensity of one’s 
psychological response to perceived threats to the natural environment (e.g., Hansla, Gamble, 
Juliusson, & Garling, 2008; Schmuck & Schultz, 2002).  This coupled psychological 
appraisal and response to risk is part cognitive and analytical, and part emotional and feeling-
focused (Etkin & Ho, 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic, 2000, 2010; Sundblad et al., 
2007).  In the context of climate change, concern can and often does refer to both a concern 
for and about the natural environment in terms of the impacts of climate change on existing 
natural ecosystems and environments, and concern about how the cascading physical 
environmental impacts and manifestations of climate change might affect human 
communities and one’s self, family and local community (e.g., DeGroot & Steg, 2007; 
Schultz, 2000; Snelgar, 2006).  Finally, the construct of climate change concern is of course 
also interlinked with notions of subjective exposure and perceived and experienced 
vulnerability, and is often found in the now extensive and largely nonpsychological climate 
change literature in which these often very psychological considerations are addressed and 
explored.  
The present Australian survey research attempted, with modest success, to navigate 
these parallel research and practice literatures, and to use existing items and scales that 
differentially addressed environmental risk perceptions on the one hand and experienced 
concern about the threat and implications of climate change on the other.  Ultimately 
principal emphasis has been placed on what the findings were able to say about experienced 
climate change concern and vulnerability, notwithstanding that this could be concern for 
oneself (egocentric), concern for others (altruistic), or concern for the natural environment 
(ecocentric).  This emphasis is nonetheless important and strategic as such concern is a 
sensitive and readily measured psychological impact of the ongoing threat of climate change, 
it directly influences psychological health and well being, such concern can directly mediate 
and be mediated by psychological adaptation and behavioural engagement, and in association 
with other variables can strongly contribute to other psychological impacts such as distress, 
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frustration, and pessimism (Doherty & Clayton, 2011; Dunlap & Jones, 2002; Reser et al., 
2011, 2012a).  
Notwithstanding the seeming ever-fluctuating public concern levels with respect to 
the threat and impacts of ‘climate change’ around the world, there exists a more consistent 
and coherent evidence base suggesting that public concern about climate change remains 
relatively constant and high, both in Australia and overseas.  But the highly charged political 
context of climate change nationally and internationally (e.g., Dunlap & McCright, 2008; 
Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2010; Villar & Krosnick, 2010), and the multiple challenges of 
specification and measurement of these public understandings and responses, have ensured 
that the documentation and monitoring of public risk perceptions and concerns with respect 
to climate change, as with belief, have been less than satisfactory, and reported findings 
rarely comparable.  There also exists a considered view that a more general ‘attenuation of 
risk’ (e.g., Pidgeon et al., 2003) in the context of climate change has taken place over the past 
several years, especially in countries where the impacts of climate change are perceived to be 
less evident, with this seeming lessening of concern interpreted as reflecting a number of 
convergent factors (e.g., oversaturated and sensationalised media coverage, the influence of 
the ‘climate gate’ email leaks from the University of East Anglia, the problematic glacial 
melting forecasts made by the International Panel on Climate Change, and the severe 
northern hemisphere winter of 2009-2010).  Recent evidence, however, from North America 
and Europe (Borick & Rabe, 2012; Krosnick, 2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 
2011b) suggests this apparent temporary decrease in public concern appears to be returning to 
more stable levels of high public concern and decreasing uncertainty and scepticism (e.g., 
Brulle et al., 2012; Eurobarometer, 2009; Furedi, 2010; Spence, Pidgeon et al., 2010).  
A comparison of broader public perceptions, understandings, and responses to the 
threat of climate change between Britain and Australia is of particular interest as climate 
change concern was thought to be on the wane in Britain according to recent survey findings 
(e.g., Spence et al., 2010), accompanied by an increasing element of climate change 
scepticism.  Climate change concern in Australia on the other hand had arguably become 
stronger, attributed, in part, to the nature and intensity and human costs of recent extreme 
weather and natural disaster events in Australia (drought, bushfires, cyclones, floods) over 
the past few years (e.g., Hanson, 2009; Morrissey & Reser, 2007; Spratt & Sutton, 2008).  
These considerations invite an expectation that the level of climate change concern in 
Australia would be quite high and much higher than might be the case in Britain.  Indeed in 
Australia climate change appears to have become a much more evident attribution and 
explanation for many physical and social environmental changes taking place, and is an 
ubiquitous part of everyday conversation with respect to everything from the weather, to 
politics, to the economy, to rural and remote mental health (e.g., Reser, 2010; Reser & 
Morrissey, 2008).
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The 2010 survey findings presented here would indicate that levels of climate change concern 
are in fact surprisingly similar in Britain and Australia, and arguably quite high.  A number of 
convergent explanations for these findings exist.  The explanation for very high concern 
levels in Australia is quite reasonably related to the extreme disaster events and visually 
dramatic changes taking place to the landscape in various parts of Australia, along with the 
saliency of recent urban water shortages, and a continent-wide and decade-long drought 
which has decimated major river systems and agricultural and pastoral regions.  This situation 
has, of course, been completely altered with the wide-ranging La Niña flood events of 2010-
2011, and the dramatic floods and cyclone events of January and February, 2012 (Bureau of 
Meteorology & CSIRO, 2012).  The explanation for comparably high levels of concern in 
Britain is less clear, although several lines of argument and evidence might be advanced.  
Media coverage of the climate change phenomenon and threat in Britain, as in much of 
Europe and North America, has been constant, often dramatic, and with the content, images, 
and representations being largely global, distant in space and time, and with less reference to 
local environmental changes, events, or impacts (Butler & Pidgeon, 2009; Hulme, 2009; 
Pidgeon, 2010).  
THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCING 
The acknowledgement but ‘distancing’ of the impacts and immediacy of climate 
change through global media coverage and intertwined processes of social construction, 
social representation, protection motivation, and emotion management, has been addressed 
by many researchers (e.g., Garcia-Mira, Real, & Romay, 2005; Spence, Poortinga, & 
Pidgeon, 2011b:Uzzell, 2000, 2004; Weber, 2006).  However, it is highly unlikely that a 
threat and risk domain of this magnitude, consequence, and symbolic currency can either be 
exorcised or effectively sanitised through defensive strategies at individual or cultural levels.  
A convergent and complementary explanation is that global climate change, unlike more 
specific and identifiable acute weather events and specific threats, is a de facto environmental 
and ambient stressor, and by nature and definition not always within individuals’ immediate 
focal attention or perceptual field, but essentially constituting  a pervasive and background 
risk domain and continuing source of anxiety, irrespective of geographic location and current 
objective exposure (e.g., Bell et al., 2001; Evans & Cohen, 1987; Reser & Swim, 2011).  
Climate change is a quintessentially local and global phenomenon, environmental threat, and 
risk domain. 
While levels of concern reported by UK respondents are surprisingly similar to those 
expressed by Australian respondents, it is equally clear that Australian respondents perceived 
the threat and impacts of climate change as more immediate and closer to home.  There was 
significantly less agreement by Australian respondents that “Climate change will mostly 
affect areas that are far away from here” and significantly more agreement with the 
statement that “My local area is likely to be affected by climate change”.  In addition, 
Australian respondents reported less agreement with the statement that, “Climate change 
will mostly affect developing countries” and more agreement with the statement that 
“Climate change is likely to have a big impact on people like me”.  This immediacy of the 
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perceived threat and impacts of global climate change in the context of dramatic acute and 
chronic natural disaster events, and a visibly changing landscape in many parts of Australia, 
is not surprising.  However, the juxtaposition of very similar and often almost identical 
climate change concern levels in British and Australian respondents in the context of very 
different perceptions of the immediacy and local and personal relevance of the threat of 
climate change is again striking.  It must be acknowledged, though, that more recently 
published research from Britain (e.g., Spence et al., 2011a), and extreme weather events in 
Britain since our respective early and mid 2010 data collections, including the current 
drought in the South and Southwest of Britain (Plester, 2012; Vaughn, 2012), would suggest 
that direct experience with these events, and a strengthening perception that such events and 
changes might well be linked to climate change (Spence et al., 2011a), is changing the nature 
of underlying public understandings and the risk domain of climate change for residents of 
Britain, as would appear to be the case in Australia.  It is also likely that more recent media 
coverage of climate change in Britain, including that in regional newspapers is changing local 
narratives and understandings (e.g., Brown, Budd, Bell, & Rendell, 2011). 
An important aspect of the survey findings which begin to tell us something about 
local area, and risk proximity, exposure, and vulnerability relates to natural disaster and 
extreme weather event findings, and, indirectly, to climate change risk exposure.  Results 
clearly indicate that relative salience and reported concern levels relating to particular 
extreme weather reflect regional exposure and event histories.  However, the unprecedented 
geographic extent of some common disasters for Australia, particularly drought and flooding 
rain, is undoubtedly increasing the extent of direct experience with natural disasters for many 
Australians.  The fact that Queensland was extensively flooded in the Wet Season of 2009-
2010, for example, prior to the 2010 survey, and then again in 2010-2011, along with many 
other regions of Australia, in ‘the summer of disasters’, prior to the 2011 national survey, 
suggests that levels of perceived climate change risk and levels of concern are being given 
particular local meaning and salience for many Australians.  To the extent that these seeming 
changes in weather patterns, and extreme event intensity and geographic coverage, are being 
linked to the influence of climate change, this global phenomenon and threat becomes much 
less geographically, temporally, and psychologically distant.  Having said this, familiarity 
and long experience with extreme weather events and natural disasters can also provide a 
ready and normalising explanation and account for otherwise marked but incremental 
environmental and weather pattern changes and events which are plausibly associated with 
unfolding climate change impacts. 
The most recent national survey data from the Yale Project on Climate Change 
Communication (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith & Hmielowski, 2012) provides 
very consistent and compelling findings from the United States with respect to public risk 
perceptions and understandings relating to climate change and extreme weather events. 
Following a record-breaking year of 14 ‘weather and climate disasters’ in the U.S., with each 
resulting in more than one billion dollars in damages, 82% of survey respondents reported 
that they had personally experienced one or more types of extreme weather or natural disaster 
in the past year.  A large majority of these American respondents believe that climate change 
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made a number of high profile extreme weather events worse, with these including the 
unusually warm winter of December and January, 2011 and 2012 (72%), record high summer 
temperatures in 2011 (70%), the drought in Texas and Oklahoma in 2011 (69%), and the 
Mississippi River floods in the spring of 2011 (63%).  
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDINGS  
The nature and importance of public understandings of climate change have been a 
central focus of this research, but this focus has been, necessarily, more indirect and 
convergent than we would have preferred.  A national survey such as that undertaken is not 
the ideal method for addressing anything as complex and essentially epistemological as 
individual or collective understandings, nor is there currently the requisite conceptual clarity 
in areas of environmental risk perception, threat appraisal, environmental knowledge, or 
psychological responses to climate change to adequately address these long standing issues.  
In addition the reality is that ‘climate change’ is an ever-changing referent as phenomenon, 
threat, objective and projected consequences and implications, and socially constructed and 
represented media product and risk domain.  For any number of the above reasons, research 
in this area has tended to restrict itself to addressing and measuring self-reported, and less 
frequently, objectively determined, knowledge of climate change science accounts of climate 
change processes and associated causes and impacts (e.g., Malka et al., 2009; Reynolds et al., 
2010; Sundblad et al., 2007; Wolf & Moser, 2011).  This is often undertaken with scant 
attention paid to the multiple and convergent types of knowledge involved in the fostering 
and undertaking of ecological behaviour, such as declarative, procedural, effectiveness, and 
social knowledge (e.g., Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003).  Nonetheless our pragmatic attempt to 
differentiate and measure respondents’ subjective and objective knowledge of science 
accounts of climate change, and to explore psychological responses to risk perceptions of 
climate change and natural disasters, acknowledging analytic, emotional, and more general 
meaning components and aspects of this phenomenon and threat, have been a qualified 
success.  The risk domain of climate change for Australian respondents is coming into clearer 
view, and we have hopefully advanced the case and provided a research platform and 
indicators for documenting changes in these public risk perceptions, understandings, and 
psychological responses over time, arguably matters integral to psychological and 
behavioural adaptation. 
 
While this has been one of the few national studies to address and measure objective 
knowledge of climate change science accounts, along with subjective respondent judgments, 
we are convinced that such objective knowledge of climate change science is but one 
component of more personal, experience-based, culturally informed, and emotion and 
meaning-based understandings of the phenomenon and threat of climate change.  While our 
focus has been more attentive to the sense seeking and sense making individual in the context 
of this seemingly profound threat, it is clear that ‘climate change’ is a socially constructed 
and socially represented phenomenon, risk domain, ‘environmental problem’, and 
environmental, social, and political issue, in which intertwined social, cultural and 
contemporary information environments and technologies all play important and 
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interdependent roles (e.g., Burr, 2003, Pettenger, 2007; Spector & Kitsuse, 2000).  But we 
would argue that our examination of risk perceptions and psychological responses to climate 
change and other environmental threats does provide a more balanced and strategic starting 
point and data base when considering strategies for public engagement, the enhancement of 
psychological coping and adaptation strategies, and the measurement and monitoring of 
important changes in individual and community understandings of and responses to climate 
change, which in turn are integral to psychological adaptation. 
CLIMATE CHANGE, EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS, AND DISASTERS 
“A deluge in Pakistan has upended the lives of 20 million people. It was preceded by 
floods in the United States that battered New England, then Tennessee, then Arkansas, 
then Oklahoma.  Summer heat waves baked the eastern United States, parts of Africa 
and eastern Asia, and Russia, which lost millions of acres of wheat and thousands of 
lives in a drought worse than any other in the historical record.  Seemingly 
disconnected, these far-flung disasters are reviving the question of whether global 
warming is causing more extreme weather…” (Gillis, New York Times, 2010, p. 1) 
An important focus of this research was the extent to which climate change and 
extreme weather events are perceived and understood by the Australian public as interrelated 
phenomena and risk domains.  In a broader theoretical and conceptual sense this focus could 
be seen as relating directly to public risk perceptions and understandings, relative salience 
and risk, and sense making and perceived causal interconnections.  But there are multiple 
practical and strategic reasons why this seemingly simple empirical question and issue is 
more complex and particularly important.  There exists substantial cumulative wisdom and an 
extensive research literature relating to disaster preparedness and prevention, risk perception 
and communication, psychological and social response and recovery, and adaptive capacity 
and resilience (Reyes & Jacobs, 2006).  To what extent can this body of knowledge and best 
practice be generalised?  The more salient and observable manifestations of global climate 
change are in terms of extreme weather events and natural disasters.  Given the global and 
abstract nature of climate change as a phenomenon and threat, it is very understandable that 
individuals and communities might well be understanding and adapting to this extensively 
communicated threat in terms of what is more familiar, local, and directly, virtually, and 
vicariously experienced (e.g., Stewart, 2009, 2010).  This is certainly how this phenomenon 
and risk has been presented to the public through media headlines, images, and general 
coverage.  Engaging the public with respect to climate change adaptation and mitigation has 
posed a considerable challenge for climate change science and policy makers, yet there has 
been considerable reluctance and indeed censure when suggesting that causal linkages might 
be made between any particular natural disaster or extreme weather event and global climate 
change (e.g., Stott et al., 2010). 
 
The present research findings provide ample evidence that our survey respondents, 
and by inference the Australian public, do see and understand climate change largely in terms 
of extreme weather events and natural disasters, as well as in terms of profoundly 
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consequential environmental and landscape changes.  This is particularly evident in our open-
ended, qualitative research findings, and in respondents’ descriptions and explanations of 
their personal encounters and experiences with events and changes which they think might be 
associated with and/or evidence of climate change.  We must seriously ask ourselves how 
else would most individuals be able to make psychological and adaptive sense out of the 
complexity of climate change, but through such analogical thinking and personal and local 
experience.  An ongoing further examination of our 2010 and 2011 data will provide further 
insights with respect to the possibly overlapping or intersecting risk domains of climate 
change and natural disasters.  Preliminary analyses suggest that the risk domain and cultural 
meanings associated with climate change include attributes of both natural and technological 
disasters, with possible implications relating to human agency and responsibility, dread risk, 
and the implications of an ongoing, chronic, environmental stressor and dramatically altered 
global and personal environment.  From a psychological perspective, these findings suggest 
that climate change adaptation approaches would be well served by more serious 
consideration of evidence-based psychological applications and insights routinely used in the 
disaster preparedness and response context as well as in health psychology, such as 
psychological preparedness, anticipatory coping, the fostering of resilience, and 
psychological adaptation (e.g., Folkman, 2011: Reser & Morrissey, 2008). 
 
A number of authors have recently suggested that there is considerable merit in both 
applying some of the distilled wisdom from over four decades of psychological and social 
science research on disaster preparedness and response, and more strategically utilising the 
psychological reality that public perceptions and understanding of the threat of climate 
change are strongly coloured and informed by direct and virtual exposure to and experience 
with extreme weather events and natural disasters (Morrissey & Reser, 2007; Spence et al., 
2011).  Such personal experience with acute weather events, and ongoing environmental 
stressors relating to deteriorating environmental conditions, typically in the context of one’s 
own residential region, provides for a more personal, experiential, and localised 
understanding of what the manifestations of climate change are likely to be like (e.g., 
Baldwin & Chandler, 2010; Luginaah et al., 2002; Moyano, Paniagua, & Lafuente, 2008).  
Such personally meaningful environmental experience can help make this abstract and 
geographically and temporally distant, and hence psychologically distant issue and threat 
more concrete, immediate, and real.  Such strategies for bringing the biosphere – and climate 
change – home have been framed differently by different authors (e.g., Thomashow, 2002; 
Whitmarsh et al., 2011), but the suggestion makes considerable practical as well as 
psychological sense. 
 
Highlighting the links between local events and climate change may encourage people 
to engage with the issue and to take action to mitigate potential impacts. Indeed 
personal experience is thought to be a key driver of perceptions, and the perceived 
likelihood of a risk is found to increase if it has recently been experienced or can 
readily be imagined. Relating local events to climate change may also have perceptual 
and behavioural impacts to the extent that these help to make the issues less distant and 
more tangible. (Spence et al., 2011, p. 1) 
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My views on climate change, for example, owe in part to the physical experience of the 
hottest and driest summer ever recorded in Arkansas.  I spent the summer out of doors 
working on a small farm and quite literally felt the heat without relief, day after day.  I 
learned that heat has a certain smell and feel to it that I experienced bodily for months 
on end.  When rains and cooler weather finally arrived in late fall, that feeling came 
like salvation.  Subsequently, I have had more than a passing interest in the abstractions 
of climate change, I suspect because I felt what it might be like. (Orr, 2007, p. 1). 
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS, DISTRESS, AND HEALTH AND WELL BEING 
The current research has prioritized the central importance but research gap which 
exists with respect to the psychological and social impacts of the threat of climate change 
(Doherty & Clayton, 2011; Morrissey & Reser, 2007; Reser et al., 2011; Reser et al., 2012a).  
This in turn has reflected a larger and related concern with respect to important changes that 
are likely taking place in the human environment and landscape with respect to the threat and 
possibly the unfolding physical environmental impacts of climate change.  Such a framing of 
these matters brings both the social representation and risk communication of this 
environmental problem and threat into clearer view, and also acknowledges the fundamental 
person-environment interdependencies and reciprocal influences that characterise a more 
environmental psychological approach to questions relating to perceptions and responses to 
an environmental phenomenon, threat, and stressor such as climate change (e.g., Gifford, 
Kormos, & McIntyre, 2011; Stokols et al., 2009; Wapner, Demick, Yanamoto, & Minami, 
2000).  Clearly there were many candidate variables which might have been examined as 
sensitive ‘indicators’ of impacts and/or changes (such as trust, pessimism, perceived control) 
but those which were selected appeared to resonate best with emerging academic and climate 
change science salience and interest, as well as health and well being implications.  These 
included risk perception, acceptance/belief, climate change concern, experienced 
psychological distress, psychological adaptation, and pro-environmental behavioural 
engagement.  Each of these parameters was seen to be linked in particular ways with other 
possible impacts and associated psychological changes and states, to be readily accessible 
and meaningful to survey participants, and to be both sensitive to and informative of 
important changes which might be taking place in the context of climate change, with 
corresponding adaptation, policy and health implications. 
Our research findings with respect to psychological concern and distress in the 
context of climate change reflected the increasing salience of this health and well being issue 
and psychosocial impact considerations, and at the same time a dramatic dearth of evidence-
based findings. (Reser & Morrissey, 2008).  Australia has received considerable global 
attention in this regard as various framings of psychological distress in the context of 
environmental change and degradation have been developed here, in a variety of contexts 
(Albrecht, 2005, 2011) and have recently been applied to the threat and impacts of climate 
change (e.g., Fritz et al., 2008; Searle & Gow, 2009; Higginbotham, Connor, & Baker, 2012; 
Reser et al., 2011).  A challenge and distinguishing feature of our own research in this 
context of distress has been that our immediate focus has been less diagnostic, treatment, or 
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epidemiology-focused, and more measurement and broader impact focused.  While due 
consideration was given to available measures (e.g., Higginbotham et al., 2007; Searle & 
Gow, 2010), it was ultimately necessary to design a research-focused and climate change-
specific prototype measure.  Our findings suggest that the development and establishment of 
a number of further suitable, sensitive, and climate change-specific, measures and indicators 
relating to important psychological considerations and adaptation and impact processes is 
quite possible.  Such measures can play a crucial role in addressing the current gap in 
knowledge relating to psychological considerations generally in the context of climate change 
and more specifically to psychological adaptation and psychological impacts.  
One of the strongest and most important findings of the present research is not only 
the extent of psychological distress being experienced by respondents through their virtual 
and literal exposure to, and perceived direct encounters with, the threat and phenomenon of 
climate change, but how the psychological and behavioural impacts of this distress are 
mediated by psychological adaptation, and how the respective contributions of prior variables 
in the structural equation model appear to be mediated by psychological distress.  That 
experienced psychological distress at the media coverage and implications of climate change, 
and its associated environmental stress, was found to be the strongest predictor of 
psychological adaptation in the present study is both remarkable and compelling.  The picture 
here appears to be not just one of an important area of adverse climate change impacts which 
is not being systematically documented and monitored, but the very strong motivating role 
being played by this angst and distress, for many, in terms of psychological adaptation and 
behavioural engagement.  However it is clear from our SEM analyses and other findings that 
psychological adaptation is not mediating the influence of experienced climate change 
distress for other respondents, and other less adaptive coping strategies are being engaged in 
dealing with the threat of climate change, such as avoidance, dismissal, and denial.  
Further research is obviously necessary to more adequately document the dynamics of 
stress and coping and psychological adaptation in the context of climate change, along with 
documentation and monitoring of associated psychological impacts including adaptation 
costs (e.g., Reser et al., 2011, 2012).  Our 2011 national survey research has specifically 
addressed these matters, and this data is currently being analysed (Reser et al., 2012c).  It is 
noteworthy that there has been considerable recent interest in the adverse psychological and 
mental health impacts of the threat and unfolding physical environmental impacts of climate 
change, both internationally and in Australia (e.g., Agho et al., 2010; APS, 2010; Berry et al., 
2008; Berry, Hogan, Owen , Rickwood, & Frayar, 2011; Berry, Bowen,& Kjellstrom, 2010; 
Coyle & Van Susteren, 2012; Doherty & Clayton, 2011; Gow, 2009; Higginbotham et al., 
2012; Psychologists for Social Responsibility, 2012; Searle & Gow, 2010; Swim et al., 2011; 
The Climate Institute, 2011; Weissbecker, 2011). 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION 
In this research we have purposefully addressed what has been a crucially neglected 
consideration in climate change science discussions of adaptation, psychological adaptation 
(e.g., Reser et al., 2012a; Reser & Swim, 2011).  As adaptation, a core construct and set of 
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convergent processes within psychology, covers a spectrum of considerations and 
applications, and an encompassing suite of levels of analysis, it was important to 
conceptually specify and operationalise psychological adaptation in the context of climate 
change as an initial and clarifying course of action.  The conceptual and operational 
definition employed has strong resonance with existing use and applications within 
psychology, and the social sciences more generally. 
Psychological adaptation in the context of climate change refers to those within 
individual adjustments and changes in risk perception, threat appraisal, and associated 
cognitive, emotional, and motivational responses to the threat and perceived physical 
environmental impacts of climate change, as well as to altered behavioural responses 
and engagements associated with such changed thinking, feeling, and motivational 
responses. Psychological adaptation also and necessarily refers to those underlying 
psychological processes mediating and moderating such individual change (e.g., 
emotion management, self perception, self-efficacy, protection motivation, coping 
strategies), as well as to the achieved state of relative balance with respect to own 
needs and environmental press and/or threat.  
Our findings strongly suggest that psychological adaptation plays crucial interlinking 
and mediating roles with respect to other psychological variables, including behavioural 
engagement, and very likely physical and emotional well being, reflecting the fact that 
adaptation, essentially intra and extra individual adjustments to environmental press, both 
constitutes and fosters greater person-environment congruence (e.g., Bell et al., 2001).  
Importantly, this would suggest that psychological adaptation is a powerful mediator of 
individual level behavioural adaptation and mitigation.  A very promising finding is that 
climate change distress appears to be partly mediating how other variables are related to 
psychological adaptation, and that psychological adaptation may be integrally tied up with 
the psychological impacts of the threat of climate change.  This also would make logical and 
theoretical sense in that effective psychological adaptations would reduce and minimise the 
effects of environmental threats and stressors, and would complement and selectively reduce 
the need for continual behavioural adjustments, but might understandably be associated with 
some adaptation costs as well as benefits, with these psychological costs constituting 
associated and adverse psychological impacts.   
Finally, and very importantly, behavioural engagement would appear to be not only a 
partially mediated outcome of psychological adaptation, but itself an integral part of 
psychological adaptation with respect to ‘taking action’, concretely ‘doing something’, and 
feeling that one is responsibly being part of the solution as well as the problem.  Our 
qualitative findings very strongly point to just such psychological benefits and ‘psychological 
significance’ in the context of such carbon-reducing behaviour engagements.  The Structural 
Equation Modelling undertaken is providing a coherent way of framing and understanding 
the interrelationships among these core variables and processes, and a template and platform 
for undertaking further research relating to specific variables and relationships.  These 
findings validate the overall approach we have taken and the value of incorporating these 
core variables and appropriate measures in a national survey exercise such as that which we 
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have undertaken, so that we can go beyond descriptive statistics and nominal data, in the 
documentation of more complex interrelationships, and dynamic adaptation changes, and 
impacts. 
INTERSECTING CONSIDERATIONS 
Clarity emerges and seeming inconsistencies tend to dramatically reduce when 
convergent and related survey questions and responses are considered together.  Responses to 
an initial and arguably uninfluenced survey question about how concerned respondents were 
about climate change, with no qualification about where or when, has 66.3% of respondents 
reporting being very concerned (26.2%) or fairly concerned (40.1%), with 88% reporting 
some level of concern.  When examining responses to the question of “How serious a 
problem do you think it will be for Australia, and for the world, if nothing is done to 
reduce climate change?”, 77.9% and 81.8% of respondents respectively agree that this 
would be very serious (40%, 49.4%) or somewhat serious (37.9%, 32.4%).  The picture that 
emerges is that respondent concern about the threat of climate change is very high and 
consistent, and the initial figure of two thirds reporting high to moderate concern is really 
much closer to 80% when the national and global picture comes into view.  The survey 
included 12 items or questions directly relating to concern about climate change, along with 
closely related measures of climate change risk perception, general environmental concern, 
and climate change distress. 
The survey design and content was similar for the intertwined matters of ‘belief’ and 
certainty with respect to climate change.  While responses to the initial question “Do you 
personally think the world’s climate is changing?” were 74% yes, and 18% no, with 8% 
reporting not knowing, 81.4% of respondents either strongly agreed (30.8%) or tended to 
agree (40.6%) with the strong statement “I am certain that climate change is really 
happening” with only 4.7% ‘strongly disagreeing’.  When to this we add the fact that 54% of 
respondents believed that “we are already feeling the effects”, 75.2% expected this to be the 
case in the next 50 years, and 77.8% expected this to be the case in the next 100 years, it 
becomes clear that acceptance and concern about climate change in Australia are 
unambiguously very high.  It is noteworthy that 12.9% of respondents to the above question 
indicated that they just ‘did not know’ while 5.5% ticked ‘never’, again validating data 
interpretations and conclusions relating to felt knowledge levels and uncertainty and genuine 
scepticism and/or disbelief. 
Hence what emerges is that multiple and convergent items do provide a much clearer 
and consistent picture of survey respondent views, and address the inevitable contextual bias 
of particular question framings and response formats.  To the extent that such items are 
standardised across other genuine research undertakings and reflect established sensitivity 
and validity, meaningful comparisons with other national and international research findings 
can be made, again leading to a more convergent and coherent global picture.  Those surveys 
in which climate change questions and items are relatively few, often ambiguous and 
complex, and being asked in very different contexts, cannot provide a very clear or credible 
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picture of public risk perceptions, understandings, or responses - or meaningful changes over 
time. 
PERSISTENT AND CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES 
QUESTION AND RESPONSE FRAMING  
In the context of survey research such as that presented here it is not surprising that 
question and response framing presented as an important issue (e.g., de Vaus, 2002; Fink, 
2003).  In many ways nothing is quite as determining as how you ask a question, and what 
response options are provided (e.g., Schwarz, 1999; Tourangeau et al., 2000).  In addition to 
the matter of survey questions, the larger issue of global climate change is of course subject 
to myriad ‘framings’ by media organisations and vested interests (e.g., Dirikx & Gelders, 
2010; Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall, & Bretschneider, 2011).  Hence it is important to make 
a few statements about the framing of the survey as a whole as well as its items.  Respondents 
were clearly told in the survey title and in a front page that the research was about “Public 
understandings, risk perceptions, and responses to climate change and natural disasters”.  The 
research was identified with Griffith and Cardiff Universities, and survey panel participants 
were further told that the aim of the survey was  
… to more fully appreciate how Australian and UK residents think and feel about the 
threat and possible impacts of climate change and the threat and impacts of natural 
disasters in their respective countries. The survey questions also ask about how changes 
taking place in our world today may influence how you see and understand such 
matters as energy challenges for the future and the importance of other environmental 
concerns. (Griffith Survey information sheet fronting on-line survey instrument). 
Once respondents were embarked on the on-line survey, the more salient framing was 
carried by the specific questions and items.  The survey commenced with an energy futures 
focus, then moved on to matters more immediately pertinent to climate change and natural 
disasters, and a spectrum of situational and psychological considerations.  
Framing issues that became particularly apparent in the context of our data analyses and 
reporting of comparative findings were relatively few.  In the context of the collaborative 
partnership with Cardiff, shared items were in almost all instances virtually identical in 
question framing and response formats.  Similarly the selection of items from other 
researchers was done in such a way as to standardise questions and items where possible, 
again reducing the problem of differing framings leading to differing findings and 
interpretations.  But the most important and evident ‘framing’ issue encountered was that 
with respect to differing response options, and particularly in the case of acceptance of the 
reality of human-forced climate change.  As discussed in the context of scepticism and causal 
attributions, restricting the range of options to essentially two dichotomous and absolute 
alternatives with respect to human causation of climate change, i.e., completely human 
caused or completely naturally caused, does not allow for those options that the majority of 
respondents would endorse, and hence can distort both the findings and their interpretation.   
Climate Change Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses 
182 
PRIOR, DIRECT, AND VIRTUAL AND VICARIOUS EXPOSURE AND EXPERIENCE 
The research undertaken, the issues encountered, and the findings themselves would 
suggest that there are a number of considerations at play which require serious attention when 
examining public risk perceptions, understandings and responses to ‘climate change’.  The 
focus of the research underscored the importance of the threat of climate change from the 
inception of the project, as the objective physical environmental changes and impacts of 
climate change are only now becoming more discernable in terms of noteworthy changes and 
events in one’s local environment for many regions of the world, and perhaps most 
particularly in highly urbanised communities.  So there is the clear conceptual distinction 
between the threat and the unfolding environmental manifestations and impacts, though both 
are referenced and evoked in casual discussions of ‘climate change’ or more specific 
considerations of implications or projected consequences.  Yet the nature of climate change 
as ongoing environmental stressor would seem to encompass both the threat and risk as well 
as the ensuing reality. 
A further and related consideration is that the more common and indeed ubiquitous 
encounters with ‘climate change’ for most individuals are indirect, virtual, and/or vicarious, 
typically through media coverage, popular culture films and documentaries, and arresting 
images.  This is a very ‘real’ exposure and experience, either with the threat or the coverage 
of an actual climate change-related event, but do such encounters articulate with conventional 
notions of direct exposure and experience?  The very status of climate change as a threat and 
risk domain underscores the importance of such considerations, particularly as this media 
exposure, and associated psychological impacts such as concern, distress, and protection 
motivation, are very real and consequential impacts of climate change which directly 
implicate climate change adaptation and behavioural engagement.  All of this, of course, also 
suggests that the psychological and social impacts of climate change are not simply 
projections of what may happen, but dynamic phenomena that are currently taking place and 
which constitute powerful determinants of adaptation and mitigation as more conventionally 
considered.  The importance of the ‘information environment’ in the context of climate 
change is only beginning to be appreciated. 
One of the most interesting findings of the present research is that direct experience 
with what is perceived to be a possible climate change impact or event appears to powerfully 
change the salience and importance of many other variables and their interrelationships.  
Such encounters would appear to be much more influential than direct experience with 
dramatic extreme weather events, though if these are seen as manifestations of climate 
change they too seem to be charged with particular significance and implications.  That 45% 
of Australian respondents report having had such experiences is quite impressive, though this 
finding is actually not so different from survey respondent percentages in the United States 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2011a).  Why is it that such encounters are so powerful and, seemingly, 
life changing in terms of perceptions, understandings, motivations and behavioural 
engagement?  Do such encounters and experiences make the global phenomenon and threat 
more personal, more local, more graspable, more significant?  Does having such an 
experience make one’s past indirect and virtual encounters more real, more persuasive, more 
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impactful?  An alternative and cogent explanation is of course that believing is seeing, that is, 
if one already accepts, is concerned about, and on the lookout for evidence of climate change, 
one is more likely to ‘encounter’ it.  While our current findings cannot resolve this issue, 
there is little question but that such perceived and experienced encounters with environmental 
events or conditions or changes which one perceives as being associated with climate change 
are very powerful, and indeed much more significant in many ways than dramatic direct 
experience with extreme weather events not deemed to be associated with climate change. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY LITERACY AND COLLABORATION 
While there is little argument that the contribution of psychology, and social science 
generally, to effective climate change policies is crucial (e.g., APA, 2009; Gifford, 2011; 
Gifford et al., 2011; Hulme, 2009; Lever-Tracy, 2010; National Research Council, 1992; 
2010a, 2010b; Swim et al., 2011; Weber & Stern, 2011), a number of interlaced problems 
continue to frustrate the utilization of highly relevant bodies of work and multi- and 
interdisciplinary collaborations.  Two of the most important would appear to be those of 
language and meaning issues, and cross-disciplinary literacy.  These problems are not new in 
the context of global environmental change research, but they have become particularly 
problematic in the contemporary climate change context as core constructs, processes, and 
terms from the natural and social sciences have been re-glossed and redefined by the IPCC 
and an associated and emergent culture of use and application in climate change science 
research.  These constructs and processes include climate change ‘adaptation’, ‘exposure’, 
‘vulnerability’, ‘resilience’, and ‘impacts’ and impacting processes, with these specification 
and conceptual clarity issues clouding more general considerations and discussions of such 
matters as risk perception and appraisal, exposure and prior experience, motivation and 
behavioural responses and changes, and psychological as distinct from environmental 
significance. 
HISTORY EFFECTS 
A final consideration in this report is that of ‘history factors’ which might plausibly 
have influenced the survey findings.  A number of global and national events and issues 
might arguably have influenced survey respondents over the course of the two respective 
national surveys reported here.  These can usefully be divided into natural disaster and 
extreme weather events, local and global; and geopolitical events and issues, both national 
and international.   Noteworthy extreme weather and natural disasters events across the world 
from January 2010 to mid 2010, at which point the Australian survey was undertaken, are 
summarised in Appendix F.   A number of quite dramatic and extensively covered natural 
disasters occurred in the years immediately preceding this seven month period, which might 
also have had a residual effect on a survey addressing public perceptions and understandings 
of climate change.  This is even more probable in the case of the Australian survey, which 
also addressed public perceptions and responses to natural disasters.  As previously 
discussed, these global events included such events as the Asian tsunami (2004), Hurricane 
Katrina (2005), and the Pakistan earthquakes (2005, 2008), with global media coverage 
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reflecting constantly improving and more graphic and immediate information and 
communication technologies.  A number of these global disasters and extreme weather events 
received widespread and very dramatic media coverage at the time, such as the Haiti and 
China earthquakes, the Columbia, Poland, and China floods, the Russia heatwaves and fires, 
the California bushfires, and severe flooding in India and Pakistan.  At issue is whether 
noteworthy global events might have overly influenced both Australian and British survey 
responses, as well as whether differing country-specific events might plausibly account for 
any survey differences found.  
Appendix G highlights those more immediate extreme weather events for Australia in 
the 18 month period preceding the Australian survey administration, though we should not 
dismiss the perceived salience of Asian-Pacific regional events.  Clearly this was an eventful 
period, though not that unusual, in the broader Australian context.  As well, a pervasive and 
continuing ‘slow disaster’ and chronic environmental stressor was that of a nation-wide 
Millennium drought, with many Australian cities facing extreme water shortages, and some 
states not being declared drought free until the latter part of 2010.  Arguably the most 
noteworthy disaster during this period was the Victorian bushfires leading up to and 
following Black Saturday, with the extensive media coverage of this seemingly apocalyptic 
event making this a very salient national tragedy (e.g., APS, 2009; McGourty, 2009).  
Widespread severe flooding in Queensland and New South Wales during the same period, on 
the back of severe nation-wide drought, gave the impression of a country under siege by 
convergent natural disasters.  Other Australian extreme weather events preceding this 18 
month period would include increasingly severe bushfires, and the devastation of Cyclone 
Larry in North Queensland (2006).  Interestingly, Great Britain was also encountering its 
share of extreme weather events both in the 18 month period leading up to, and during, the 
survey administration, experiencing severe flooding events over the preceding few years, an 
extreme winter in 2008/2009, and serious drought in the summers of 2009 and 2010. 
What is particularly compelling about the present findings, and their many 
similarities, is that they suggest that these country-specific historical factors do not constitute 
plausible explanations for the differences found, given the far greater number of similarities 
in the findings.  It is also worth noting that while the preceding 18 months had been 
‘eventful’, no major disaster coincided with the actual survey period in Australia (i.e., winter 
is the relatively ‘quiet’ season).  The question of whether global events and issues preceding 
and at the time of the respective survey administrations might have influenced the survey 
results remains, but the overall findings suggest that these high concern levels are more 
plausibly interpreted as robust and understandable findings reflecting more stable public 
perceptions, appraisals, and concerns.  
At the same time, our research data suggests that ‘local’ extreme weather events and 
changing weather patterns can and do inform, influence, and ‘localise’  public risk 
perceptions and understandings of climate change.  This nexus between ‘climate change’ and 
extreme weather events in the context of public perceptions, however, does not necessarily 
change general levels of concern about climate change, as the present data shows, but rather 
seems to concretise and localise this global phenomenon and risk domain in particular ways, 
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with clear implications for psychological preparedness and psychological adaptation (e.g., 
Morrissey & Reser, 2007; Reser & Morrissey, 2008).  Ongoing analyses of the current data 
set, and in particular, extensive qualitative data collected, will hopefully illuminate this 
perceived interrelatedness between climate change and extreme weather/natural disaster 
events, and how these public understandings might inform better risk communication and 
public engagement policies and initiatives. 
At the commencement of writing up our findings in September of 2010, immediately 
following our initial data analyses, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
[NOAA] was reporting that “the planet had just come through the warmest decade, the 
warmest 12 months, the warmest six months, and the warmest April, May and June on 
record”.  To this date, nine nations had set their all time temperature record in 2010, with the 
drought, heat wave and widespread fires in Russia receiving extensive media coverage, along 
with the dramatic floods in Pakistan and China.  While these global events might arguably 
have had a slight influence on a small proportion of late return Australian surveys, in reality 
the dramatic events characterising mid-2010 were post data collection for both countries.   
In addition to extreme weather events and natural disasters, public perceptions and 
responses to the phenomenon and threat of climate change continued to be influenced by 
other global and national events, including technological disasters, such as the Gulf Oil Spill 
(2010), and the increasingly heated political debates, nationally and internationally, as the 
world moved toward the Copenhagen Summit (2009), and Australia and Britain toward 
decisive changes of government in 2010, with climate change policies and energy futures 
being very salient political issues and agendas.  Clearly direct comparisons between Australia 
and Great Britain cannot be made with respect to whether political debates in one country 
were more heated or determining than in the other, and with this potentially influencing 
participant responses in a national survey such as the one being reported.  On balance, this 
seems unlikely, notwithstanding clear inter-linkages between individual views on climate 
change and political party affiliation, particularly given the overall similarity of survey 
findings.  Of course, the ‘disappointment’ of Copenhagen may have fueled the fears of some, 
whilst bolstering the scepticism of others.  In either case the Copenhagen Summit and its 
outcomes may well have been an important attitude change catalyst. 
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THE CURRENT RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Following from our 2010 national survey, we completed the data collection for our 
second national survey in August 2011.  Our 2010 survey involved a sample of 3096 
respondents stratified geographically and demographically across Australia, and by notional 
exposure to climate change impacts and natural disaster threat.  This survey ran from 6 June 
to 6 July, 2010, and was undertaken collaboratively with Cardiff University’s Understanding 
Risk Centre national survey of Britain which was undertaken between 6 January and 26 
March 2010.  Our Australian survey included many additional items that were specific to 
Australian circumstances and included a number of multi-item, interval level measures of 
individual difference variables (such as psychological adaptation, psychological distress in 
the context of climate change, self-efficacy, nature and extent of prior disaster experience). 
This 2010 survey research was principally funded through the Department of Climate Change 
and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE) and the Disaster Management NARP of the National 
Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF).  
While our 2011 survey was not collaboratively linked with any other survey, it 
included many identical items and measures from the 2010 survey and selected standardised 
items from very credible North American survey programs.  The strong focus of the research 
on public risk perceptions, understandings, and responses to climate change and natural 
disasters remained in 2011, but the importance of our Griffith University longitudinal 
research monitoring program documenting psychological processes associated with 
psychological changes, adaptations, and impacts was also a crucial objective and priority in 
2011.  This meant that it was important to obtain as many same respondent completions as 
possible, while also surveying new/replacement respondents.  The second phase of our 
national survey ran from 15 July to 8 August 2011, with the final sample including 1037 
repeat 2010 respondents and 4347 new respondents, constituting a separate independent 
sample for 2011.  The sampling framework was the same as in 2010 and the survey was 
administered through the same service provider, Qualtrics.  These substantial respondent 
numbers allow for a sensitive within-subjects comparison of responses and change scores 
between 2010 and 2011 for 1037 repeat respondents, and a quite separate independent groups 
comparison of responses for the 3096 (2010) respondents and the 4347 new (2011) 
respondents.  This longitudinal extension of the research utilising a ‘within-subjects’ design 
and methodology, and a separate repeated cross-sectional design and sample, allows for an 
objective documentation of change at an individual respondent level, and an independent 
groups comparison level.  This also allows for a consideration of the specific roles of 
psychological adaptation factors and processes which are mediating behavioural adjustment 
and change (adaptive capacity) and which themselves constitute psychosocial impacts of the 
threat of climate change and natural disasters (e.g., Reser & Swim, 2011; Reser et al., 2012a). 
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CONCLUDING NOTE 
The extreme weather and natural disaster events of 2010 and 2011 in Australia have 
provided for a natural laboratory in the exploration of the roles of direct and indirect 
experience in the context of perceived climate change encounters for many respondents. This 
opportunity is exceptional in many respects as a very large database and geographically 
stratified and representative national sample relating to the present research is available for 
examining interrelationships between objective and subjective proximity and exposure to 
climate change and natural disaster threat, direct and indirect respondent experience of such 
events and impacts, and adaptation responses and processes as well as the psychosocial 
impacts of these extreme weather events.  A further summary report of what will have been a 
two year research project will be finalised in 2012.  A further extension of the survey 
research program, contingent on funding, will take place over the 24 month period from 
January 2013 to December 2014, with a possibility of this longitudinal research continuing 
over a longer period of time. 
Queries relating to this report and research program can be directed to Michelle Ellul 
m.ellul@griffith.edu.au or Joseph Reser j.reser@griffith.edu.au
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BRITISH AND 
AUSTRALIAN RESPONDENTS 
 UK (n=1822) 
%
AU (n=3096) 
%
Gender Male 48 47 
Female 52 53 
   
   
Age 15-17 3 1 
18-24 12 7 
25-34 14 19 
34-44 18 20 
45-54 17 21 
55-64 14 20 
65-74 13 10 
75 and older 9 2 
  
  
Employment  
Status 
 
Working (full time) 
 
36 
 
38 
Working (part time) 13 20 
 Unemployed 8  
 Unemployed – seeking work  3 
 Unemployed – not seeking work  1 
 Retired  27 15 
Looking after house/children 7 8 
Disabled 3 4 
Student 7 6 
 Other  4 
    
Level of education 
 
No formal qualifications 
 
18 
 
Year 10 or less  13 
Year 11  5 
Year 12  17 
GCSE/O-level/CSE 19  
Vocational qualification 11  
A-level or equivalent 18  
College Certificate or Diploma 21 
Trade qualification/Apprenticeship  12 
Bachelors degree or equivalent 19 19 
Postgraduate degree 6 11 
 Still studying 1  
 Other 8 1.2 
 Don’t know   
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APPENDIX B: AUSTRALIAN SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION ACROSS POPULATION 
CENTRES 
Australian Demographic Statistics, March 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region Population 
New South Wales 7,221,000 
Victoria 5,529,400 
Queensland 4,498,900 
South Australia 1,640,700 
Western Australia 2,286,100 
Tasmania 507,100 
Northern Territory 228,500 
Australian Capital Territory 357,700 
Australia 22,271,900 
Selected Population Centres 
 Population Sample #   Population Sample # 
New South Wales   Australian Capital Territory 
Sydney 4,399,722 319  Canberra 345,257 82 
Albury 53,507 45     
Port Macquarie 42,900 100  Victoria   
Ballina 41,677 77  Melbourne 3,892,419 348 
Singleton 23,458 51  Bendigo 100,054 66 
Bourke 3,091 34  Shepparton 61,014 24 
Total  626  Mildura 49,280 23 
    Morwell 22,765 14 
Queensland    Bright 358 19 
Brisbane 1,945,639 268  Total  494 
Gold Coast 497,848 280   
Sunshine Coast 312,801 100  South Australia  
Mackay 167,666 10  Adelaide 1,172,105 311 
Townsville 162,730 76  Port Pirie 26,023 6 
Cairns 142,001 85  Ceduna 3,731 2 
Toowoomba 125,339 72  General state-wide 100 
Mount Isa 21,570 16  Total  419 
Longreach 3,703 7     
Charleville  3  Tasmania  
Total  917  Hobart 209,287 98 
  Launceston 65,222 36 
Western Australia  Total  134 
Perth 1,602,559 315     
Bunbury 63,202 36  Northern Territory  
Geraldton 35,361 5  Darwin 120,652 37 
Albany 34,667 14  Alice Springs 27,481 9 
Broome 15,386 7  Katherine 9,912 1 
Laverton 757 3  Total  47 
Total  380     
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APPENDIX D: SELECTED UK SURVEYS ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
  
Date Source Survey Method N 
May 2010 YouGov/EDF Energy survey results  4262 
Feb 2010 Populus BBC climate change poll National 
telephone 
survey 
1001 
Jan-Mar 
2010 
Cardiff University 
Understanding Risk 
Group Working Paper 
Public perceptions of climate 
change and energy futures in 
Britain 
National survey, 
face-to-face 
interviews 
1822 
Mar 2010 Department for 
Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs 
2010 Omnibus survey on public 
attitudes and behaviours towards 
the environment 
National survey, 
face-to-face 
interviews 
1700 
2009 
(Previous 
surveys
from 1986–
2007) 
Department for 
Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs.  
2009 Survey of public attitudes 
and behaviours towards the 
environment 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
2009 
1772 
Sep-Oct 
2009 
BBC Cymru Wales. 
Beaufort Research 
Green Wales report Telephone 
survey 
Discussion 
groups 
1004 
Six discussion 
groups 
2008 
2007 
2006 
U.K. Department of 
Transport 
Public attitudes towards climate 
change and the impact of transport 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
2008 (n=1102) 
2008 (n=1095) 
2007 (n=1083) 
2006 (n=1238) 
May 2008 Ipsos Mori Public attitudes to climate change, 
2008: Concerned but still 
unconvinced 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
1039 
Jun 2007 Ipsos Mori Climate change survey Face-to-face 
interviews 
2031 
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APPENDIX E: SELECTED U.S. SURVEYS ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
 
 
Date Source Measure Method N 
Jun-Jul 
2010 
Yale Project on Climate Change 
Communication Leiserowitz, Smith, & 
Marlon  
American’s knowledge of 
climate change 
National survey 
online panel 
2030 
May-Jun 
2010 
Yale Univeristy, George mason 
University Leiserowitz, Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf, & Smith 
Climate change in the American 
mind: Americans’ global 
warming beliefs and attitudes in 
June 2010 
National survey 
online panel 
1024 
Jun 2010 Stanford University Krosnick, & 
Villar 
Stanford global warming poll National survey 
telephone poll 
1000 
Jan 2010 Pew Research Centre Energy concerns fall, deficit 
concerns rise. Public’s priorities 
for 2010: Economy, jobs, 
terrorism 
National survey, 
telephone 
interview 
1504 
Dec 2009-
Jan 2010 
Yale Univeristy, George mason 
University Leiserowitz, Maibach, & 
Roser-Renouf
Climate change in the American 
mind: Americans’ global 
warming beliefs and attitudes in 
January 2010 
National survey 
online panel 
1001 
Nov 2009 GfK Roper Public Affairs & Media 
Stanford University 
The Associated press-Stanford 
University Environment Poll. 
National survey 
telephone poll 
1005 
Sep-Oct 
2009 
Pew Research Centre Global warming and public 
opinion 
National survey, 
telephone 
interview 
1500 
Sep-Nov 
2009 
Muhlenberg College Institute of 
Public Opinion, Gerald Ford School 
of Public Policy at the University of 
Michigan. 
The climate of belief: American 
public opinion on climate 
change 
National 
telephone survey 
988 
Sep-Oct 
2008 
Yale Univeristy, George mason 
University Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & 
Leiserowitz 
Global warming’s six Americas 
2009: An audience 
segmentation analysis 
National survey 
online panel 
2164 
Jul 2008 The Woods Institute for the 
Environment at Stanford University 
Krosnick 
ABC News, Planet Green, 
Stanford University Poll 
National survey 
telephone poll 
1000 
Apr 2008 Pew Research Centre Global warming and public 
opinion 
National survey, 
telephone 
interview 
1502 
Mar-Apr 
2008 
SRIC-BI, Alliance for Climate 
Protection, Dept of Conservation. 
The Nature Conservancy 
American climate values survey - - 
Apr 2007 The Woods Institute for the 
Environment at Stanford University 
Krosnick
ABC News, Washington Post, 
Stanford University 
National survey 
telephone poll 
1002 
Jan 2007 Pew Research Centre Global warming: A divide on 
causes and solutions 
National survey, 
telephone 
interview 
1708 
Mar 2006 The Woods Institute for the 
Environment at Stanford University 
Krosnick 
ABC News, Time, Stanford 
University 
National survey, 
telephone 
interview 
1002 
Jul-Aug 
2004 
Kellstedt, Zahran, & Vedlitz Personal efficacy, the 
information environment, and 
attitudes toward global warming 
and climate change in the 
United States 
National 
telephone survey 
1093 
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APPENDIX F: GLOBAL – REPRESENTATIVE NATURAL DISASTERS AND 
EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS JAN 2010 – JULY 2010 
 
 
Date Location Event Death Toll Number of people 
affected 
July/August  
2010 
Pakistan Severe floods 1,985 18,102,237  
June/July Russia  Heatwave 55,736 - 
July  India Severe floods 98 523,000  
July Benin Flood 46 831,000 
July Cameroon Flood 13 3,095 
July Central African Rep Flood 3 1,585 
July Burkina Faso Flood 16 133,362 
July Sudan Flood 36 138,397 
July  Southern California Bushfires  - 
July  Eastern U.S and Canada Heatwave Approx 300 - 
July  China Heatwave, flood - - 
July  Philippines Cyclone  146 585,474 
June  Brazil Flood 72 157,000 
June Mexico Cyclone 22 170,000 
June  South America Cold wave - - 
June Ghana Flood 45 7,500 
June Romania Flood 26 12,237 
June El Salvador Cyclone 6 500 
June Ukraine Flood 6 40,059 
May/June  China Flood/storm 1,691 134,000,000 
May  Pakistan Heatwave - - 
May Zaire/Congo Dem Rep Landslide 46 1,167 
May  India Cyclone 52 - 
May  Guatemala Cyclone 187 397,962 
May  El Salvador Cyclone 10 11,520 
May Honduras Cyclone 18 24,675 
May Poland Flood 16 100,000 
April India Cyclone 114 500,000 
April Colombia Flood 363 2,217,518 
April Mexico Earthquake 2 25,232 
April China Earthquake 2,968 112,000 
April Brazil Flood 256 74,938 
April Ecuador Flood 2 6,440 
March   India Heatwave 250 - 
March Iceland Volcanic eruption - - 
March Angola Flood 7 185,886 
March Zaire/Congo Dem Rep Flood - 67,500 
March  Madagascar Cyclone 40 211,611 
March  Kenya Flood 94 - 
March  Fiji Cyclone - - 
March Russia Flood - 3,250 
Feb France Cyclone (winter storm) 53 500,079 
Feb Chile Earthquake 562 2,671,556 
Feb Brazil Heatwave 32 - 
Feb Haiti Flood 27 22,085 
Jan  India Cold wave 100 - 
Jan  Romania Cold wave 52 - 
Jan  Serbia Cold wave 3 - 
Jan  Bulgaria Cold wave 3 - 
Jan  Haiti Earthquake 222,570 3,700,000 
Jan Mexico Flood 41 20,000 
Jan Bolivia Flood 26 227,860 
Jan 2010 Russia Cold wave 13 - 
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APPENDIX G: DISASTER/EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN AUSTRALIA JAN 
2009 – JULY 20102 
                                                          
2 The information provided has been primarily sourced from the Australian Emergency Management Institute, 
Disasters Database and the Bureau of Meteorology, Severe Weather Events.   
 
    Date Location Event Death toll Injured Property impacts 
June 
2010 
Lennox Head-
NSW 
Tornado  Several 
injuries 
Homes damaged or 
destroyed – 30+ 
March 
2010 
Cape Shield 
NT 
Cyclone Paul 
Category 2 
  Minor damage to 
infrastructure, Disruptions 
to power, phone and 
sewerage 
March 
2010 
Mackay and 
Whitsundays 
QLD 
Cyclone Ului 
Category 3 
1  Large areas of sugar cane 
destroyed. Structural 
damage. Many boats 
damaged or destroyed 
March  
2010 
Perth and 
Southwest WA  
Severe thunderstorms  Increased 
demand for 
emergency 
services 
Over 150,000 properties 
lost power. Hail, rain and 
severe winds resulted in 
considerable damage. 
March 
2010 
West and 
Northwest 
Victoria,  
Melbourne  
Severe thunderstorms  Over 7500 
calls to 
Emergency 
services 
Widespread damage across 
the city. Flooding, hail and 
wind damage to homes and 
buildings 
Feb-Mar 
2010 
Western, Southern 
Qld, Northern 
NSW 
Severe floods   Major damage to 
infrastructure 
Jan 
2010 
Cairns 
Gulf Country 
Cyclone Olga 
Category 1 
  Minor damage to 
infrastructure 
Jan 
2010 
Kuri Bay WA Cyclone Magda 
Category 3 
  Minor damage to 
infrastructure 
Dec 
2009 
Wallal WA Cyclone Laurence 
Category 5 
 1 Considerable damage to 
properties.  
Sept 
2009 
NSW and QLD Extensive dust storm 
covering much of the 
continent 
 Increased 
demand for 
emergency 
services 
Severe disruption to flights 
and ferry services. Road 
closures. Schools closed. 
Aug 2009 Victoria Severe thunderstorm and 
wind event 
  Residential and 
commercial properties 
damaged 
May 
2009 
South East QLD/ 
Northern NSW 
Severe floods 1   
March/ 
April
2009 
Tamworth - NSW Severe floods   Residential and 
commercial properties 
damaged 
Feb 
2009 
Victoria Black Saturday Bushfires 173 414 Homes destroyed – 2,298 
Business destroyed - 61 
Jan  
2009 
Onslow WA Cyclone Dominic 
Category 2 
  Minor structural damage 
Jan 
2009 
Northern QLD Severe floods 1  Residential and 
commercial properties 
damaged 
Jan/Feb 
2009 
South Eastern 
Australia 
VIC 
SA 
TAS 
NSW 
Severe Heatwave 404 Increased 
admissions 
to 
emergency 
wards  
Widespread power 
outages. 
 
Disruptions to trains 
services 
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APPENDIX H: ANNOTATION OF ITEM ADDITIONS TO AUSTRALIA/CARDIFF 
CLIMATE CHANGE SURVEY, AUSTRALIAN VERSION 25 MAY 2010 
This 2010 survey has incorporated items from Cardiff University’s national survey as well as 
including many Australia specific survey items.  In each instance an annotation of survey constructs 
and operationalised measures was developed, and used to clearly specify and synchronise items for 
the collaborative Australia survey exercise. 
Part one, Cardiff section,  
Item #22 has essentially been substituted for the nonessential values scale in the Cardiff 
survey, which was based on a 10 item values scale from Schwartz plus additional biospheric values 
items taken from De Groot & Steg.(2007).  This scale from Schultz (2001, 2002, and Schultz, 
Shriver, Tabanico, & Khazian, 2004) is widely used, and is also framed as an ‘environmental 
values’ as well as environmental concern scale.  The scale from Schultz better aligns with the 
broader environmental canvas of the Australian study, allows for a more specific examination of 
public understandings of climate change, and articulates more strategically with a central and 
convergent focus on environmental concern.  The decision dilemma here in part reflected the 
conceptual, theoretical, and measurement confusion in the literature across environmental values 
and concern(s) on the one hand and with respect to ‘environmental’ risk perception and appraisal 
on the other (e.g., Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005).  It was deemed that the Schultz scale gave us 
our best comparison options; the scale has excellent psychometric properties, and has its own, 
straightforward face validity for respondents, in the context of the survey, as contrasted with the 
Schwartz scale (e.g., 1992).  Finally this scale provides a widely used individual difference measure 
with much in common with other environmental values and concerns scales (e.g., Clayton & 
Opotow, 2003; Hawcroft & Milfont, 2010; Stern & Dietz, 1994).  The scale essentially involves a 
three-factor model (egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric concerns) and hence three distinct 
subsections and scores; there is no overall meaningful score. 
Item #10 is taken from Krosnick (2008) and overlaps with the Cardiff survey question 13g 
(omitted).  This item, along with the immediately following item 11 addresses climate change risk 
perceptions and concerns, and brings in the local (national) and global spatial framing which 
Uzzell (e.g., 2000) and Gifford et al. (2009) and others (e.g., Lima & Castro, 2005; Zube, 1991) 
have documented as being of particular importance.  This section of the Cardiff/Griffith survey 
suits this item as both spatial and temporal considerations are addressed.  The item also addresses 
the interesting findings with respect to greater pessimism in Australia relating to the future impacts 
of climate change (Gifford et al.) and allows for direct comparison with the United States and the 
UK, with such comparisons (also encompassing other items) allowing for a contemporary 
comparison and explanation of the Gifford et al. findings.  Selected Krosnick items (Krosnick, 
2006, 2007, 2008; Malka et al., 2009) interspersed in the survey allow for comparisons with North 
American survey findings in the context of a highly credible and long standing research program 
for which the items, methodology, and data are fully available.  Hence, for the sake of 
comparability and standardisation, and in seeking to use established best practice (e.g., Li, 2010) 
we have included a number of Krosnick survey items and measures which have dovetailed with our 
needs. 
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Part 2, Australian specific survey items 
Item #23 addresses a number of commitments with respect to project research funding 
through the Department of Climate Change, under the aegis of their Disaster Management Research 
Plan.  In this item we are seeking to better appreciate how public risk perceptions, 
understandings, and concerns relating to specific natural disaster threats in Australia 
compare with other ‘environmental threats’ of and to the environment, and to the 
phenomenon/threat of climate change.  Each of these risks can be considered independently or 
overall as a rank ordering and relative comparison of these threats and in the context of the nexus 
between natural disaster risk perception and appraisal and climate change risk perception and 
appraisal (e.g., Reser & Morrissey, 2008).  These items provide an indication of the relative 
salience, seriousness, and implied adverse consequences of these risk domains, with climate change 
also considered as a separate risk domain.  There is also the possibility of examining these items in 
the context of a multidimensional scaling exercise in which we might consider where and how 
climate change sits vis-à-vis other risks.  Climate change was deliberately placed as the last risk 
domain in the series so that this would invite a more reflective rating, taking other environmental 
threats and risks into consideration. 
Item #24  The logic of this item follows from the preceding item and attempts to compare 
and contrast the threat of climate change vis a vis other largely ‘non-environmental’ risk 
domains.  Again this provides both a rank ordering of relative perceived risk and/or concern, with 
climate change again being one of the risk domains evaluated.  Many studies have reported the 
changing relative salience and urgency of the climate change threat relative to other salient risks 
and threats, though this of course can depend greatly on framing and context.  Nonetheless items 23 
and 24 allow for a considered examination of the relative importance of climate change risk 
appraisal and concern. 
Item #25 is taken from Krosnick, where ‘importance’ is used as a single item measure of 
what has been a consistently important parameter and predictor variable, with some arguable 
overlap with values.  As with belief in climate change and the credibility of scientists, Krosnik 
views self-reported importance as a necessary but not itself sufficient precursor to taking mitigation 
action in the context of climate change. 
Item #26 addresses level of knowledge concerning climate change. Many researchers have 
shown that this domain is important to climate change concern(s) and behaviour (including 
intentions, decisions, and actions) (e.g., Krosnick, Leiserowitz, Kellstedt).  Knowledge of 
consequences also comes up frequently in the literature, overlapping with concern and risk 
appraisal.  Our focus on ‘public understandings’ makes knowledge a very important domain.  But 
the procedure of Krosnik, Kellstedt, and others (e.g., Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008) using self-
reported level of knowledge is open to criticism and their findings are surprising (i.e., the more 
information a person has about climate change, the less responsible he or she feels about it and the 
less concerned he or she is, (Malka et al., 2009), so we have gone with ten true/false items based on 
the work of Sundblad et al. (2007) (objective knowledge across three knowledge domains) followed 
by a confidence rating about the correctness of respondents’ answers.  This allows for comparisons 
with Krosnick’s self-report knowledge item. 
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Item #27 addresses the matter of public trust which has been related by many studies to 
concern levels, motivational processes, and behavioural responses.  This is a very important 
construct and domain, with a very substantial research literature (e.g., Barnett et al., 2007; Earl & 
Cvetkovich, 1995; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003), which is also addressed in item 47.  Krosnick 
argues that public trust in scientists and science reporting is a necessary but not sufficient precursor 
to taking personal action in addressing one’s own carbon footprint. 
Item #28 addresses the related matter of whether respondents believe that scientists 
generally agree on the reality of climate change and its threat status.  The item is modified from 
Krosnick (2008).  This item also addresses the matter of uncertainty with respect to the climate 
change threat, which is presumably strongly mediated by the public’s perception of the level of 
agreement among scientists. 
Item #29 measures felt connectedness to the natural environment and derives from 
Mayer and Frantz’s 14 item Connectedness to Nature Scale (2004).  The scale used is essentially 
the same as the modified 7-item version of this scale (minus one item) used by Gosling and 
Williams with an Australia population of rural residents (2010) addressing connectedness to nature, 
place attachment and conservation behaviour among farmers.  Several elements of this modified 
scale also reflected the work and measure of Dutcher, Finley, Luloff, & Johnson (2007). While 
other versions of similar scales and current critiques were considered (e.g., Hinds & Sparks, 2008; 
Perkins, 2010; Perrin & Benassi, 2009), it was thought that the modified items of Gosling and 
Williams offered a simple and pre-tested scale in the Australian context with good psychometrics, 
and the possibility of useful comparisons with the present Australian sample.  Again, this scale 
provided an important individual difference measure to be factored into this investigation of public 
understandings of and concerns about climate change. 
Item #30 addresses the nature and extent of respondents’ personal and direct 
experience with the natural environment.  A substantial literature suggests that personal and direct 
experience with natural environment, and prior experience with natural disasters, are important 
factors in moderating pro-environmental behaviours and in influencing specific risk perceptions 
and concern levels (e.g., Reser, 2010).  As well it is clear that for most people in the world today, 
and for urban-based Australians, people will have had very limited direct experience with 
noteworthy natural environmental change or the perceived impacts of climate change.  Rather 
people’s exposure to and encounters with climate change have been largely indirect, virtual, and 
mediated by information and communication technologies and the vantage point and storylines of 
journalists and editors.  These items were largely created for this survey exercise, though modelled 
on pre-tested items from prior environmental research of the authors.  The survey has sampled 
respondents from across Australia, with a substantial representation of rural and peri-urban areas, 
where it is expected that respondents will have more extensive experience of and exposure to the 
natural environment. 
Item #31 addresses respondents’ perceptions of the condition of the natural environment 
in the world today.  This is essentially a global risk perception and judgment in the present 
context.  
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Item #32 frames the issue of climate change as an environmental problem, with the 
respondent judging the seriousness of the problem right now.  This item also comes from 
Krosnick (Malka et al., 2009) with ‘global warming’ changed to ‘climate change’, and is therefore 
useful for direct comparison.  This and the preceding item continue with a focus on the present 
and/or the foreseeable future in the Australian items of the survey.  The item may be used as a 
component of a composite risk perception and/or climate change concern score. 
Item #33, also from Krosnick, shifts the content of item 35 to the condition of the natural 
environment in one’s local region, with this being a local risk perception and judgment in the 
present context.  This is an important item to consider when looking at differences in public risk 
perceptions and levels of concern across differing regions of Australia and differing levels of 
exposure to climate change impacts.  It is important to stress that public perceptions of climate 
change are, at one level, about perceptions of changes in the natural environment, whether relating 
to climatic changes or to the impacts of other causal factors. 
Item #34 relates to actual behaviours engaged in by respondents.  While many such lists 
exist, we have opted to use the items employed by Krosnick (2008) as they are reasonably 
straightforward, they were asked in the context of climate change and reducing one’s carbon 
footprint, and they preceded important items by Krosnik and used by ourselves relating to self-
reported motivations for engaging or not engaging in these behaviours.  This item represents a 
logical outcome measure in terms of strategic multiple regression analyses which may be 
undertaken to establish the putative mediating and moderating roles of other variables examined. 
Item #35 provides an open-ended item and opportunity for respondents to say something 
about their own motivations and/or rationale for engaging in particular pro-environmental 
actions.  The question also allows for a determination of whether the above actions appear to relate 
to psychologically significant as well as environmentally significant considerations.  The 
accompanying document discussing the construct domains explored in the survey discusses the 
matter of motivational processes and existing measures in more detail. 
Item #36 follows on from item #39 but specifically addresses self-reported reasons and 
or motivations or barriers for not engaging in many of the behavioural responses to climate 
change listed in item #34.  While a considerable research literature addresses barriers to taking 
action (e.g., APA, 2009; Gifford, 2011; Gifford et al., 2011), the preferred and modest focus in the 
present survey has been to more directly focus on motivational processes underlying particular 
behavioural responses and inaction, and respondents’ overall psychological response to the 
climate change phenomenon and threat.  Some useful Australian survey data exists which addresses 
these matters. 
Item #37, a-f, addresses perceptions of control, agency and self efficacy with respect to 
environmental problems and climate change mitigation. The items constitute Kellstedt et al.’s self 
efficacy scale (2008) used in the context of climate change, and supplemented by several developed 
items reflecting other sources. Two of these items also directly address causal and responsibility 
attributions.  Several items also address the perceived inevitability of climate change and the 
perceived futility of trying to mitigate the impacts now in train. 
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Item #38 addresses the perceived accuracy and credibility of media coverage, and the 
stories and information provided by news organisations.  This Krosnick item was used in the 
compilation of a composite source credibility and trust score.  This matter of media credibility is 
arguably of fundamental importance as for most individuals their knowledge about and exposure to 
climate change has been almost exclusively virtual and indirect, through the media (e.g., Reser, 
2010). 
Item #39, also from Krosnick, addresses both information search and selective attention, 
with both of these being often-used measures in the climate change context.  This could also be 
seen as an item relating directly to public interest as well as public understanding of the climate 
change phenomenon and threat. 
Item #40, again from Krosnick, provides some information about the salience of climate 
change as a concern and possibly preoccupation, and again says something about its issue status 
and its putative emergence as an explanatory frame of reference for myriad issues and problems. 
Item #41 constitutes an objective knowledge scale relating to the phenomenon of climate 
change.  The 10 item true/false statements can be compared with the self-reported knowledge level 
at item 30.  A number of these items were modified from Sundblad et al. (2007) while others were 
constructed by the present researchers for the purpose of this Australian survey. It was anticipated 
that this knowledge score would greatly assist in exploration of public understandings, and more 
readily addresses Kellstedt’s surprising findings relating to knowledge levels and concern levels. 
Item #42 ask respondents to rate their own certainty with respect to the correctness of 
their knowledge item responses.  This item was taken from Sundblad et al., 2007, where it has 
been used in tandem with his objective knowledge items. Hence with items #30, #41, and #42 it 
was possible to more adequately assess the extent and role of both subjective and objective 
knowledge levels as these relate to other variables of interest and public understandings. 
Item #43, a-g.  The items for the psychological impacts/experienced distress section 
address a much neglected area in the context of climate change research, and indeed with respect to 
the stress of environmental change (e.g., Aldwin & Stokols, 1988).  There are few extant measures 
which can be readily transferred from research domains such as those addressing the chronic stress 
of living near degraded or contaminated or potentially dangerous sites, or recurrent natural or 
technological disaster threat (e.g., Lima, 2004; Rogan, O’Connor & Horwitz, 2005; Santiago-
Rivera et al., 2007).  A substantial review of the measurement of key behavioural science constructs 
in climate change research does not really address this domain (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008).  
While considerable discussion and speculation has taken place with respect to the impacts of 
climate change in the context of rural and remote mental health, for example, very little systematic 
research has been undertaken (e.g., Berry et al., 2008; Fritze et al., 2008; Morrissey & Reser, 2007).  
The one scale which has been developed (in Australia) which has addressed this type of 
environmental distress is the Environmental Distress Scale (EDS) (Higginbotham et al., 2007).  
While careful consideration was given to the use of this scale in the present context, and while a 
‘solastalgia’ subscale has been used in previous related research (Ellul, 2009), the scale items were 
not specific enough or in other respects deemed sufficiently appropriate to the climate change and 
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natural disaster focus of the present survey exercise.  Hence 7 items were developed which address 
the increasingly discussed mental health and quality of life impacts of both the threat and the 
directly experienced salient environmental alteration and change attributed to climate change and 
its unfolding environmental impacts.  These items attempt to capture a number of the dimensions of 
the experienced distress and other psychological responses and reactions to the threat of and/or 
directly experienced environmental impacts of climate change, such as concern, felt powerlessness, 
experienced responsibility, loss, and possible forced relocation.  Following the employment of 
these items and composite index in the present survey research exercise, a more systematic 
examination of the psychometric integrity and general utility of these items can be undertaken and a 
potential scale can be given careful consideration. 
Item #44 has been inserted by Qualtrics to check whether respondents are actually reading 
through and thinking about the survey items.  If they are not, these respondents are deleted.
Item #45, a-g.  The items addressing psychological adaptation in the context of climate 
change similarly reflect the seeming absence of any existing scales or measures which would 
appear to address this aspect of within-individual psychological adjustment.  The exception is 
arguably that literature which has addressed stress and coping in the context of environmental 
stress, environmental change, disaster threat and impacts, and climate change (e.g., Homburg et al., 
2007; Reser & Morrissey, 2008; Reser & Swim, 2011).  The climate change science literature 
generally has introduced a particular gloss for adaptation which effectively ignores the fact that 
adaptation is a core multi-level and multi-faceted construct and process within psychology and the 
health sciences which encompasses crucially relevant intrapsychic as well as extra-individual 
adjustments and responses.  While stress and coping inventories are not entirely inappropriate, it 
was decided to maximise the face validity and currency of a set of transparent items which might 
directly address and explore the matter of psychological adaptation in the context of the climate 
change threat.  The items will ideally serve to document and explore the nature of those putative 
changes in the way individuals are framing, thinking about, and feeling about, the threat and 
unfolding impacts of climate change and with respect to the adjustments to their lives which 
these environmental changes and impacts will require.  The survey also includes a behavioural 
response inventory (item 34) which identifies particular actions and behaviours which individuals 
and/or are taking in the context of sustainability considerations and the threat of climate change, 
with these also being acknowledged as ‘adaptation’ responses.   
Item #46 addresses respondents’ overall feelings with respect to the threat of climate 
change and underlying optimism, self-efficacy, and frustration.  The items are taken from a recent 
national survey by the Australian Conservation Society addressed principally to its members.  We 
thought it interesting that this organisation was using a number of psychological items in their 
survey and we decided that these selected items were particularly appropriate for our Australian 
respondents and articulated in interesting ways with other constructs and issues being addressed, 
including psychological distress, risk-as-feelings, etc. 
Items #47 and #48 address whether respondents have personally seen or experienced 
any noteworthy changes or events in their local environment over the past decade which they 
think might be due to climate change.  These items taps into personal experience, threat versus 
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unfolding impacts, causal attributions, and the extent to which climate change is being used as both 
cause and account of noteworthy changes.  Given that the focus of the survey is on climate change, 
it is important to have some measure of the extent to which respondents have personally noticed 
environmental changes, including changes in climate weather patterns, which they attribute to 
‘climate change’.  It is also important to examine the extent to which climate change and natural 
disasters overlap and interact as a risk domain.  It will be interesting to see whether the changes and 
events mentioned are in effect extreme weather events or natural disasters, but now perhaps 
increasingly viewed as manifestations of climate change.  Item 48 has an open-ended response 
format allowing for respondents to describe these changes and/or impacts in their own words. 
Items #49 and #59 further explore this matter, but now in the context of the national and 
the global, again with an open-ended format at item 49. 
Item #51 also addresses the perceived nexus between climate change and natural disasters, 
in the context of an open-ended response format, in this case asking whether climate change is 
seen as a causal factor with respect to the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events 
in Australia. 
Items through #52 through #55 address respondents’ personal experience with natural 
disaster events and the nature and magnitude of both the event and their psychological response to 
the event.  
Item #56 is essentially a logical follow-through of the preceding question, but framed in 
terms of risk perception and perceived vulnerability.  This item, along with others, can provide a 
composite index or score relating to perceived seriousness of natural disaster threat in one’s own 
region. 
Item #57 moves from natural disaster vulnerability to climate change vulnerability, with 
responses ideally shedding some light on the perceived nexus between climate change and natural 
disasters in terms of own region exposure and vulnerability.  Importantly this item, as with other 
items, is seeking respondent’s perceptions and appraisals as distinct from the risk and 
vulnerability assessments relating to physical environment and system parameters 
Item #58 examines respondents’ indirect or virtual encounters with the phenomenon of 
climate change through their self-reported exposure to a spectrum of films, mini-series, and 
documentaries relating to climate change.  These responses provide some measure of the extent 
to which such virtual presentations of climate change have been viewed, and the influence which 
(exposure) to such media products might have on respondents’ risk perceptions, understandings, 
and psychological and behavioural responses to climate change. 
Item #59 includes a number of statements from Kellstedt et al (2008) relating to their much 
discussed study addressing personal efficacy, the information environment, and attitudes 
toward climate change.  The statements are framed by Kellstedt and his colleagues as a ‘public 
concern for global warming’ measure and we decide to include these both as a criterion measure for 
our other measures of climate change concern, and in order to further investigate the surprising 
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findings of this study concerning public understandings, knowledge and concerns.  The measure 
also provides a recent and direct comparison opportunity with U.S findings. 
Item #60 was designed to assess respondents’ own perspective on whether their level of 
climate change concern has changed over the past two years.  An ABS survey conducted in 
2007/2008 asked respondents about their level of concern.  It was of interest to see whether 
respondents feel that their concern levels have increased, stayed the same or decreased over what 
has been a very turbulent two year period in terms of public debate and international events with 
respect to climate change.  In the absence of longitudinal data this also provides and important self-
report measure of change and psychological impact. 
Item #61 simply provides an open-ended opportunity for respondents to indicate why their 
level of concern and/or views on climate change might have changed, if they have. 
Item #62, the final substantive survey item preceding the demographic information section, 
provides respondents with an opportunity to offer their view or comment on any aspect of 
climate change or natural disasters in Australia which they may care to make.  We have included 
this as an opportunity to pick up on other matters not canvassed in the survey but of importance to 
the participant. 
Items #63 through #81 cover demographic information from respondents, with item 81 
ascertaining whether the respondent has participated in a survey addressing environmental issues or 
climate change in the past two years. 
Summary statement of survey research objectives for collaborative research exercise with 
Cardiff University’s Understanding Risk Research Group national survey on Public 
Perceptions of Climate Change: Australian Survey Exercise Expanded Objectives: 
1. To provide Australian comparison data with respect to the UK national survey addressing 
public risk perceptions and energy futures being undertaken by Cardiff University’s 
Understanding Risk Research Group. 
2. To provide an in-depth documentation of Australian risk perceptions, public understandings, 
and psychosocial and behavioural responses to ‘climate change’ and natural disasters. 
3. To provide a national data base with respect to climate change risk perceptions, 
understandings, and psychosocial and behavioural responses. 
4. To provide a credible survey protocol and set of items and measures, reflecting standardised 
best practice where possible, which can be utilised in future studies to document important 
changes in risk perceptions, public understandings, and responses to climate change over 
time in Australia, with standardised items and measures allowing for comparison with North 
American and European research findings. 
5. To establish and document how these risk perceptions and understandings differ from risk 
perceptions and understandings regarding natural disasters and other salient risk domains, 
and to more extensively explore the nexus between climate change and other disaster risk 
domains in public risk perceptions and understandings. 
6. To research and document how differing mediating and moderating parameters and 
processes appear to be influencing climate change risk perceptions, understandings, and 
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responses, with particular attention being given to both established and less-researched 
aspects of strategic importance to climate change adaptation and mitigation.  [These include 
knowledge, risk appraisal, spatial and temporal distance, direct versus indirect experience, 
personal importance, environmental values, environmental concern, self-efficacy, 
experienced distress, psychological adaptation, belief/scepticism, trust, political affiliation, 
and motivational processes generally.] 
7. To establish and differentiate where possible the role and impacts of media coverage and 
social representations of ‘climate change’ in Australia (i.e., indirect, virtual, vicarious 
exposure to and ‘experience’ of the threat and unfolding impacts) as distinct from direct 
exposure and experience with environmental events or phenomenon perceived and 
understood as manifestations and/or consequences of climate change. 
8. To assess and document the self-reported psychological impacts of the perceived threat and 
unfolding impacts of climate change to compare and contrast with widely reported but 
largely anecdotal accounts of climate change anxiety and distress. 
9. To examine whether there exist noteworthy differences across Australia’s geographic and 
urban-rural regions with respect to risk perceptions, public understandings, and responses to 
climate change, with consideration also given to conventional socio-economic and 
demographic parameters (age, education, gender, income, national origin, residential status 
and duration, occupation). 
10. To provide a more comprehensive examination and data base of risk perceptions, public 
understandings, and responses to climate change in the Southeast corner of Queensland, 
(through oversampling, face-to-face interviews following survey completion, and focus-
group exploration) to address current under-emphases in other ongoing Griffith Climate 
Change Response Program and NCCARF research initiatives with respect to psychological 
considerations generally, and to enhance collaborative and comparative research options 
and reported study findings syntheses. 
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GLOSSARY 
This research and report reflects a psychological and social science perspective in addressing 
public risk perceptions, understandings, and responses to the threat of climate change.  There 
is no question but that language use and meaning issues have frustrated interdisciplinary 
collaborations and communication in this profoundly important area of research.  We have 
therefore attempted to provide a working glossary for readers of this report who have only a 
passing familiarity with some of the language and terminology which has been used.  But, to 
the extent possible, we have attempted to use a relatively jargon-free and reader-friendly 
language in the reporting and interpretation of the research findings.  A particular challenge, 
however, has been that differing disciplines are at times using identical words and language 
but invoking very different levels of analysis and making very different assumptions about a 
number of core constructs and processes which are at the heart of much climate change 
science research, particularly where this involves the ‘human dimensions’ of global climate 
change.  These terms and underlying constructs include climate change adaptation, 
mitigation, vulnerability, resilience, and other core constructs, variables, and processes.  Such 
terms and constructs have been given particular emphasis in this glossary, hopefully allowing 
readers to better appreciate and understand important commonalities as well as differences in 
such language use and meaning as one moves from the natural and physical sciences to the 
social and behavioural sciences. 
Acceptance:  While survey items reflect the prevailing use of ‘belief’ in this climate change 
research context, acceptance of the reality of this current phenomenon and risk arguably 
better reflects and captures the cognitive and emotional processes and responses involved in 
public responses to climate change, and the risk representation and communication nature of 
most social representations of climate change (Authors).  
Acute environmental hazard or disaster:  Acute environmental disasters are sudden, 
extreme, environmental phenomena or life-changing events, such as cyclones, bushfires, or 
tsunamis, which occur with little or no warning and impact a large number of people (Bell, 
Greene, Fisher, & Baum, 2001). 
Acute (environmental) stress:  An immediate state of arousal during which a person feels 
that he or she does not have the resources available to meet the environmental demands 
placed upon him or her (APA, 2009). 
Adaptation (conventional climate change science context):  Adaptation with respect to 
human systems is understood and conceptualised in very structural terms by the IPCC. 
“Adaptation is the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climate stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” 
(IPCC, Parry et al., 2007, p. 27).  “Adaptation strategies for human settlements, large and 
small, include assuring effective governance, increasing the resilience of physical and linkage 
infrastructures, changing settlement locations over a period of time, changing settlement 
form, reducing heat-island effects, reducing emissions and industry effluents as well as 
improving water handling, providing financial mechanisms for increasing resiliency, 
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targeting assistance programmes for especially impacted segments of the population, and 
adopting sustainable community development practices” (IPCC, Parry et al., 2007, p. 381). 
“Adaptation in the context of human dimensions of global change usually refers to a process, 
action or outcome in a system (household, community, group, sector, region, country) in 
order for the system to better cope with, manage or adjust to some changing condition, stress, 
hazard, risk, or opportunity” (Smit & Wandel, 2006, p. 282). 
Adaptation (psychological):  Psychological adaptation in the context of climate change 
refers to those within individual adjustments and changes in risk perception, threat appraisal, 
and associated cognitive, emotional, and motivational responses to the threat and perceived 
physical environmental impacts of climate change, as well as to altered behavioural responses 
and engagements associated with such changed thinking, feeling, and motivational responses.  
Psychological adaptation also and necessarily refers to those underlying psychological 
processes mediating and moderating such individual change (e.g., emotion management, self 
perception, self-efficacy, protection motivation, coping strategies), as well as to the achieved 
state of relative balance with respect to own needs and environmental press or threat.  
Psychological adaptation in the context of climate change can also encompass community 
and societal changes in how the phenomenon and threat of climate change is perceived, 
understood, and responded to in terms of shared understandings and collective behaviour 
change and adjustment, and the respective sense-making social psychological processes 
involved such as social comparison, social construction, social representation, and the social 
amplification of risk (Reser, Bradley, & Ellul, 2012).
Adaptive capacity:  “The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate 
variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, 
or to cope with the consequences” (IPCC, 2007, p. 869). 
Adaptive capacity (psychological):  Having the ability and resources (psychological, social, 
community, economic, etc.) to adjust to, adapt to, and cope with the impacts of climate 
change (APA, 2009). 
Adjustment:  Changing one’s situation or life circumstances to achieve a desired outcome in 
relation to one’s perception of threats and changing circumstances, particularly through direct 
action and/or alteration of one’s immediate environment.  Often adjustment is contrasted with 
adaptation, with the former emphasizing external changes and the latter emphasizing internal 
responses (APA, 2009). 
Anticipatory coping:  See ‘proactive coping’.
Anthropogenic:  Made by people or resulting from human activities. Usually used in the 
context of emissions that are produced as a result of human activities (APA, 2009).  See 
‘forcing’. 
Appraisal:  Within psychology appraisal refers to subjective sense making and evaluation by 
an individual or group of individuals, of a situation, threat, or response options.  Threat
appraisal is, for example a core construct and process in stress and coping models in 
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personality and social psychology and environmental risk appraisal is a core process in 
environmental psychology.  This latter phrase and construct differs from environmental risk 
assessment which is a more formal and systematic process undertaken by experts (e.g., 
Gifford, 2007). 
Attitude:  A general and enduring positive or negative feeling and evaluation about some 
person, object, or thing, often including a motivational disposition (Bohner & Dickel, 2011; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). 
Attribution:  “Ascription of an effect to a cause” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). 
Attribution theories: Theoretical approaches concerning individuals’ explanations for why 
an event occurred and/or who was responsible for causing it. These theories examine the 
kinds of information people use to determine causality, the kinds of causes they distinguish, 
and the rules and psychological processes that lead from information to inferred cause. (APA, 
2009) 
Behavioural engagement:  Behavioural involvement in an activity or course of action, as 
distinct from a motivation or intention to take a particular action (Authors). 
Belief: “Trust, confidence, faith; mental acceptance of a statement, fact, doctrine, thing, etc., 
as true or existing; the thing believed; a proposition or set of propositions held to be true” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). 
Beliefs:  “As used by social psychologists, beliefs represent people’s information about 
themselves and about their social and non-social environment.  A belief associates an object 
with a certain attribute.  Beliefs are formed as a result of direct experience, on the basis of 
second-hand information received from various sources, and by means of logical or quasi-
logical inference from other information about the object” (Ajzen, 1996, p. 89).  Beliefs are 
typically understood as more fundamental and important working perceptions and 
assumptions about the nature of the world and its phenomena than are opinions or attitudes 
(Authors). 
Chronic (environmental) stress:  Chronic stress is a long lasting state of arousal during 
which a person typically feels that he or she doesn’t have the resources available to meet all 
of the demands placed upon him or her (APA, 2009). 
Chronic environmental stressor:  Continuous stressful events or prolonged and adverse 
environmental conditions such as drought or a contaminated housing estate or mining region 
are viewed as chronic or ongoing stressors and are not event-specific.  Ambient stressors are 
a type of chronic stressor particularly characteristic of environmental stressors.  Ambient 
stressors can represent regional conditions of the environment, such as pollution or toxicity, 
that affect a large number of people but that may not be considered acute because they 
approximate low level background noise and may go unnoticed either because they are subtle 
or because people habituate to them (e.g. Adeola, 2000; Edelstein, 2002).  Climate change 
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can be understood as an ongoing environmental stressor encompassing periodic acute stressor 
events (Reser & Swim, 2011). 
Climate: The mean and variability of, for instance, temperature, precipitation, cloud cover, 
and wind or broadly the state of the atmosphere (gaseous envelope surrounding the earth), 
hydrosphere (water on the surface of the earth), cryosphere (snow, ice, and permafrost on and 
beneath the surface of the earth and ocean), land surface, and biosphere (ecosystems and 
organisms living in the atmosphere, land, and oceans) (APA, 2009). 
Climate change:  In IPCC current usage climate change refers to any change in climate over 
time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.  This usage differs 
from that in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, where climate change refers to a 
change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that is in addition 
to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods (IPCC, 2012).  
Climate change concern:  Dictionary definitions of concern or ‘being concerned’ make 
reference to descriptors such as being interested, involved, troubled, and anxious (e.g., OED).  
In a psychological context and with respect to the threat of climate change, concern relates to 
the cognitive and emotional accompaniments of climate change threat exposure and 
appraisal, such as moderate preoccupation, and ongoing worry and anxiety (Authors). 
Climate change distress:  Climate change distress is defined for the purpose of this research 
as experienced apprehension, anxiety, sorrow, or loss due to the threat and projected 
consequences of climate change, for oneself, humanity, and/or the natural world.  Such 
distress might well take the form of preoccupation, heightened worry and fear, and/or 
pessimism with respect to being able to adequately address this seemingly profound 
environmental and social problem and issue (Authors). 
‘Climate change’, ‘global climate change’ (social science):  The shared risk perceptions 
and understandings that people have of what ‘climate change’ is, including both the 
threatening changes in global climatic patterns and diverse impacts, the consequences of such 
changes, and other implications for known natural and human environments, as represented 
and communicated by multimedia, through interpersonal communications, and through direct 
experience (Authors). 
Collective coping:  Social-based coping strategies such as community responses to deal with 
the experience or prospect of drought (APA, 2009). 
Collective efficacy:  A collective’s or group’s perception of its ability and capacity to meet 
environmental demands (APA, 2009). 
Connectedness to nature:  A sense of personal emotional bond with the natural environment 
(APA, 2009). 
Coping:  “Coping is a process integral to adaptation and development.  Coping is often 
defined as ‘constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external 
and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person’ 
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(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141).  Closely related terms include stress, stressor, stressful 
life events, defense, challenge, threat, adversity, risk, resilience, mastery, vulnerability, 
thriving, hardiness, and social support” (Skinner, 2001, p. 2761).  
Coping appraisals:  Appraising or evaluating the coping responses one might make to the 
stressor in terms of, for example, self-efficacy, the ability to carry out the coping response, or 
response efficacy, the likelihood that the response will have the desired outcome (APA, 
2009). 
Coping responses:  Behaviours, cognitions, and regulatory mechanisms that a person uses to 
respond to a stressor.  Coping responses may be aimed at managing and resolving a stressor 
or at ameliorating its negative emotional or bodily effects, for example by re-appraising the 
significance or personal relevance of a threat or by confronting the perceived cause of the 
problem (APA, 2009). 
Coping resources:  Properties of individuals (e.g., self-efficacy), their social environment 
(e.g., social support), and physical environment (e.g., privacy affordances) that enable 
individuals and communities to respond to stressors (Authors). 
Distancing, discounting:  The tendency to reduce the importance of a threat or outcome with 
greater perceived ‘distance’ (temporally, socially, geographically, and probabilistically) 
(APA, 2009). 
Dread risk:  A particular type of risk associated with "perceived lack of control, dread, 
catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and 
benefits." (Slovic, 1987)  This perceived characteristic of risk domains, such as nuclear 
radiation and technological hazards, is thought to constitute a fundamental dimension in 
human perception of and response to various risk domains.
Environmental hazards, disasters:  “Environmental hazards are defined as extreme events 
or substances in the earth and its ecological system that may cause adverse effects to humans 
and things they value.  Environmental hazards include geophysical and meteorological 
phenomena such as earthquakes, droughts, and hurricanes, often called ‘natural hazards’, as 
well as pollution problems and other ‘technological’ hazards.  Most scholars agree that an 
event does not become a hazard until humans are exposed to it, and thus that hazards result 
from the interaction of humans and extreme events” (Liverman, 2001, p. 4656). 
Environmental hyperopia:  A now well-documented form of far-sightedness with respect to 
environmental risk and environmental problems, with many people perceiving environmental 
problems to be more serious at a distant and global level.  Unfortunately this inverse distance 
effect is paralleled by an inverse relationship between felt responsibility and self-efficacy on 
the one hand and distance, with distant and global problems tending to be viewed as the 
responsibility of others and not something which an individual can do much about in their 
own local region or country (Uzzell, 2000).  Global climate change is arguably a classic 
instance of such environmental hyperopia, with the magnitude of the problem acknowledged 
at a global level but with this perceived risk minimized at a local level. 
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Environmental impacts (geophysical and biophysical):  The expression ‘environmental 
impacts’ while encompassing the projected or actual consequences of interventions, human 
uses, or naturally occurring events for both natural and human environments, tends to be used 
primarily in the context of direct or indirect causal impacts on natural environments.  When 
speaking of global climate change, what is often being referred to are the projected or 
unfolding geophysical and biophysical environmental impacts of changing climate patterns 
(Authors). 
Environmental impacts (human settings):  The physical environment also encompasses 
human made and designed ‘built environments’ or ‘human settings’ including all human 
modified physical environments.  The projected impacts of global climate change will 
undoubtedly have dramatic impacts on human settlements and infrastructure throughout 
much of the world (Authors).
Environmental impacts (psychosocial):  Psychosocial impacts refer to the consequences of 
an introduced intervention or natural change in an environmental system or setting, which is 
being experienced at individual, institutional, or community levels.  Such impacts can be 
primary (first-hand) and immediate in terms of direct local weather related encounters and 
experiences, or secondary, in terms of longer term impacts resulting from and mediated by 
climate-driven changes in regional geophysical or biophysical environments and ecosystems, 
such as altered growing seasons or water scarcity.  What differentiates psychological impacts 
from conventional social impacts is that these impacts are individual level, experience-based 
consequences and emotional responses such as pessimism or optimism, psychological 
mediated conditions such as panic attacks or subjective well being, as well as a spectrum of 
experiential states ranging from concern, to enthusiasm, to vigilance, to enjoyment, to 
enhanced appreciation or understanding (Reser & Bentruperbäumer, 2001).   
Environmental psychology:  The study of the transactions between individuals and their 
physical settings. In these transactions, individuals change their environments, and their 
behavior and experiences are changed by their environments.  Environmental psychology 
includes theory, research, and practice aimed at making the built environment more humane 
and better understanding and improving our relationship with the natural environment 
(Gifford, 2007; Gifford, Steg & Reser, 2010). 
Environmental risk:  “The product of a hazard and the likelihood of it occurring, using a 
simple formula that defines a risk as the product of the probability an event and its severity 
measured in terms of the population exposed, and the nature of the consequences” (Liverman, 
2001, p. 4656). 
Environmental significance:  A shortened reference to environmentally significant 
behaviour (below).  From a psychological perspective, ‘environmental significance’ typically 
refers to perceived or judged consequences for the natural environment. 
Environmentally significant behaviour (ESB):  Environmentally significant behaviour is 
an expression used to identify and distinguish those individual behaviours and actions that 
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can make a substantive difference in terms of reducing adverse human impacts on the natural 
environment (e.g., Gardner & Stern, 2002, 2008).   
Environmental stress:  Adverse individual and community impacts as a result of both acute 
and chronic environmental stressors, including multiple and interacting stressors in the 
extended environment (e.g., noise, crowding, traffic congestion, pollution, contamination, 
natural and technological disaster events, and environmental threat) (APA, 2009). 
Environmental stressor:  In the context of human considerations and psychology an 
environmental stressor refers to any force or event in the human or natural environment that 
may cause a person to experience stress.  Some examples of environmental stressors include: 
noise, air pollution, crowding, traffic congestion, terrorism, natural disasters and extremes of 
temperature.  Studies on the effect of different environmental stressors on people indicate that 
they can impact people's behavior, mood, cognitive function, physical health and/or 
psychological well-being (Authors). 
Exposure:  The condition of being exposed to or vulnerable to risks, especially to severe 
weather or other forces of nature (Authors). “The presence of people; livelihoods; 
environmental services and resources; infrastructure; or economic, social, or cultural assets in 
places that could be adversely affected.”(IPCC, 2012, p. 3) 
Extreme weather events:  “Extreme weather events are meteorological, hydrological, 
climatological, or related incidents that cause widespread damage, either in terms of human 
lives, property damage, or both.  These events range in effect and scope.  Some examples of 
extreme events can be listed as winter weather, heat waves, floods, drought, dust storms, 
wildfires, tropical cyclones, hurricanes, and tornadoes.  These events are relatively commonly 
occurring events.  What makes them extreme is the severity of their impact” (Simpson, 
Weissbecker & Sephton, 2011, p. 58) 
Forcing:  Any imposed mechanism that forces climate to change.  Natural forcing of climate 
change results from volcanic eruptions and solar variability; human-made or anthropogenic 
forcing of climate change comes from behaviours that influence the emissions of greenhouse 
gases (APA, 2009). 
Global warming:  Literally one of the more salient and consequential impacts and mediating 
processes of current global climate change, but used by many, particularly in North America, 
as a synonymous expression for global climate change (APA, 2009). 
Habituation:  A decrease in response to repeated stimulation. Response decrements due to 
altered sensitivity of receptors are often termed receptor adaptation (APA, 2009). 
Human dimensions of global change:  The common name for a number of international 
organisations which have a shared research focus on the human impacts on and of changing 
natural and human environments across the world.  These include the International Human 
Dimension Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP) established by the 
International Council for Science in 1996, and the Board on Environmental Change and 
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Society: Division of Behavioral and Social Science and Education within The National 
Academies.  These umbrella organisations and others have fostered research and policy 
initiatives addressing human aspects of global climate change for well over the past two 
decades (Authors). 
Hybrid disaster:  A hybrid disaster is a disaster which is characterized by characteristics of 
both natural and technological disasters and typically the result of both natural and human 
causes.  A hybrid disaster can occur when a natural disaster results in greater damages as a 
result of human causes or when a technological disaster results in greater impacts as a result 
of an accompanying natural event or process, as in the case of Fukushima.  Some phenomena 
and risk domains appear to have both natural and human causal elements, as in the case of 
contemporary climate change, considered by many to be a global disaster. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):  The main international body 
established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Program to assess climate change science and provide advice to the 
international community.  The IPCC is an international group of scientists who summarize 
the current understanding of climate change and predict how climate may evolve.  The 
purpose of the IPCC reports is to give policy makers and other interested parties an in-depth, 
authoritative view of the state of scientific knowledge about climate change, making possible 
more-informed climate-related decisions.  The IPCC does not recommend specific policies, 
but is restricted to describing scientific knowledge and its limitations (APA, 2009). 
Knowledge:  An important aspect of knowledge is coming to understand, and the fact of 
understanding, or the state of being aware and informed of something (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2002).  Knowledge is more than the content of what is known, and more than 
what can be accessed or communicated.  While a particular aspect of knowledge, such as 
understanding a particular branch of learning, or public understanding of science, is often 
emphasised in discussions of climate change knowledge, knowledge of climate change can 
constitute or include important aspects of experiential learning, tacit knowledge, emotional 
knowledge, symbolic associations, and cultural knowledge.  Public knowledge and 
understandings of ‘climate change’ can incorporate, but may be very different from 
knowledge of climate change science, or climate change science accounts and explanations of 
climate change (Routledge, 2000).   
Meaning making:  “A coping strategy that involves trying to see the positive or meaningful 
aspects of the stressful situation, especially with severe or chronic stressors.  It is sometimes 
referred to as cognitive reappraisal” (Aldwin & Yancura, 2004, p. 507). 
Mitigation:  With regard to climate change, any human action that reduces the sources of or 
enhances the sinks of greenhouse gases. Emissions can be decreased by a variety of means 
such as lowering energy demands, making existing energy systems more efficient, increasing 
the contribution of renewable forms of energy production, and afforestation or stopping 
deforestation (APA, 2009). 
Climate Change Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses 
290 
 
Primary appraisal:  Individual judgments of the degree of threat, harm, or challenge 
represented by the potentially stressful event (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Taylor & 
Aspinwall, 1996, p. 79). 
Proactive coping:  “The process of proactive coping involves anticipating and/or detecting 
potential stressors and acting in advance either to prevent them altogether or to mute their 
impact.  As such, proactive coping blends activities typically considered to be coping 
(activities undertaken to master, reduce or tolerate environmental or intrapsychic demands 
perceived as representing potential threat, existing harm, or loss) with those considered to be 
self-regulation (the processes through which people control, direct, and correct their own 
actions as they move toward or away from various goals).  Proactive coping combines these 
two processes by examining people’s emotions, thoughts, and behaviours as they anticipate 
and address potential sources of adversity that might interfere with the pursuit of their goals” 
Aspinwall, 2011, p. 334-335).  
Protection motivation:  Protection motivation is an umbrella term for a number of 
psychological processes and convergent theoretical formulations that address how 
psychological responses to threat and risk tend to serve protective or defensive functions.  
Protection motivation theories give particular attention to threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal, i.e., to ascertaining how severe or likely a threat is, and to what can be done about 
it, with what prospect of success.  Protection motivation is the result of the threat appraisal 
and the coping appraisal.  The theory argues that people are highly motivated to appraise 
threats, and what can or cannot be done, in functional and self-serving ways that allow 
individuals to manage anxiety, uncertainty, and fear, whether or not such responses are 
ultimately adaptive or maladaptive.  Protection motivation approaches are in many ways 
similar to and draw from both psychodynamic and more cognitive stress and coping and self 
regulation approaches in psychology, and they have recently been used to address human 
responses and adaptations to the threat of climate change (Authors).
Psychological adaptation:  Psychological adaptation in the context of climate change refers 
to those within individual adjustments and changes in risk perception, threat appraisal, and 
associated cognitive, emotional, and motivational responses to the threat and perceived 
physical environmental impacts of climate change, as well as to altered behavioural responses 
and engagements associated with such changed thinking, feeling, and motivational responses.  
Psychological adaptation also and necessarily refers to those underlying psychological 
processes mediating and moderating such individual change (e.g., emotion management, self 
perception, self-efficacy, protection motivation, coping strategies), as well as to the achieved 
state of relative balance [equilibrium, congruence] with respect to own needs and 
environmental press and/or threat.  Psychological adaptation in the context of climate change 
can also encompass community and societal changes in how the phenomenon and threat of 
climate change is perceived, understood, and responded to in terms of shared understandings 
and collective behaviour change and adjustment, and the respective sense-making social 
psychological processes involved such as social construction, social representation, and the 
social amplification of risk (Reser et al., 2012). 
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Psychological vulnerability:  Psychological vulnerability relates to one’s subjective 
experience of being exposed to or susceptible to particular risks or dangers, and hence can be 
closely interconnected with risk perception and threat appraisal.  Psychological vulnerability 
can also refer to one’s lack of defences or resilience to environmental stressors and 
susceptibility to adverse psychological impacts (Authors). 
Psychosocial impacts:  The psychological and social consequences of an introduced 
intervention or natural change in the environment.  Psychosocial impacts occur at the level of 
individual or shared experience (e.g., of households or community) and entail consequences 
such as distress or anxiety, heightened environmental concerns, and optimism or pessimism 
about the future (APA, 2009). 
Psychosocial environmental impact assessment (PSIA):  Psychosocial impact assessment 
is a more inclusive framing and formal evaluation of how proposed interventions potentially 
affecting biophysical environments, human-designed environments, and social environments 
impact on people and individual and community experience and behaviour (Reser & 
Bentrupperbäumer, 2001; 2005). 
Psychological preparedness: Psychological preparedness is a psychological state of 
awareness, anticipation, and heightened vigilance, and readiness - an internal, primed, 
capacity to anticipate, identify and manage the requirements of an emergency situation and 
one’s own psychological response and those of others in an emergency situation (Reser & 
Morrissey, 2008).  
Public understandings:  Public understandings are lay understandings, explanations, and 
causal accounts of particular risks, events, phenomena, or wider societal or environmental 
changes.  Public understandings encompass more than opinions, attitudes or specific 
knowledge and include shared beliefs, values, cultural assumptions, and symbolic 
associations and meanings (Authors).
Resilience (Psychological):  Individual, collective, or group patterns of successful adaptation 
(in the context of significant risk or adversity.)  Enduring the temporary upheaval of loss or 
potentially traumatic events well, with no apparent disruption in ability to function, and 
moving on to new challenges with apparent ease.  Resilience typically arises from the 
operation of common human adaptation processes rather than from rare or extraordinary 
processes (APA, 2009). 
Resilience (Climate change, disaster context):  Within the climate change science and non-
psychological disaster preparedness and response literatures, resilience is a system attribute, 
typically with no reference made to psychological considerations or individual level analysis, 
although at times used in the context of social systems.  “The ability of a system and its 
component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a 
hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the 
preservation, restoration, or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions.” 
(IPCC, 2012, p. 3). “Resilience is the ability of a social system to respond and recover from 
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disasters and includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to absorb impacts and 
cope with an event, as well as post event adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the 
social system to re-organize, change, and learn in response to a threat” (Cutter et al., 2008, p. 
599). 
Risk: A situation or event in which something of human value (including human lives, social 
stability, and well being) has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain (APA, 
2009). 
Risk appraisal:  Individual or public subjective evaluations of the magnitude, probability, or 
personal or household vulnerability to a perceived risk (APA, 2009). 
Risk assessment:  A more formal and objective assessment of risk by experts, against 
established criteria, to an environment, environmental attribute, or community or group of 
people (e.g., Gifford, 2007; O’Riordan, 1995).  
Risk perception:  Subjective belief (whether rational or irrational) held by an individual, 
group, or society about the chance of occurrence of a risk or about the extent, timing, or 
consequences of its effect(s) (APA, 2009).  “The awareness or impression of a risk to health 
or the environment adopted by the public and/or media and/or pressure groups.  It may or 
may not relate to scientific risk assessment, but it is important in influencing policy makers 
and regulators and hence is a driving force in risk management” (Calow, 1998, p. 644). 
Secondary appraisals:  Individual assessment of one’s ability to manage a stressor (Taylor 
& Aspinwall, 1996, p. 81). 
Self efficacy:  “Perceived self-efficacy is concerned with people’s beliefs in their capabilities 
to exercise control over their own functioning and over environmental events”(Bandura, 
2001, p. 13820). 
Sense making:  Sense making is a fundamental motivational imperative in human behaviour, 
and of particular relevance to risk perception, threat appraisal, public understandings, and 
adaptation to a profound threat such as climate change.  Core considerations in making sense 
of a phenomenon such as climate change relate to causal accounts or explanations, the role of 
human agency, world views, and what these projected environmental changes mean in terms 
of human and environmental consequences.  Fostering public engagement with climate 
change requires an appreciation that the world’s publics are attempting to make personal and 
collective sense of this complex phenomenon, threat, and set of issues, and that such sense 
making, and changed ways of thinking about, feeling about, and understanding climate 
change, are powerful aspects of psychological and social adaptation to climate change 
(Authors; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). 
Social adaptation:  Continually adjusting group or community level responses to concerns 
and perceptions of threats and changing circumstances.  Examples include group level sense-
making, adjusting explanations, responsibility attributions, meta-narratives, shared accounts, 
and social constructions of climate change as a risk domain (APA, 2009). 
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Social amplification of risk:  The intensification of perceptions of risk and its management 
via communication processes including the way that risk signals (images, signs, symbols) are 
disseminated via psychological, social, institutional, or cultural processes (APA, 2009). 
Social impact assessment (SIA):  “SIA can be defined as the process of assessing or 
estimating the social consequences likely to follow specific policy actions or project 
development, particularly in the context of national, state or provincial government policy 
legislation.  Social impacts include all social or cultural consequences to human populations 
of any public or private actions that alter how people live, work, play, relate to one another, 
organise to meet their needs and generally cope as members of society” (Burdge & Vanclay, 
1995). 
Social representation(s):  “Systems of values, ideas and practices” that “enable individuals 
to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it” and “enable 
communication to take place amongst members of a community by providing them with a 
code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various 
aspects of their world and their individual and group history.”  Social representations are built 
on shared knowledge and understanding of common reality. In the context of climate change, 
social representations include media coverage, articles, books, magazines, documentary and 
popular culture films, research findings, collective knowledge, and public discourse about 
climate change and its nature, causes and consequences (APA, 2009). 
Stress:  A process that occurs when there is an imbalance between environmental demands 
and response capabilities of the organism (Evans & Cohen, 1987, p. 573; Lazarus, 1966; 
Lazarus & Launier, 1978). 
Stressor:  “Conditions of threat, demands, or structural constraints that, by the very fact of 
their occurrence of existence, call into question the operating integrity of the organism” 
(Wheaton, 1996, p. 32). 
Symbolic coping:  The process of appropriating the novel and unfamiliar in order to make it 
intelligible and communicable.  This includes sense-making such as naming the novel and 
attributing characteristics which allow the phenomenon to be talked about.  In this 
understanding symbolic coping is the collective activity of a group struggling to maintain the 
integrity of its worldview which is also crucial for social identity (APA, 2009). 
Threat appraisal:  Evaluating the extent to which an upcoming situation exceeds the 
perceptions of abilities or resources needed to cope.  Threat appraisals differ from challenge 
appraisals where one anticipates that one has sufficient abilities and resources needed to cope 
and differs from harm/loss appraisals that occur after an event occurs (APA, 2009). 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:  An international 
environmental treaty set out to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in order to combat 
global climate change.  It was agreed upon at the Earth Summit, staged in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, in June 1992 (APA, 2009). 
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Values:  “Values are and represent important individual and collective investments and 
judgments about what in this world and in this life is truly important, worthwhile, and 
meaningful – indeed what ‘has value’ and what are ‘core values’ and guiding principles for 
human society.  Values, as distinct from other beliefs and attitudes, have been conceptualised 
and understood as more fundamental and enduring convictions, having strong emotional 
and/or moral overtones, and as providing for shared world views, social and moral orders, 
and ethical, justice, and legislative considerations”. Values are often discussed in the context 
of climate change, but personal and societal environmental values are rarely distinguished 
from political ideologies and world views. (Reser & Bentrupperbäumer, 2005, p. 128-129; 
Schmuck & Schultz, 2002). 
Vicarious exposure and experience:  Exposure through empathy and/or identification with 
others who are experiencing or who have experienced extreme or tragic events, either through 
direct interpersonal communication and observation, or through observation of media 
coverage of crucial events and crises (Authors). 
Virtual exposure and experience:  Exposure and indirect experience through multi-media 
coverage of an extreme event and others’ experience, and felt empathy, sympathy, or 
identification with victims (Authors). 
Vulnerability (climate change science context):  “Vulnerability is the degree to which a 
system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including 
climate variability and extremes.  Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude and 
rate of climate change and the variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its 
adaptive capacity” (IPCC, Parry et al., 2007, p. 27). 
Vulnerability (social science use and meaning):  The extent to which systems and 
individuals are susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change.  
Vulnerability is a function of the characteristics of climate change impacts (e.g., its 
magnitude and rate of change) and variation in systems and individuals (e.g., degree of 
exposure to climate change impacts, individual and community adaptive capacity, and 
connectedness to communities) (APA, 2009). 
Worldview:  “An integrated set of beliefs about what is real, what is knowable, what is 
valuable, and what it means to be human, typically learned as part of a cultural socialization” 
(Clayton & Myers, 2009, p. 212).
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